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Abstract
Individuals use their cognitive abilities to make decisions, with the ultimate goal of improving
their status. Decisions outcomes are used to learn the association between the decisions
which lead to good results and those resulting in punishing outcomes. These associations
might not be easily inferable because of environmental complexity or noisy feedback. Tasks
in which outcomes probabilities are known are termed “decisions under risk”. Researchers
have consistently showed that people are risk averse when choosing among options featuring
gains, while they are risk seeking when making decisions about options featuring losses.
When the probabilities of the options are not clearly stated the task is known as “decisions
under ambiguity”. In this type of task individuals face an exploration-exploitation trade off:
to maximise their profit they need to choose the best option but at the same time they need to
discover which option leads to the best outcome by trial-and-error. The process of knowledge
acquisition by interaction with the environment is called adaptive learning.
Evidence from literature points in the direction of unskilled investors behaviour being
consistent with naive reinforcement learning, simply adjusting their preference for which
option to choose based on its recent outcomes. Experimental data from a binary choice
task and a quasi-field scenario is used to test a combination of Reinforcement Learning and
Prospect Theory. Both the investigations include reinforcement learning models featuring
specific parameters which can be tuned to describe individual learning decision-making
strategies. The first part is focused on integrating the two computational models, the second
on testing it on a more realistic scenario. The results indicate that the combination of
Reinforcement Learning and Prospect Theory could be a descriptive account of decision-
making in binary decision tasks. A two-state space configuration, together with a non-
saturating reward function appears to be the best setup to capture behaviour in said task.
Moreover, analysing the parameters of the models it becomes evident that payoff variability
has an impact on speed of learning and randomness of choice. The same modelling approach
fails to capture behaviour in a more complex task, indicating that more complex models might
be needed to provide a computational account of decisions from experience in non-trivial
tasks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A toddler struggles to stand on her own two feet, balancing the weight above the hips to
avoid tumbling. A few months later this process is refined, the challenge is now coordinating
her steps to avoid tripping. A few years later the same child, on her first bike ride, will learn
to adjust her equilibrium to get rid of the stabilisers. All these tasks are completely new to
the child but she manages nonetheless to master each task.
A Formula 1 driver is testing the car on a new track, the lap-time is quite poor and
she almost loses control of the vehicle at a chicane. After a two-days practice session, her
lap-time has improved by several seconds, her driving has become more precise, allowing
higher speeds through the chicane.
A hungry monkey found some palm nuts but these have a hard shell which cannot be
opened by hand. By exploring the environment, the monkey learns that it is possible to crush
the shell and recover the nut and that a big rock is required to do so. Instruments and tools
are often used by primates for provisioning. Also, they learn to assess if a nut is ready to be
opened or not by tapping on its shell and listening to the sound it makes, leaving it to dry in
the sun in case it is not dry enough. This behaviour shows highly complex use of information
previously acquired.
The previous examples are all instances of a learning process, that combines newly
acquired information with existing knowledge to improve the outcome of ones behaviour.
The ability to learn is one of the defining features of animals (including humans) and more
recently, machines as well. From an ecological point of view, both humans and animals
are capable of adapting to their environment by changing their behaviour, with the goal of
increasing their chance of survival and reproduction. Quite interestingly, this process is
commonly carried out under uncertainty, in environments that can only partially be observed.
The toddler doesn’t know what happens when shifting her weight off balance and will learn
that toppling over on her head is associated with undesirable pain, a form of punishment.
2 Introduction
The Formula 1 driver is rewarded with faster lap times after practising driving to improve the
trajectory of the curve, but if the car is crashed in the process, the driver will learn a very
expensive lesson on how not to approach a curve.
Learning is a complex process involving many areas of the brain, bringing together mem-
ory, reasoning, uncertainty evaluation and eventually judgement. Researchers from different
fields of research are trying to understand learning and decision-making, by analysing these
at different levels of detail. Trying to describe, replicate or predict human behaviour has
been historically the ultimate goal of many disciplines. Economics for example, has a long
tradition of trying to encapsulate behaviours into formal descriptive or normative models. For
example, Expected Utility hypothesis has been employed for several years (von Neumann
and Morgenstern [1947]) but has been shown to be inadequate, giving rise to new trends like
behavioural economics (Kahneman and Tversky [1979]; Starmer [2000]). Psychology is
intrinsically concerned with decision-making. Behavioural psychologists for example, have
been using sequential decision problems to evaluate people’s risk attitude (Frey et al. [2015];
Kahneman and Tversky [1979]; Pleskac [2008]; Wallsten et al. [2005]), in order to predict
actual proneness to risk in real-life scenarios (Hoffrage et al. [2003]; Lejuez et al. [2003a,b,
2002]; Wallsten et al. [2005]). While economics and psychology are focused on the emerging
manifestations of decision-making and its implications, neuroscience is a field of research
which aims to understand the biological structure and the mechanisms underpinning human
and animal decision-making (Barraclough et al. [2004]; Britten et al. [1996, 1992]; Gold and
Shadlen [2001, 2002, 2007]; Shadlen et al. [1996]; Shadlen and Newsome [1996]).
Recently these fields of research have started to cooperate, contributing to the rise of
a new multi-disciplinary field called Neuroeconomics (Glimcher and Rustichini [2004];
Loewenstein et al. [2008]; Sanfey et al. [2006]). These disciplines approach the problem
from different perspectives and levels of abstraction but, under the new paradigm, they
influence each other to achieve a unified account of how humans or animals make decisions.
This emerging discipline of research has great potential for understanding and describing
behaviour, but faces the challenge of satisfying different points of view in its investigations.
Understanding the decision-making process could help improve people’s welfare. For
example, knowing how people perceive health risks related to medical treatments and how
they act accordingly, would allow policy makers to redesign the information campaigns to
have a better impact on people’s perception. People tend to dismiss warnings about global
warming levels and the impact their behaviour has on it; this could be changed by re-framing
the information with the objective of altering individuals behaviour and improving their
environmental awareness.
3The aim of this thesis is to improve the understanding of human decision-making. To do
so, the first part of this work attempts to model a binary decision task involving repeated non-
trivial choices, with computational models of learning and decision-making. Components
of prospect theory are integrated within the models developed to investigate whether this
could help better describe human behaviour. Moreover, a series of phenomena highlighted in
literature, linked to the perception of variability and how this appears to impair learning and
performance is investigated.
In the second part of this thesis, the work focuses on describing the choices made by a
set of players from an online financial trading simulation game. Using indications provided
by literature and previous studies concerning unskilled investors as a starting point, this work
attempts to model the transactions made by the players. The work presented in the second
part has been published in the proceedings of the 2016 IEEE Conference on Evolving and
Adaptive Intelligent Systems (EAIS), with the title “Modelling Stock-market Investors as
Reinforcement Learning Agents” (Pastore et al. [2015]).
The next chapters are organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides a detailed literature review
of the field of neuroeconomics, dissecting it from the perspective of each of the three fields:
Economics, Psychology and Neuroscience. A final section within this chapter is devoted to
introducing the computational modelling framework of reinforcement learning and some of
the models which will be adopted in this work and that are widely used in literature. Chapter
3 offers a deeper analysis of the experimental studies which this thesis uses as a starting point.
Furthermore, the details about the experimental setup for the data analysed in this thesis will
be presented in this chapter. Chapter 4 focuses on the proposed attempt to link prospect
theory and reinforcement learning and the investigation of phenomena relative to perception
and performance. Chapter 5 offers an attempt to generalise previous findings by testing the
insights deriving from the experimental study to a quasi-field task. In Chapter 6 we conclude,
discussing the limitations of the present work and the potential future extensions which can
help improve this work.

Chapter 2
Literature Review
Human behaviour was thought to be rational for a long time but empirical evidence, in
many instances, proved this assumption to be wrong. The causes of the irrational choices
observed in literature have been identified in multiple documented biases and phenomena;
in fact, distortions of information perception and representation can lead to incoherent
behaviour. An example is the “recency bias”, consisting in relying on partial information
deriving from undersampling (Erev and Roth [2014]; Hau et al. [2010, 2008]; Hertwig
et al. [2004]; Hertwig and Erev [2009]; Hertwig and Pleskac [2010]; Plonsky et al. [2015];
Tversky and Kahneman [1974]) Other causes of irrational behaviour are “framing”, an
instance of emotional modulation (Benartzi and Thaler [2007]; Kahneman and Tversky
[1979]; Tversky and Kahneman [1981]), and “mental accounting”, which involves treating
money as if belonging to different categories (Barber and Odean [2013]; Benartzi and Thaler
[1995, 2007]; Camerer [1999]; Hsu and Chow [2013]; Shefrin and Statman [1985]; Thaler
[1980, 1985, 1999]; Thaler et al. [1997]). Human behaviour has been the main concern of
disciplines such as Economics, Psychology and Neuroscience. These research areas share a
substantial interest in decision-making and learning; as a result, they started to collaborate and
influence each other. A summary of how each discipline proceeded to study the phenomena
associated with behaviour is presented in the following sections, and how their collaboration
has helped bridge the gaps in understanding learning and decision-making. In the last section
of this chapter we present a powerful adaptive learning computational framework called
Reinforcement Learning (RL), widely used both as a descriptive account of decision-making
in its many instances, and as computational mechanism for control tasks in engineering and
automation.
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2.1 Neuroeconomics
Neuroeconomics is a recent field of research which combines the effort of three prominent
research areas interested in behaviour: economics, psychology and neuroscience. These
operate at different levels of abstraction and detail. Historically, economists have tried to
formalise decision-making into theories to describe behaviour or to characterise the normative
approach. Often these theories would show lack of complexity or would make unrealistic
assumptions (Loewenstein et al. [2008]; Platt and Huettel [2008]) resulting in attempts to
extend their explanatory capacity. The attitude of researchers in psychology instead, is
rooted in empirical studies, delaying the formalisation of theories to when enough data
is gathered. The two disciplines have clear overlap of interests as their main focus is to
understand human behaviour. Thanks to the technological advancements in the late 20th
century, Neuroscience, the study of the brain and the nervous system, became a prominent
area of experimental research, deeply entangled with psychology. While neuroscience studies
the neural circuitry and the relative computations, psychology examines the emerging effects
of such computations. Even if these two research areas focus on different levels of detail,
they both share a great deal of interest in the study on human behaviour.
Following this outline, an example can help clarify how these three fields are intertwined.
When a traffic light turns yellow and it is about to turn red, a driver faces a choice whether
to help the inertia of the car by accelerating or to slow the vehicle to a stop before the
yellow light switches to red. The driver is facing a decision in which the outcomes are
potentially crashing her car for entering the intersection too late or losing a certain amount
of time at the stop. From the economics point of view, the driver’s behaviour is a utility
problem. It can be formalised to describe the observed behaviour or to develop a normative
account, to determine which course of actions will maximise the driver’s utility. If the
driver is incredibly late, speeding through might be considered, therefore taking the risk of
an accident to avoid a loss of time. Conversely, if the driver is in no rush, taking the risk
of an accident to save a few seconds is not a good idea. A psychologist’s point of view
instead, would consider whether ambiguity has a negative effect on the driver’s behaviour.
For example, testing whether the information about the probability of crashing for speeding
through an intersection would change the driver’s behaviour, making her more risk-averse.
Examining the same scenario at the lowest level of detail, it can be described as a stimulus
(i.e. yellow/red traffic light) perceived through the visual apparatus, elaborated by the brain
by combining previous experience and knowledge (e.g. past accidents and possible warning
road signs) with current information (e.g. distance from the crossing, current speed), and
resulting in the driver’s decision to push either pedal, to accelerate or break. These three
disciplines could benefit from each other, as they could inform each other, by sharing data,
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models and theories. Neuroeconomics is the attempt to do this, with the ultimate goal of
understanding and formalising behaviour, by making a wiser use of the resources and the
knowledge base from each of these fields. We will now present these disciplines in more
detail providing a summary of the research studies of interest for this work.
2.1.1 Economics Perspective
Expected Value Theory
A first attempt to formulate a decision theory to make optimal choices under uncertainty was
made by Blaise Pascal and Pierre Fermat during the 17th century. Their epistolary exchange
about the problem of points lead to both of them independently solving it (David [1962]).
The problem involves two players competing in a game of chance. They agree that the first
player to win a certain number of rounds wins the game, they both have the same probability
of winning a round and contribute evenly to the prize pot. The problem arises when, stopping
the game at any point before the end, the prize has to be divided between the players fairly.
A few years later, Christiaan Huygens wrote the “De ratiociniis in ludo aleae” 1 in which he
used Pascal’s and Fermat’s same principles to solve the problem of points, thus laying the
foundations of probability theory. The expected value, or “mathematical expectation” of a
random variable X (E[X ]), which can take N values x1, · · · ,xn with probabilities respectively
p1, · · · , pn is:
E[X ] = x1 p1+ x2 p2+ · · ·+ xn pn (2.1)
As an example, a common six-faced die can be seen as a random process in which the
potential outcomes are the values of the faces and the probability of each is 1/6 (being it a
fair die), then:
E[X ] = 1 · 1
6
+2 · 1
6
+3 · 1
6
+4 · 1
6
+5 · 1
6
+6 · 1
6
= 3.5 (2.2)
In this case the expected value is exactly the arithmetic mean but in a general case, when
the probabilities of the possible events are not all the same, the expected value becomes the
weighted average of the outcomes.
1tr. On Reasoning in Games of Chance
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Expected Utility Theory
Expected value theory is flawed and this has been highlighted not long after its formulation.
Less than a century after EV theory was first formulated, in 1738, Daniel Bernoulli used the
St. Petersburg paradox to show how this theory was flawed from both a descriptive and a
normative point of view (Jensen [1967]). The paradox was described by Daniel’s cousin
Nicolas, a quarter of a century earlier. The St. Petersburg paradox is about the estimation
of the price to pay to enter a casino offering a gamble on a fair coin being tossed multiple
times. The gamble is the following: the initial stake is 2 dollars and this gets doubled each
time the coin toss lands on heads. The player wins the stake when the coin toss results in a
tails. Therefore, the player wins 2 dollars if the coin lands tails at the first trial, 4 dollars if
it lands tails on the second trial, 8 dollars if the first two coin tosses land on heads and the
third lands on tails, and so on. Generalising, the player wins 2t dollars where t represents
the number of tosses after which tails appears. What can be considered a fair amount of
money to pay the casino, mcas, to be allowed to play this gamble? According to expected
value theory, assuming the casino has infinite resources, the expected value of this gamble is:
E =
1
2
× (2−mcas)+ 14 × (4−mcas)+
1
8
× (8−mcas)+ 116 × (16−mcas)+ · · ·
= 1+1+1+1+ · · ·− mcas
2
× 1
1− 12
= 1+1+1+1+ · · ·−mcas
= ∞ .
(2.3)
This means that when offered to play this game, potential participants should be willing
to play this game at any cost. In fact, no matter how high P is, the expected winning of
this gamble is infinite. On the practical side though if P is high enough, there is very little
chance of being able to recover the initial investment, let alone make a profit. As an example
if the price to play this gamble P is 128 dollars, it will take at least 6 consecutive heads
followed by tails to get at least the initial stake back. The probability of this happening is
2−t with t = 6, that is 1 chance in 64. It is evident that this gamble is very unattractive,
even if mathematically its expected value is infinite. Bernoulli shifted the view from the
monetary value of the gamble to the utility it can potentially yield. He postulated that the
price to pay for such a risky game should not be estimated from the monetary expected
value but instead from the expected value of the utility deriving from the potential wins,
denoting this as “moral expectation”, in contrast with the EV mathematical expectation. This
conclusion derives from the belief that a certain gain will yield different utility to different
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Fig. 2.1 A hypothetical Logarithmic Utility Model
individuals. Bernoulli even suggested adopting a logarithmic function as a utility model.
This would signify that the utility of a win increases with the amount of the win itself but
at a slower pace as shown in Fig. 2.1. By adopting this model, or other concave functions,
it is possible to account for the risk aversion phenomena shown by people faced with this
type of gamble. The expected utility theory (EUT) evolved during the years, eventually
becoming the foundation for Von Neumann and Morgenstern game theory (Jensen [1967];
von Neumann and Morgenstern [1947]).
Prospect Theory
Despite expected utility theory models representing a simple, somewhat effective way of
formalising decisions in uncertain environments, they are often unsuccessful in describing
real-world behaviour (Loewenstein et al. [2008]; Starmer [2000]). As an example, in the
famous franchise game “Deal or No Deal”, which aired on television channels all over
the globe, uncertainty perception and relative decisions by contestants were shown to be
influenced by the history of their former choices (Platt and Huettel [2008]; Post et al. [2008]).
According to expected utility these decisions should have been made solely on the basis of
the prizes available at each point in time. In the real world, these violations are frequent and
often appear to happen when the decision-maker (DM) is faced with risky or ambiguous
probability distributions. The concept of ambiguity is distinct from risk and follows Ellsberg’s
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terminology (Ellsberg [1960]). Decisions under risk happen in environments in which
probabilities about the outcome of the choices are known and represented symbolically (e.g.
with percentages, frequencies or pictorial representations such as pie charts).
In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky criticised expected utility theory and presented a
new model called prospect theory, which will become extremely influential in literature
(Kahneman and Tversky [1979]). Specifically they identified the following phenomena
which systematically violate EUT. The underweighting of uncertain outcomes as opposed to
certain outcomes. This phenomenon leads to risk-aversion when individuals face choices
involving certain wins and symmetrically, to risk-seeking behaviour when the same subjects
face choices involving certain losses. They refer to this paradigm of choice as the reflection
effect. Moreover, they identified a phenomenon that causes people to neglect common
features of the available choices and focus on the characteristic traits. This inclination is
called isolation effect and leads to inconsistencies in choice when the same alternatives are
presented in different formats. As these effects exposed the flaws of EUT as a descriptive
theory of decision-making, Kahneman and Tversky went on to propose their prospect theory.
It is important to note that this theory was originally developed for decision tasks involving
descriptive probabilities in which the subjects are informed from the beginning of the task
about the options features (payoff and probability). Their account subdivides the decision
process into two stages. The first is called editing while the second is named evaluation. The
editing phase consists of a simplification of the available choices by means of the following
operations. The DM makes adjustments about the reference point, according to which she
judges the outcome of the choices. To back this claim, Kahneman and Tversky provide
evidence of people’s perception of the outcomes, not as ending states of wealth but as gains
and losses relative to their personal reference point. The framing of the choices can affect the
position of the reference point and the subsequent encoding of the potential gains and losses.
Framing refers to the different possibilities of presentation of a problem, such as changes of
perspective; these should not influence a rational decision-maker, in real life though framing
can greatly sway people’s decisions (Tversky and Kahneman [1981]).
The first to suggest that individuals use a personal reference system to judge the subjective
utility of gains and losses, instead of using the final asset values, was Markowitz (Markowitz
[1952]). In their account, Kahneman and Tversky equate judgement to human perception.
Concrete examples of the way perception accommodates the assumption that previous
experiences move the reference point for future assessment can be found in temperature
or brightness perception. The same object can be perceived as hot or cold depending on
an individual’s previous state. Drinking a cup of hot chocolate, after spending a day in the
snowy Alps in winter, is certainly more enjoyable than having the same drink during a hot
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day of summer in a southern Italian city. Kahneman and Tversky also indicate how this
assumption had already been widely accepted in experimental studies on utility assessment
(Kahneman and Tversky [1979]). Combination is the operation by which some options can
be conflated when they exhibit equivalent outcomes. As an example, if two options, with
different probabilities p1 = 0.15 and p2 = 0.25, are available and both of them offer 100
dollars as a result, then they can be combined into a single prospect of 100 dollars potential
win with probability p3 = p1+ p2 = 0.40. When choices include a risk-free option this is
separated from the risky counterpart, this process is called segregation. For example, from
the choice between 500 dollars with probability p1 = 0.20 and 100 dollars with probability
p2 = 0.80, an individual will extract a sure outcome of 100 dollars with a risky alternative
consisting of the difference in the outcomes (500−100 = 400 with probability p3 = 0.20).
This happens in the same way in the losses domain. Cancellation happens when subjects
ignore parts of available options shared among the various choices. For instance, if option A
offers the following outcomes: (100, 0.20; 50, 0.30; 0, 0.50)2 and option B offers: (100, 0.20;
100, 0.30; 25, 0.50), then the result of the cancellation operation will be a choice between
A = (50, 0.30; 0, 0.50) and B = (100, 0.30; 25, 0.50). While the previous operations were
applied to single prospects independently, cancellation is applied to a set of multiple choices.
Another intuitive operation is simplification, which consists of rounding the outcome and/or
probability stated in the prospect (e.g. 299, 0.51 becomes 300, 0.50). Despite its simplicity,
this operation is quite powerful, since it could potentially lead to neglecting outcomes with
very small probabilities. The last operation applied by subjects in the editing phase is the
detection of dominance, consisting of the rejection of alternatives which are considered
disadvantageous. For example, if A = (1000, 0.31; 201, 0.69) and B = (1000, 0.20; 199,
0.71), the subject will disregard option B altogether, after simplifying the second part of both
options to (200, 0.70).
In the first phase the complexity of the choice is reduced while in the second phase,
called evaluation, individuals compute the value of each option and then choose the highest
one. This value is based on two quantities which in turn are a function of probabilities and
outcomes. Each probability p is associated with a decision weight πPT (p) and each outcome
x is associated with a number νPT (x). The scale πPT is not a measure of probability in itself
but represent the influence of the probability of an outcome on the general value of the
choice. The scale νPT instead, represents the subjective value of an outcome or how much
an outcome deviates from the reference point in either the direction of gains or losses. The
idea of using a weighting system instead of raw probabilities had already been proposed by
2for the sake of brevity the gambles notation assumes dollar as currency for the outcomes followed by the
probability associated in the format (outcome, probability); e.g. (100, 0.2; 0, 0.8)
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Edwards (Edwards [1962]; Kahneman and Tversky [1979]). Therefore, for several potential
outcomes x1, · · · ,xn with associated probabilities p1, · · · , pn the value VPT will be calculated
as:
VPT =
n
∑
i=1
πPT (pi)νPT (xi) (2.4)
where the value function νPT is formally defined as:
νPT (x) =
xαPT if x≥ 0−λPT (−x)βPT if x < 0 (2.5)
with λPT > 1 being the coefficient of loss-aversion , and the parameters αPT and βPT
being the coefficients of risk-avoidance or risk-seeking behaviour, respectively in the gain or
loss domain, which range from 0 to 1 (Nilsson et al. [2011]). The values of these parameter
was not originally estimated in Kahneman and Tversky [1979]. Subsequently in a refinement
of their theory, the same authors provided parameter values based on the median estimates of
the subjects in Tversky and Kahneman [1992] The parameters were estimated on a subject
basis with a non-linear regression. Their median values were then presented: λPT = 2.25
and αPT = βPT = 0.88.
Considering prospects of the type (x, p;y,q), where outcome x has probability p of
happening, y has probability q and outcome nothing has probability 1− p−q, the prospect
will be considered regular if either p+q < 1 or x≥ 0≥ y or x≤ 0≤ y. In this case:
VPT (x, p;y,q) = πPT (p)νPT (x) (2.6)
In the cases in which p+q = 1 and one of x > y > 0 or x < y < 0 is true (respectively
strictly positive and strictly negative prospects), the segregation operation from the editing
phase separates the available prospect into risk-free options which is the certain gain or loss
and the risky component which is the probabilistic gain or loss.
VPT (x, p;y,q) = νPT (y)+πPT (p)[νPT (x)−νPT (y)] (2.7)
The value of such prospects is the value of the risk-free component summed to the
difference of the values of the two outcomes, multiplied by the perceived influence of the
probability of the more extreme outcome. The decision weight π(p) is used on the risky part
of the option (the value difference) but not on the risk-free component.
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Fig. 2.2 Prospect theory hypothetical subjective value function, generated with αPT = βPT =
0.88 and λPT = 2.25 estimated as median in Tversky and Kahneman [1992]. The kink in the
origin characterises the principle of loss aversion for which losses loom larger than gains.
The prospects offered to individuals by Kahneman and Tversky are descriptions of
monetary gains or potential holiday trips (Kahneman and Tversky [1979]). These decisions
are assumed to be made under risk, the subject has a symbolic representation of outcomes
probabilities and makes her choice based on this information. On the other end of the
uncertainty spectrum are decisions under ambiguity which are characterised by lack of prior
knowledge about outcomes and therefore require at least a certain degree of exploration
for the individual to operate an informed decision. This exploration process consists, as an
example, of sampling the available options. People violate expected utility again in this type
of setup. A clarifying example is the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg [1960]), in which a subject
is offered a choice between two urns (Fig. 2.3). The first contains 100 balls, of which 50
are white and 50 are black. The proportion of white and black balls in the second urn is not
known. By drawing a ball of a specific colour the player wins 100 dollars. Participants have
the tendency to choose indifferently between white or black when drawing from the first urn,
indicating that their belief about probability distribution for such urn is uniform between
white and black. Individuals show the same preference when separately betting on the second
urn, which indicates they hold similar beliefs for the two urns. Nevertheless, subjects are
more likely to bet on a specific colour if they are allowed to draw the ball from the first urn,
14 Literature Review
the one in which the proportion of balls is known. This behaviour is clearly inconsistent, the
subjects who did not show any preference between colours in the second urn, now show a
preference for the first urn, indicating that they believe the balls to be equally distributed
(Ellsberg [1960]; Loewenstein et al. [2008]). Some possible sources of this phenomenon
have been proposed in psychology works, which will be analysed more in depth in section
2.1.2.
Fig. 2.3 A graphical representation of the Ellsberg paradox: an example of the violation of
subjective expected utility theory. The proportion of white and black balls in the first urn
is known while it is not in the second. Subjects considering these two gambles separately,
one risky and the other ambiguous, show the same preference. Indifferently betting on any
colour being drawn. When offered the chance to bet on either of the two urns, subjects prefer
the risky (known distribution) option to the ambiguous (unknown distribution).
A decision scenario can become even more complex when the payoff distributions are
not stationary but change over time. Who can tell what will be the outcome of entering the
stock market by purchasing stock A or stock B? Could the time investors enter the market
affect the performance of their portfolio? The former question represents the “portfolio
selection” task, the latter is known as the “market timing” problem. These are only two of
the many problems investors face when dealing with financial markets. Unskilled investors -
but also many professionals - tend to achieve a suboptimal return in these markets because of
their flawed behaviour (Barber et al. [2007, 2014]; Benartzi and Thaler [1995]; Frey et al.
[2015]; Lakonishok et al. [1992]; Odean [1998]; Shapira and Venezia [2001]; Strahilevitz
et al. [2011]; Weber and Camerer [1998]; Weber and Welfens [2011]).
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Table 2.1 U.S Returns 1802-2000
Mean Real Return
Period Market Index
Relatively
Riskless
Security
Risk Premium
1802-1998 7.0% 2.9% 4.1 pps
1889-2000 7.9 1.0 6.9
1926-2000 8.7 0.7 8.0
1947-2000 8.4 0.6 7.8
Annual yield for U.S. Market and compared riskless security along with the risk premium
(pps = percentage points). Data from Mehra [2003], originally from Siegel [1998], and
Mehra and Prescott [1985].
Flawed Investors Decision-Making: the Equity Premium Puzzle
An interesting example of suboptimal financial behaviour is characterised by the systematic
underinvestment in stocks as opposed to bonds. Investing in bonds, in fact, has been shown
to underperform the market systematically and for many years (Mehra and Prescott [1985]).
Nevertheless, investors keep showing this behaviour. The difference in return between
equities (i.e. stocks) and risk-free options (e.g. bonds) is called the equity risk premium and
is considered the premium compensating an investor for the risk taken by choosing a risky
asset over a risk-less one. The intrinsic risk associated with equities alone, is not enough to
explain the reluctance of investors to choose stocks over bonds. This inadequate pattern of
behaviour is known as the Equity Premium Puzzle (EPP) and was first brought to attention
by Mehra and Prescott [1985]. In their work the annual returns for an investment in the
Standard and Poor 500 index are shown to have outperformed short-term debt average returns.
Specifically in the 90 years considered, between 1889 and 1978, the average return of the
S & P 500 index had been 7% while the average return of Treasury Bills (T-bills) had been
less than 1%. This data is extended in Mehra [2003], including 110 years of average annual
real returns providing evidence of the relevance of the EPP in modern times. Different time
periods are presented in Fig. 2.1, showing the real returns (inflation-adjusted returns) and
how the risk premium is unrealistically high for each of them.
In their work, Mehra and Prescott [1985], find that the level of risk aversion which
characterise the EPP is implausibly explained by the combination of low risk-free rate
and high equity premium together. According to their calculations, the coefficient of risk
aversion needed to explain such effect would be one order of magnitude higher than the
ones commonly used in literature. This phenomenon contributed to emphasise the failure
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Table 2.2 Returns for Selected Countries, 1947-1999
Mean Real Return
Country Period Market Index
Relatively
Riskless
Security
Risk Premium
United Kingdom 1947-99 5.7% 1.1% 4.6 pps
Japan 1970-99 4.7 1.4 3.3
Germany 1978-97 9.8 3.2 6.6
France 1973-98 9.0 2.7 6.3
Annual yield for United Kingdom, Japan, Germany and France. Data from Mehra [2003],
originally from Siegel [1998], and Campbell [2003].
of standard neoclassical financial economic theories at explaining financial behaviour in
uncertain scenarios. In Benartzi and Thaler [1995] it is reported that annual real return of
stocks has been about 7% from 1926 to 1995, as opposed to the meagre less than 1% yielded
by T-bills. In their work, Benartzi and Thaler [1995] provide a theoretical account of how
the EPP could be explained by using two concepts from prospect theory: loss-aversion and
narrow-framing. This theoretical account has been tested experimentally by Thaler et al.
[1997] with good results. Their findings indicate that a myopic framing of outcomes could
help explain why investors are more willing to settle for lower returns from risk-free (or
low-risk) options instead of chasing high returns from high-risk prospects. Thaler et al.
[1997] work will be analysed in greater detail in Chapter 3 because of its crucial role in this
thesis. Another potential explanation of the EPP lies in the direction of extrapolative investor
behaviour (Choi and Mertens [2006]). According to this proposal, investors hold the belief
that previous performance has predictive power over future performance. There is evidence
of correlation between recent performance and subjective predictions (Andreassen and Kraus
[1990]; De Bondt [1991]; Fisher and Statman [2000]). This belief is commonly considered
irrational as the market returns have been shown to possess no correlation (Fama and French
[1988]). An effort to understand investors behaviour can be made by acknowledging their
adaptive learning skills. Adaptive behaviour, linked to the “Law of Effect” (Thorndike [1898]
presented in section 2.1.2), could be a potential explanation for apparently irrational behaviour.
The suboptimal choices made by investors which give rise to the equity premium puzzle
(Barron and Erev [2003]; Zion et al. [2010]) are an instance of such irrational behaviour. The
indication that adaptive behaviour could help explain the EPP is reflected by the findings in
Choi et al. [2009], who studied 401(k) retirement savings behaviour. Their results indicate
that those investors who experienced a positive outcome from previous savings accounts,
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increase their commitment to such assets more than those who experienced lower outcomes.
The documented behaviour is compatible with a naive reinforcement learning approach (Choi
et al. [2009]), which is generally a reasonable approach in other tasks. For a large part of
human history, decision-makers operated in scenarios where they did not have access to
high level information about their options; for example, they did not know the long term
implications of the actions the took. In the wild it is often the case that behaviour which has
led to good outcomes in the past will produce similarly valuable outcomes in the future. This
is not the case in financial markets (Choi et al. [2009]; Fama and French [1988]).
An analogous pattern of behaviour is found in Huang [2012]. By analysing data spanning
5 years and starting from 1991, the author provides evidence that positive trading experience
in a particular industry increases the likelihood of engaging in trading similar securities
within that industry as compared to other industries. The results in Huang’s article are robust
to external effects such as industry momentum or wealth effects. Two other important insights
from Huang’s research are that time dampens the effect of purchase from the same industry
and that higher levels of investor sophistication attenuate the effect.
Similar overweighting of personal experience has been documented in Barber et al.
[2009]; De et al. [2010]; Kaustia and Knüpfer [2008]; Malmendier and Nagel [2011];
Strahilevitz et al. [2011], and later reported in Barber and Odean [2013]. This type of
financial behaviour is assimilable to the well documented chasing of past returns (Chevalier
and Ellison [1997]; Ippolito [1992]; Sirri and Tufano [1998]; Zeckhauser [1993]) and is
related to phenomena of market overreaction (Chopra et al. [1992]; De Bondt and Thaler
[1990, 1985]; Offerman and Sonnemans [2004]). As previously noted, in financial scenarios
it is not guaranteed that repeating behaviour which resulted in rewarding outcomes will yield
good payoffs again. Such naive behaviour could potentially lead to catastrophic events, as in
the case of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2008 (Zion et al. [2010]). An explanation of
the causes for this large scale event is identified in a pattern of behaviour exhibited by the
mortgage and trading agents. Their risky behaviour resulted in rewarding outcomes for these
financial agents, leading to more risk being taken in their future choices, fuelling a vicious
cycle which resulted in disastrous defaults and repossessions.
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2.1.2 Psychology Perspective
Classical and Instrumental Conditioning
In learning, for both humans and animals, there are two distinct scenarios which the learner
can face. The first of the two is known as classical conditioning3 while the second type
is instrumental conditioning. In the classical conditioning kind of learning procedure, a
subject is presented with a neutral stimulus, for example a light, a buzzer sound or a bell;
this is also called a conditioned stimulus (CS). Some time after this, the subject receives a
valuable stimulus, which can be palatable food or some other attractive or desirable stimulus.
This is called the unconditioned stimulus (UCS) and it usually results in an observable
response. Classical conditioning refers to the process by which the subject learns to associate
the two stimuli after experiencing them repeatedly in succession. In the famous Pavlovian
dog experiment the conditioned stimulus (bell ring) is associated with an unconditioned
stimulus (food) to the extent that, after removing the UCS, the dog’s response (salivation) is
elicited solely by the CS. The response, initially appearing at the time when the UCS was
presented and named unconditioned response (UR), appears after learning the association
of the stimuli at the time of the CS and takes the name of conditioned response (CR). In
this type of scenario the subject does not operate a choice deliberately but simply shows a
shift in response timing, from the time when the reward is received to the time when the
CS is presented. A quantitative psychological model which captures this type of learning
is the Rescorla-Wagner (RW) model (Rescorla and Wagner [1972]). This model is based
on a discretisation of the conditioning process in trials, during which the subject learns to
associate the CS to the UCS and exhibits a conditioned response. In this model there are two
scalar quantities which encode the values of UCS and CS: the value of the unconditioned
stimulus uRW and the strength of the conditioned response vRW which by extension captures
the value of the CS. In the RW model, learning happens when, via repeated presentation
of the CS and UCS, the value vRW converges to uRW . This convergence happens through
updating the value of vRW with difference between the two values, also known as prediction
error δRW . This prediction error can be thought of as the “surprise” a subject experiences
when the US appears. This model has two parameters which represent the salience of the
CS and the strength of the US and they are respectively denoted with αRW and βRW . The
Rescorla-Wagner model is formally defined as:
Vt+1 =Vt +αRWβRW (λRW −V ) (2.8)
3also respondent conditioning or Pavlovian conditioning, after Ivan Pavlov (Pavlov [2010]), the first to study
this type of interaction with dogs experiments
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where VRW is the associative value of the CS with Vt+1 and Vt respectively the new and
previous values of VRW . The salience is the parameter αRW ∈ (0,1) and the association value
(or strength) of the US is the parameter βRW ∈ (0,1). Salience can be tweaked by varying the
stimulus intensity (for example the frequency of a buzzer) with αRW → 0 if the CS does not
draw any attention and αRW → 1 if the CS draws the maximum attention of the subject. The
strength of the US is encoded by βRW and represents the learning-rate parameter in the RW
model, with βRW → 1 meaning that the subject exhibits a great rate of conditioning. Finally,
λRW is the maximum associative value that can be attributed to the CS, achievable within the
experimental setup. It represents the strength of the UCR as a result of the US and captures
the potential impact of time delays between stimuli. Classical conditioning allows for the
study of reward prediction error signals in the brain.
Instrumental conditioning (also known as operant conditioning) instead, is a type of
conditioning based on the active interaction of the subject with the environment. The
consequences of the subject’s behaviour influence the learning process. As opposed to
classical conditioning, in instrumental conditioning what is learnt is the action (or course
of actions) resulting in the best rewarding outcome. On the other hand, if the outcomes are
negative, what is learnt is avoidance behaviour. Edward L. Thorndike has been the first to
study this type of learning, investigating cats behaviour in an escape task (Thorndike [1898]).
Cats trying to escape from puzzle boxes, initially took a long time to find the action that
would set them free (e.g. pulling a cord or pushing a button). With more experience, this
association of action and outcome became more clear and eventually cats would take the right
action straight-away and escape. The observation that behaviours resulting in good outcomes
are repeated while actions leading to poor consequences are avoided became Thorndike’s
“Law of Effect”. As a result of this law, the quality of consequences, either satisfying or
dissatisfying, leads respectively to the strengthening or weakening of behaviour. The positive
outcomes can be considered “incentives” and represent the ultimate objective of behaviour
stemming from the actions-outcomes associations (Dickinson and Balleine [1994]). These
considerations allow us to draw a parallel with natural selection and evolutionary theories
(Darwin and De Beer [1956]) on two levels. In a narrow view, only the stimuli and actions
leading to good outcomes emerge within the action-selection process in animals, leading to
improved fitness and life-expectancy maximisation. As an example, the association of an
eye-catching colourful fruit with the tasty reward leads to an improvement of health for an
animal. In the opposite direction, an unripe green colour will not elicit the same approaching
behaviour for the animal. It follows that ripe fruits will be preferred while green fruits will
be left hanging by their branches. A famous instrumental learning example is the hot stove
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effect, for which a cat jumping on a heated cooker gets a punishment so bad the behaviour is
never replicated, thus improving future fitness. In a more broad view, those animals which
exhibited a good learning ability over the course of their life are more likely to reproduce,
passing on their abilities to their offspring. Those unfortunate individuals who were deficient
in these learning mechanisms and did not learn, or took too long to learn the best behaviour
perished. As an example, the zebras which never learnt to run away from the water hole
when the crocodiles got too close will have a lower probability of passing on their learning
machinery.
Work in non-human primates involving both types of conditioning tasks provided some
evidence of this. Mirenowicz and Schultz [1994] recorded single neuron responses of two
Macaca fascicularis monkeys in behavioural tasks and showed that 75% of dopamine neurons
(ventroanterior midbrain, substantia nigra pars compacta and dorsally adjoining groups)
produced a short-latency phasic response to an unexpected reward (apple juice liquid drops)
and that the same neurons stopped responding after the learning was completed. These
neurons responded then, at the time when the conditioned stimulus was presented. Similar
results have been fond in following works, including Schultz [1998] and Hollerman and
Schultz [1998]. These findings are not well captured by a Rescorla-Wagner model. An
extension of the RW rule that takes into account the timing of the interactions and that takes
the name of temporal-difference learning is more representative of the results (Montague
et al. [1996]; Schultz et al. [1997]). The characteristic neuronal response pattern in classical
conditioning, shifting of the firing backwards from the UCS to the CS after learning, is well
approximated by this model (O’Doherty et al. [2003, 2007]). These types of behaviour are
also studied in contexts in which outcomes are not deterministic but involve a certain degree
of uncertainty (Niv et al. [2002]; O’Doherty et al. [2004]). Non-deterministic tasks are more
representative of the class of decision-making scenarios humans face in everyday life. In this
regard it is convenient to clarify the terminology used and the findings of previous works in
this area of psychology.
Risk-Ambiguity Difference, the Description-Experience Gap and Payoff Variability
Effect
As briefly introduced in the previous sections, the literature on experimental studies features
two types of configurations in which decision-makers operate their choices: risk and uncer-
tainty. This distinction follows Knight’s concepts (Knight [1921]) and Ellsberg’s terminology
(Ellsberg [1960]). Choice behaviour is said to be made under risk in those scenarios in which
the probabilities of the options are known. On the other hand, scenarios regarding options
without defined outcomes description are labelled as ambiguous choices. Individuals who are
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normally risk-averse show even stronger aversion in ambiguous situations (Platt and Huettel
[2008]). Generally, when faced with the decision between a risky and an ambiguous option
people tend to avoid the ambiguous one. For example, between two medical treatments
of which one has known probability of success (50%) and the other provides no informa-
tion, people prefer the first (Curley et al. [1986]). The same type of ambiguity-avoidance
has been shown in money based studies (Becker and Brownson [1964]; Curley and Yates
[1985]; Slovic and Tversky [1974]). Many hypotheses have been proposed to explain such
ambiguity-avoidance; among these there is the “hostile nature” hypothesis. According to this,
subjects favour the options providing more information, because they believe the ambiguous
options would produce adverse outcomes, according to an intrinsic non-randomness (Curley
et al. [1986]; Ellsberg [1963]; Loewenstein et al. [2008]). Experimental work by Curley
et al. [1986] provided no support for this hypothesis. In the same work another hypothesis
was tested and supported by experimental data. This was the “other-evaluation” hypothesis,
which assumes that subjects operate decisions anticipating the moment in which their actions
will be assessed by someone else, leaning towards choices that are more justifiable (Curley
et al. [1986]; Ellsberg [1963]; Knight [1921]; Loewenstein et al. [2008]).
Real life decisions are comprised of both types of scenarios but their observed distribution
in every day life is highly skewed towards ambiguous decisions. It is very often impractical,
although not impossible, to calculate the probability of events such as a house being struck
by lightning or winning the national lottery. At the time of writing a national lottery radio
advertisement claims that “playing makes it possible” but does not state the actual probability
(roughly one chance in 14 million). In Kahneman and Tversky [1979] study, decisions were
made by informed individuals who were told the probabilities of the prospects before deciding
which one to pick; because of their structure, these tasks have been denominated “decisions
from description”. On the other end of the spectrum of information provided before a choice
there are tasks in which no prior information is available and decision-makers have to build
an idea of which option is best based on experience. This task structure is further divided in
two types of information paradigms: the information obtained from subjects’ interactions
can be partial or complete. If only the outcome of the selected prospect is presented the task
is referred to as “partial-feedback” (also known as “minimal information” in some works);
if both the selected and forgone payoffs are shown to the decision-maker the task assumes
the name of “full-feedback”. Within this subset of choice tasks with no prior information
there are two possible configurations that can be envisioned. In the first, decision-makers
are allowed to experiment with the available options. They can sample them to construct a
belief about which option is best to pick but only the final selection actually counts as their
decision. These tasks represent the sampling-paradigm (Hertwig and Erev [2009]). These
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tasks are similar to decisions from description in that they are one-shot problems but the
information provided to the decision-makers have a different source, experience instead of
description. Differently, tasks in which each decisions counts towards the final outcome are
similar to the real-life scenarios in which each decision has a tangible, yet sometimes not
immediate, outcome. A representation of these task categories is provided in Fig. 2.4
Fig. 2.4 Three different paradigms of choice task information. The outcome of the chosen
option is in blue, the forgone in red. Panel a) shows the sampling paradigm. The selections
are of sampling nature until the very last which counts as choice. In panel b) the partial
feedback paradigm (also called minimal information). Each choice results in an outcome
valid in the task. The forgone payoffs are not shown. Panel c) represents the full feedback
paradigm, in which every choice is meaningful and all information is provided: the outcomes
of both options after each choice.
In order to study human behaviour for tasks resembling the structure of the type of
markets in which the equity premium puzzle arises, many works employed small decisions
from experience tasks (also called small feedback-based decisions) (e.g. Barron and Erev
[2003]; Erev and Barron [2005]; Gneezy and Potters [1997]; Thaler et al. [1997]). One of the
main features of these tasks is that they involve repeatedly operating a choice in very similar
situations, not much changes from one decision to the other. Another characteristic of these
tasks is that the decisions are small and, considered singularly, cannot lead to bankruptcy or
losing irreparably in the task. Furthermore, as it is the case for decisions from experience
tasks, these decisions are operated based on direct experience and no prior knowledge is
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available to the subjects. It follows that to make good decisions the individuals face an
exploration-exploitation trade-off for which they need to decide whether to acquire more
knowledge about the options or to dedicate their choices to capitalising on their current
information. Finally, the decision-makers receive feedback after each choice, either partially
in case only the chosen option outcome is provided, or fully in case all options outcomes are
presented. The structure of the task and its features make this type of paradigm quite distinct
from the one-shot decisions the subjects were asked to do in studies such as Kahneman
and Tversky [1979], allowing these studies to be considered a close simulation of real-life
decisions.
Some observations can be made about the emerging behaviour in these tasks, in com-
parison to one-shot decisions from description. Part of the work in Barron and Erev [2003]
focuses on some of these. A potential difference is that direct experience and real-time
feedback could elicit adaptive behaviour. This adaptive learning process should lead to
expected value maximisation behaviour, in accordance with the law of effect (Barron and
Erev [2003]; Thorndike [1898]). In contrast, work focused on decisions from description
showed consistent deviations from maximisation (Kahneman and Tversky [1979]). This
prediction is also supported by findings that subjects were more likely to play a high-expected
value gamble if they were allowed to play it repeatedly, instead of only once. It is important
to note that there are substantial differences in the number of times a decision-maker is asked
to make a choice is much lower for some conditions in these studies (Keren [1991]; Keren
and Wagenaar [1987]; Lopes [1981]; Wedell and Böckenholt [1990]).
Another prediction regarding this type of interaction paradigm is that DMs will use the
obtained feedback to estimate the underlying payoff distribution for the available choices.
This prediction is the basis for all sorts of differences in behaviour deriving from sampling
problems, such as undersampling of rare events or large variability in the payoff distributions.
Findings from other studies suggest a potential difference in behaviour based on the recency
bias, that is a propensity to weigh recent outcomes more heavily than past ones (Camerer
and Ho [1999]; Erev and Roth [1998]). The collection of evidence regarding the diverse
behaviours exhibited by decision-makers when interacting with the two paradigms is termed
description-experience gap (Hau et al. [2008]; Hertwig and Erev [2009]). One of the main
differences reported is that, while people tend to overestimate the probability of rare events in
decision from description, as shown by the various studies on prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky [1979]; Tversky and Kahneman [1992]), when DMs are involved in decisions from
experience they tend to underestimate the probability of rare events (Barron and Erev [2003];
Benartzi and Thaler [1995]; Erev and Barron [2005]; Hau et al. [2010]; Hertwig et al. [2004];
Hertwig and Erev [2009]; Hertwig and Pleskac [2010]; Jessup et al. [2008]; Newell and
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Rakow [2007]; Thaler et al. [1997]). This type of behaviour is also shown in animal studies,
such as Real [1991]. One proposed explanation for the gap is that, while in description-based
decisions there is no learning, the repeated nature of decisions from experience together with
the availability of feedback involves learning, specifically reinforcement learning (Erev and
Barron [2005]; Jessup et al. [2008]). Another potential explanation that has been tested in
Hertwig et al. [2004] and Hau et al. [2008] is undersampling, which refers to the lack of
knowledge of a particular outcome due to its rarity in conjunction with the scarce number of
times the associated option was selected. This type of behaviour is related to the observation
that people exhibit more sensitivity regarding the frequency of the outcomes instead of their
average (Erev et al. [2003]; Estes [1976a,b]; Yechiam and Busemeyer [2006]).
In Hertwig et al. [2004] and Hau et al. [2008], participants were allowed to sample as
much as they wanted and only their final preference was registered as the actual choice and
then compared to the description-based decision group. Again the gap was found, even if
attenuated by larger sample size (Hau et al. [2008]), proving that it cannot be due to the
sampling experience alone. The DE gap was also shown empirically in an experimental study
concerning choices between risky and ambiguous prospects (Dutt et al. [2013]). Recency has
been also identified and studied as potential cause of this behavioural discrepancy. Limited
memory capacity could be the reason why even large sampling does not eliminate the gap
as it would substantially reintroduce the problem of a biased sample of experiences being
considered when making decisions.
Findings in this direction are contrasting, sometimes indicating that the recency bias
could be a potential explanation and in other instances showing no supporting evidence
of this. In Hertwig et al. [2004] the second half of samples was shown to have predictive
power over choices compared to the first half. The same could not be said for the choice
data in the study by Hau et al. [2008]. Interestingly enough, in Rakow et al. [2008], recency
effects were significant only when the samples were actively collected by the subject and
not when these were deriving from passively observing the outcomes. A further common
discrepancy that has been highlighted by this research branch is the reversal of risk-related
preferences. Specifically, the results for one of the experiments in Barron and Erev [2003]
shows a more prominent risk-aversion in the loss domain, while studies on decisions from
description indicate a stronger risk-aversion in the gain domain (Kahneman and Tversky
[1979]). The loss-aversion phenomenon is another crucial aspect of prospect theory which
has been researched and found to be consistently present in both paradigms, as shown by the
replication of some conditions from Thaler et al. [1997] in Barron and Erev [2003].
As these conditions are important for the work and analysis offered in this thesis, a more
accurate perspective of these learning experiments is provided in Chapter 3. While literature
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consistently documented the phenomenon of loss-aversion, it also produced some instances
of inconclusive results or even showing evidence in the opposite direction (loss-seeking
behaviour). In an elegant experiment by Katz [1964], subjects were asked to make a decision
about which of two light bulbs would light up. These were equally likely to do so but the
subjects were ignorant to this. One option was deemed safe as it returned either +1 or −1
depending on the activation of the bulb. The alternative option was considered risky as the
returns, depending on activation, were +4 of −4. A loss-averse individual would shy away
from the risky light bulb option as it could potentially lead to higher losses compared to the
safe option and, according to loss-aversion, these losses would be perceived as more painful.
The results showed that participants were indifferent to the choice offering no supporting
evidence for the loss-aversion principle. As noted in Erev et al. [2008] the results obtained
by Katz, as well as the ones provided by Thaler et al. [1997], could be explained by the
alternative hypothesis of diminishing sensitivity. Another possible way to capture Katz’s
results is with a refined loss-aversion hypothesis involving loss-possibility avoidance (Erev
and Barron [2005]).
In an experimental study by Erev et al. [2008], similar conditions were tested providing
results contradicting the loss aversion hypothesis and supporting the diminishing sensitivity
hypothesis. Specifically, in the conditions involving the prospects “safe” paying off 0
and “risky” being a binary equally likely outcome of +1000 or −1000, subjects showed
some preference for the risky option. These results are in contrast with the original loss-
aversion definition by Kahneman and Tversky [1979] as well as Erev and Barron [2005]
loss-probability minimisation theory. The findings in Erev et al. [2008] show that a low
sensitivity to the spread of the outcomes can explain the subjects’ preference for those options
which guarantee a positive return as opposed to riskier prospects which lead to higher average
return but with a greater spread between the payoffs. The results also point in the direction
of a nominal payoff magnitude effect, according to which subjects exhibit a more marked
diminishing in sensitivity for decisions with payoffs in the range of hundreds of points, while
this effect was not found when the nominal payoffs were lower.
The dispersion of observed outcomes has also been shown to affect optimal decision-
making, this was named “payoff variability effect” (Busemeyer and Townsend [1993]) and
was previously researched by Myers and Sadler [1960] with a “card flipping” paradigm.
In binary choice tasks, if the option with the highest expected reward has a very variable
outcome distribution, decision-makers tend to reduce the proportion of choices for such
option. This has been proved to be a robust phenomenon in Haruvy et al. [2001], Erev and
Barron [2005] and Erev et al. [2012], but these studies all focus on aggregated population
choice data while it would be interesting to investigate different individual experiences in
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more detail. In Myers and Sadler [1960] subjects were presented with two cards. The first
card would be flipped and reveal a certain outcome (representing a safe option), then the
subject could reject this payoff by deciding to reveal the second card’s outcome (the risky
option). This task was carried out within a mixed description-experience paradigm because
the subjects were presented with information about the outcomes obtainable from the first
option but not for the second. This experimental setup was associated with partial feedback
for the second option: in case a subject accepted the first card’s payoff, the forgone payoff
for the second card would not be revealed. The safe deck of cards outcomes would be +1 or
-1 with even chances for each outcome. The risky deck of cards consisted of outcomes within
different ranges depending on the group the subjects were assigned to.
Three groups were denoted with the range of the absolute values and defined according
to the following ranges:
• R(4): 100 cards evenly divided for each of the integer values between -6 and +6, with
exception for -1, 0 and +1;
• R(9): 100 cards evenly divided for each of the integer values between -11 and +11, no
card for values -1, 0 and 1;
• R(14):90 cards evenly divided for each of the integer values between -16 and +16,
again with values -1, 0 and 1 not represented.
The procedure consisted of 100 trials where the subject decided whether to accept the safe
option or to risk flipping the second deck and being forced to accept the resulting outcome.
Generally, subjects exhibited behaviour in the direction of the optimal strategy: to accept the
first deck if it presented a +1 and gamble with the second deck in case of a -1. Two sources
were found to be significant in explaining the variance of proportion of risk taken: the value
(comparison of +1 and -1) and the value combined with range. An increase in deviations
from maximisation options was observed for groups with more sparse ranges of outcomes
from the risky deck. This was explained with the assumption that subject choices tend to
be affected less by the mean of the outcomes and more by the magnitude of the observed
outcomes.
Results from Haruvy and Erev [2002] are presented and discussed in Erev and Barron
[2005]. Specifically, the following three problems are analysed. These all followed the partial
feedback paradigm, and included 14 subjects making 200 decisions.
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The options presented were the following:
• Options in Problem 1
– H: 11 points for sure
– L: 10 points for sure
• Options in Problem 2
– H: 11 points for sure
– L: 19 points or 1 point with even probabilities
• Options in Problem 3
– H: 21 points or 1 points with even probabilities
– L: 10 points for sure
The proportion of choices H in the last 100 trials, denoted with Pmax2, has been estimated
and used for the comparison. The values are 90%, 71% and 57% respectively in each problem.
The comparison between problem 1 and 3 shows a reduced propensity to select option H
when this is more variable. At the same time, comparing problem 1 and 2 shows a similar and
specular pattern, with the option L being selected more when more variable. An increased
exploratory behaviour is proposed as explanation for these result. In those cases where the
variability associated with the outcomes is large, exploratory behaviour is not the best course
of action. In Erev and Barron [2005] it is suggested that choice behaviour becomes more
random as a result of the payoff variability effect, especially if the increased variability is
linked to the option yielding higher expected value. More results from similar problems,
but with negative outcomes, show that the payoff variability effect emerges in both gain and
losses domain. Moreover, the effect is present also in problems within the full feedback
paradigm, where subjects could observe the outcome of both chosen and forgone option.
The payoff variability effect is present in a single decision task (Busemeyer and Townsend
[1993]), but can also be observed in repeated tasks, as shown in Erev and Barron [2005].
These indications are at the base of the study in chapter 4.
Findings by Zion et al. [2010] point in the direction of investors decision-making deriving
from adaptive behaviour, confirming the indications in Choi et al. [2009]. Specifically in
their experimental setup, subjects are asked to allocate 100 tokens in one of three available
funds. Participants were split into groups with different feedback conditions, one in which
they received limited information about the sole outcome of the fund they had invested
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in, the other group received full feedback regarding all three funds outcomes. The pattern
of behaviour resulting from this tasks indicates that people tend to follow experience and
feedback in chasing returns, leading to risk-seeking behaviour and under-diversification. In
scenarios such as financial markets, similar to the experimental conditions studied in fact, it
is possible that adaptive behaviour leads to deviations from maximisation of expected return.
Shifting the reference point: the House-Money effect and Break-Even effect
Mental accounting indicates the mechanisms intrinsically adopted by decision-makers when
evaluating choices with associated outcomes and when assessing their wealth (Benartzi and
Thaler [1995, 2007]; Kahneman and Tversky [1984]; Thaler et al. [1997]). This process
often results in fallacies and inconsistencies. An interesting mental accounting inconsistency
phenomenon, in the context of financial decision-making, is the “house-money effect” (Hsu
and Chow [2013]; Thaler and Johnson [1990]). This refers to the tendency of investors to
seek risk when they obtained positive outcomes in the past. It can be explained by picturing
a Las Vegas casino gambler betting a quarter of a dollar in a slot machine and winning $100.
The win shifts the benchmark for assessing future gains and losses (as in prospect-theory
reference point) and results in a higher propensity to treat the gained $100 as an independent
reference point to the gambler’s budget, for assessing future prospects and outcomes. The
house-money effect produces a behaviour as if the casino gambler does not yet account the
quantity gained as their own and considers future decisions to be made using the casino’s
money (the house-money). There is experimental evidence (Thaler and Johnson [1990])
as well as field study findings (Hsu and Chow [2013]) confirming the existence of this
irrational behaviour. From a normative point of view, decision-makers should consider
incremental outcomes only when assessing gains and losses (Thaler and Johnson [1990]).
Another account on how previous outcomes lead to a change in behaviour is the “break-even
effect” (Thaler and Johnson [1990]). This phenomenon, in contrast to the house-money
effect, describes the tendency to seek risky options after having incurred previous losses,
in the attempt to offset these with potential gains. These two effects have been used in
Erev et al. [2008] to explain the potential shift of reference point and subsequently of risk-
related behaviour. Respectively, the house-money effect for predicting risk-seeking behaviour
following gains and the break-even effect to explain the same type of risk preference after
losses. These effects are related to the effect of sunk cost on choice behaviour (Arkes and
Blumer [1985]; Thaler [1980]). The sunk cost effect is another mental accounting fallacy
affecting decision-makers. Normatively and rationally, past costs should not influence future
choices, but it is often the case that DMs factor in these previous expenditures when making
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future decisions. Interestingly, this type of fallacy is exhibited only by adult humans and is
not exhibited by lower animals or children (Arkes and Ayton [1999]).
From this review it is clear that psychological and economical research are deeply
intertwined and the potential for each to influence and inform the other is high and relevant.
These pieces of information are combined in this work with the ultimate goal of improving
the understanding of how adaptive learning behaviour and decision-making are influenced by
each other and by other phenomena.
2.1.3 Neuroscience Perspective
Neuroscience is the field of science which studies the nervous system and the brain in
particular. A crucial insight provided by this field of research is that the brain is not a
single processor, but the result of the integration of multiple processes, which take place in
disparate areas and are activated depending on the type of task and its salience (Brocas and
Carrillo [2008]; Loewenstein et al. [2008]). In Bernheim and Rangel [2004], for example,
it is proposed that the brain could be modelled as working in one of two modes: “cold” or
“hot”. Which mode is adopted at any time depends on the current situation and on previous
behaviour in similar situations. Another dichotomous modelling of behaviour as a result
of competing and collaborating brain functions is suggested in Loewenstein and Donoghue
[2005]. Behaviour is the result of the interaction of a “deliberative” and an “affective” system.
The affective system is believed to be in control of routine activities; the deliberative system
is capable of influencing the affective system by exerting cognitive demanding work, referred
to as “willpower” (Loewenstein and Donoghue [2005]; Loewenstein et al. [2008]). Similar
considerations are expressed in Brocas and Carrillo [2008] and Benhabib and Bisin [2005].
The former study suggests that when emotional processes have partial information, controlled
processes step in and constrain them. The latter study, similarly, proposes that automatic
processes are constrained by executive ones, in case these produce suboptimal decisions.
This view of the brain as a dual-system can be seen metaphorically as a ship with a naïve
ferryman being in control, with the wise captain capable of taking over when needed. This
view is also presented in Kahneman’s best seller “Thinking, Fast and Slow” (Kahneman
[2011]). In this book, which is intended for a general audience, brain function is explained in
layman’s terms as the result of the interaction and competition of “system 1” and “system
2”. System 1 is believed to apply a series of heuristics and simplifying assumptions when
making decisions, while system 2 is considered the logical and reasoning counterpart.
While these examples show some researchers are concerned with high-level decision-
making other neuroscientists are focused on a lower level of abstraction, trying to understand
the structure, the dynamics and the functionality of single brain areas; their aim is to connect
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Fig. 2.5 Neuroeconomics abstraction layers. From bottom to top: neurons and synapses
(Scale bar: 100 µm) representing the basic informational units; MRI (magnetic resonance
imaging) sagittal section of the brain, comprising different structures and communicating
areas; individual behaviour, learning and decision-making; market behaviour, the result of
many actors interacting and competing. 4
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these pieces together to form a detailed map of how the brain processes information and
ultimately makes decisions.
From a biological point of view, the general structure and composition of a brain is
well known. The brain of an adult human is composed of roughly 1011 neurons, which
can be of different types and can be connected to other neurons in different areas. Even
if this quantity of neurons can seem impressive, it is definitely not the sheer number that
matters. Larger animals have more than double the number of neurons of a human and much
smaller animals have far less neurons but exhibit a great deal of competence in learning and
decision-making. The way neurons wire together in the brain is believed to play a crucial
role in the competence and complexity of behaviour. The map of connections between
neurons is called a “connectome”. It is believed to be storing the cognitive and computational
properties of a brain (Lichtman et al. [2008]; Sporns et al. [2005]). Seung [2009] even
suggests the connectome is what defines a person. The branch of neuroscience studying the
wiring of neurons is called connectomics and is believed to be of central importance to the
understanding of the brain’s functioning. A series of discoveries in relevant fields such as
molecular biology and electrophysiology together with new imaging methodologies allowed
a more refined study of neuronal interactions and connectivity in the last couple of decades
(Friston [2011]; Hai et al. [2010]; Lichtman and Sanes [2008]; Minderer et al. [2012]; Perin
et al. [2011]; Song et al. [2005]; Wedeen et al. [2012]; Wickersham et al. [2007]; Zhang
et al. [2007]). Moreover, increased computational power and accessibility have provided
support for computer-based simulations in this branch. This timely combination of findings
and enhanced machine capabilities created a vibrant research scenario which promoted the
development of some ambitious projects. For example the mapping of the human connectome
in a dataset of healthy adults (The Human Connectome Project: Toga et al. [2012]) or the
simulation of human brain activity on high-performance computers (The Human Brain
Project: Frackowiak and Markram [2015]).
The idea that neurons involved in a certain function cluster together and operate as a
single processor comes from connectionism theory (Rumelhart et al. [1987]; Sejnowski
and Rosenberg [1987]; Thorndike [1898]). These brain areas are characterised by strong
connectivity patterns between the neurons and present highly specialised competencies.
Neuronal interactions of different brain areas give rise to the observable behaviour. The
formation of such connected structures is therefore not random but is created and strengthened
4First image: CC BY 2.0 Rafael Matsunaga [https://www.flickr.com/photos/78629042@N00/479370088]
(modified: cropped), last image: CC BY 2.5 Wei-Chung Allen Lee, Hayden Huang, Guoping Feng, Joshua R.
Sanes, Emery N. Brown, Peter T. So, Elly Nedivi [Dynamic Remodeling of Dendritic Arbors in GABAergic
Interneurons of Adult Visual Cortex. Lee WCA, Huang H, Feng G, Sanes JR, Brown EN, et al. PLoS Biology
Vol. 4, No. 2, e29. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0040029, Figure 6f, (modified: plus scalebar, minus letter “f”.)]
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over time. This process is one of the most important and peculiar a brain can achieve and is
what characterises intelligent animals: learning. The retention of information is achieved
in the brain by strengthening the connections among neurons, the synapses. The number
of neurons in a human adult brain is estimated to be 86±8 billions of cells (Azevedo et al.
[2009]). The number of synapses is even higher, with estimates in the order of 1015 (a
quadrillion) synapses in an adult brain; their number slowly declining with age (Drachman
[2005]). These connections possess a property called synaptic plasticity which leads to an
improvement or a degradation of the connection between two neurons depending on their
activity (Hebb [1949]; Thomson [2000]). There are two types of synaptic plasticity which
can happen between neurons. They are referred to as short-term and long-term plasticity and
are different, not only for their duration as the names suggests, but also for the underlying
biological and chemical processes happening (Fioravante and Regehr [2011]; Kullmann and
Lamsa [2007]).
Fig. 2.6 Panel a) MRI coronal section of the human brain (of the author). Grey and white
matter are indicated by red and blue squares respectively. Panel b) Human brain MRI sagittal
external view. The colours represent areas of the cerebral cortex: frontal lobe in red, parietal
lobe in yellow, occipital lobe in blue, temporal lobe in green and cerebellum in magenta.
Synaptic plasticity is at the base of memory formation and the learning process. The study
of the microscopic changes at a neuronal level characterises the lower levels of knowledge in
the neuroscience field. Modifications at this level result in observable adaptive behaviour
at higher level, in both animals and humans. Animals demonstrate learning within simple
tasks while humans can learn much more complex functions. Communication includes
understanding and producing language; while humans mastered this task thousands of years
ago, animals are only capable of low-complexity information transmission.
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Neurons are clustered and organised within areas of the brain presenting detailed connec-
tions among them. The modular nature of the brain is considered to be a well-established
fact in literature (Brocas and Carrillo [2008]). Neuroscientific research is interested in deter-
mining which areas of the brain are involved in specific functions and how these “talk” to
each other to achieve more complex functions. Many of these structures are located in the
cerebral cortex. This is the outer layer of the brain and consists of a sheet of neural tissue of
about 2 millimetres of thickness which covers the cerebrum. The cortex is composed of grey
matter, which contains neural cell bodies, synapses, capillaries. The grey matter also presents
glial cells, which are non-neuronal cells supplying nutrients and oxygen to the neurons, also
providing them structural support and insulation. The underlying white matter is composed
of myelinated axons, also known as nerve tracts. White matter is devoid of neuronal cell
bodies or dendrites.
Fig. 2.7 Panel a) MRI sagittal section, medial view of the human brain (of the author),
with the location of the Motor Cortex, Visual Cortex, Amygdala and ventro-medial Pre-
Frontal Cortex. Panel b) Cerebellum, the components of the Corpus Callosum along with the
Thalamus, the Pons and the Medulla Oblongata indicated by the arrows.
The cortex topology is subdivided into regions which are often associated with different
functions. The main subdivision is portrayed in Fig. 2.6, panel b) and consists of frontal lobe,
parietal lobe, temporal lobe, occipital lobe and cerebellum. The visual cortex is located in
the occipital lobe of the brain, at the back of the head and above the cerebellum, which is
located at the insertion of the neck with the skull. This area of the cortex receives the visual
information from the eyes. Before getting to the visual cortex, this signal passes through the
thalamus which is one of the innermost regions of the brain.
The thalamus is located near the centre of the brain and is composed of grey matter
although not being part of the cortex. It is divided in two symmetrical halves and is thought to
be tightly involved in forwarding sensory-motor signals to the cortex (Sherman and Guillery
[2001]). The neuroconnective structures supporting the transmission of signals between brain
regions are called neural pathways and consist of tracts, which are axon bundles (Moore et al.
34 Literature Review
[2013]). The thalamus is also involved in other systems, such as somatosensory and auditory.
The thalamus is not only a relay for information propagation to the cortex but it also involved
in a two-way pathway to the cortex (Sherman and Guillery [2006]; Sherman [2007]). Other
regions of the cortex and the brain in general are indicated in Fig. 2.7.
Among the various brain regions, the basal ganglia are of particular interest for be-
havioural research. The basal ganglia are a group of subcortical nuclei located near the
thalamus; they consist of the striatum, the subthalamic nucleus, the globus pallidus, and the
substantia nigra. These nuclei are deeply interconnected with other brain regions and are part
of the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loop (CBGTC loop). In dysfunctional basal
ganglia, this pathway is thought to be involved in movement diseases such as Parkinson’s
disease or Huntington’s disease (Cameron et al. [2010]; Mahlon and Thomas [2009]; Miller
et al. [2008]; Reiner et al. [1988]; Stocco et al. [2011]). The CBGTC loop is also of interest
in conditions such as schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, attention-deficit disorder
and different types of addiction (Inta et al. [2011]; Redgrave and Gurney [2006]; Redgrave
et al. [1999]).
In healthy subjects, the basal ganglia are involved in motor-control, learning and decision-
making (Bogacz and Gurney [2007]; Bogacz and Larsen [2011]; Redgrave et al. [1999];
Wickens et al. [2007]). The main input comes from the striatum (STR) and the subthalamic
nucleus (STN), while the main output locations are the substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr)
and the internal portion of the globus pallidus (GPi). The external globus pallidus (GPe)
instead, represents an internal signal hub, with connections to and from the subthalamic
nucleus and the striatum. Modulatory signals in striatum and other regions of the basal
ganglia are provided by the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) and the ventral tegmental
area (VTA). These areas are composed of dopaminergic (DA) neurons, which are involved in
the release of the neurotransmitter dopamine; these regions represent part of the mesolimbic
(or reward) pathway (Sulzer [2005]). This pathway, similarly to the CBGTC loop, is involved
in behavioural processes, such as learning and motivation. Dopaminergic responses have
been associated with the reward prediction error: the discrepancy in the expected reward
of an action and the actual outcome of that action (Montague et al. [1996, 2004]; Redgrave
and Gurney [2006]). Highly addictive substances, such as cocaine, affect this pathway by
hijacking the dopamine neurons (Bernheim and Rangel [2004]; Montague et al. [2004]). The
substance pushes the DA neurons to signal a positive reward when taking the drug, even
if the actual consequences of doing so are adverse to the individual (Bernheim and Rangel
[2004]; Everitt and Wolf [2002]; Schultz et al. [1997]). Other areas that have been shown
to be activated in relation to addiction are the amygdala, the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC),
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACg) as well as the striatum and the dorsolateral PFC (Everitt
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and Wolf [2002]; Grant et al. [1996]; Maas et al. [1998]; Schoenbaum and Setlow [2005];
Wang et al. [1999]). Multiple fMRI studies of decision-making tasks in uncertain scenarios,
show that insular cortex (INS) and the ventrolateral pre-frontal (vlPFC) are activated when
decision-makers face adverse stimuli, which can be either decisions resulting in punishment
or involving increased risk (Huettel et al. [2005]; Paulus et al. [2003]; Platt and Huettel
[2008]; Sanfey et al. [2003]).
DA neurons functions are of central importance in cognition and motor control; they are
also known to be involved in psychiatric disorders as well as neurodegenerative diseases
(Montague et al. [2004]; Van den Heuvel and Pasterkamp [2008]). Dopaminergic neurons also
play a role in the value individuals attribute to money or personal relationships (Montague
et al. [2004]). Work by Schultz provided further evidence that these neurons are involved in
the encoding of outcome values: they are activated in case the observed outcome is better
than predicted, they are depressed in case the outcome is worse than anticipated and remain
inactivated in case of the event being as good as previously thought (Schultz [1998]). This
is confirmed by the activation of ventral striatum and medial pre-frontal cortex (mPFC) as
shown in several fMRI studies (Delgado et al. [2000]; Kable and Glimcher [2007]; Knutson
et al. [2005]; Kuhnen and Knutson [2005]; Platt and Huettel [2008]; Tom et al. [2007]).
Because the systems presented so far are involved in decision-making as well as reward-
based learning, they have been commonly formalised with the help of the reinforcement
learning (RL) framework (Montague et al. [2004]). This is a set of theories and rules used
to model decision-making problems and to provide a solution based on a trial-and-error
approach, therefore representing a logical approach to model the neuromodulatory systems
and their functioning within the brain. Reinforcement learning is adopted when modelling
behavioural scenarios, instead of a simpler methods such as Rescorla-Wagner (RW) models,
because RL provides a more sophisticated approach. Animals tackle decision-making tasks
following procedures which depend on the state they consider themselves to be in and RL
allows to capture this belief in a handy way, while a RW would simplistically focus on
the associations between stimulus and response, as portrayed in eq: 2.8 (Montague et al.
[2004]). Because of its powerful descriptiveness and since the RL framework is widely
adopted in literature, the work of this thesis will adopt it as a descriptive model for the study
of behavioural data. Therefore the reinforcement learning framework will be presented in the
next section in greater detail.
This brief introduction to neuroscience research provides some examples of how the
discoveries made in this field along with the models adopted by the researchers are of great
interest for psychology, economics and the study of learning and decision-making as a
unifying field of research.
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2.2 Reinforcement Learning
In machine learning and generally in control theory the final objective is to train an automatic
agent to produce some kind of behaviour. Often this goal is achieved by encoding an
algorithm which uses a set of examples to generalise some rule which is then applied to new,
previously unknown instances. A classic example is the email spam filter, a type of supervised
learning mechanism. This algorithm is trained on a binary classification task by the user.
The user provides the algorithm with positive and negative examples leading, eventually, to
the correct classification of new emails as spam or legitimate. Reinforcement learning (RL)
instead, is not based on this type of training by examples. The environment gives a numerical
signal and the agent processes this information to improve future behaviour. Generalising
this idea, any agent which is cast into an unknown environment and needs to learn by trial
and error the mapping of what to do in which situation, is a RL agent. This definition
immediately exposes the connection of these ideas to Thorndike [1898] experiments, in
which a cat was placed into a shutterbox and had to learn to escape by trying different actions.
It is evident how such a general approach to learning can be used to describe animal or human
behaviour. As previously noted, modelling behaviour or neural mechanisms with models
based on temporal difference (TD) error has been proved to be of great value (Daw et al.
[2005, 2006]; Doya [2000, 2007]; Hollerman and Schultz [1998]; Houk and Wise [1995];
Joel et al. [2002]; Montague et al. [1996, 2004]; Schultz [1998]; Schultz et al. [1997]). There
are several indications that TD learning is implemented in particular brain areas. A TD error
signal is, in fact, consistent with the activation of dopaminergic neurons in the striatum and
orbitofrontal cortex (Cohen et al. [2007]; Joel et al. [2002]; Lohrenz et al. [2007]; O’Doherty
et al. [2003]). This powerful framework has been used extensively to model and comprehend
behaviour and the neural processes involved, therefore becoming of pivotal importance in
the decision-making research (Dayan and Daw [2008]).
In order to fully understand the learning algorithm mechanisms and how they capture
neural computation or emergent behaviour, it is useful to provide some context and formally
define the foundations on which this powerful technique is grounded. The following sec-
tions are organised so that the general concepts are linked to the actual techniques used to
implement them and the mathematical background needed by the framework. Much of this
material follows the perspectives from Sutton and Barto [1998], reorganising the information
to best fit this thesis.
Reinforcement learning is ultimately a method of learning a mapping of which actions
to take in specific situations, or goal-directed learning. The final goal is to maximise the
numerical reward obtained from the environment. The learning agent learns which actions
are good or bad, by inferring this from its interactions with the environment. The quality of
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an action is encoded in the signal the environment gives back to the agent after an action.
In some tasks actions not only elicit rewards but also affect the future state of the agent
within the environment, in turn modifying the future attainable reward. As the RL agent
is not informed or instructed about the correct actions to take, it is required to explore and
evaluate the outcome of the exploration. These two functions represent the key components
of the learning procedure: action selection and belief update. One of the simplest settings
in which the agent can find itself to be is a two choice problem, also known as two-armed
bandit. An armed bandit is a slot machine, a n-armed bandit problem is a task in which a
decision-maker needs to decide which slot machine to play (which lever/arm to pull). In a
canonical scenario, a gambler enters a casino and faces two slot machines. The task is to
decide which of the two bandits offers the best return. This setting includes two possible
actions in a stateless environment. More complex versions of the armed bandit problem have
been developed and studied. In Vernade et al. [2017] for example, a stochastic version of
the multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem is employed in the context of internet advertisement
delayed conversion. MABs are tackled using algorithms based on the Upper Confidence
Boundary (UCB) and Kullback-Leibler UCB (KL-UCB) frameworks. The UCB algorithm
has robust performance within the class of limited stochastic rewards problems (Cappè et al.
[2013]). These algorithms are based on minimising a quantity called the “regret”, defined as
the difference between the sum of the rewards for the chosen options and the sum of rewards
had the agent known the best option (Cappè et al. [2013]; Garivier and Cappè [2011]). The
exploration-exploitation dilemma arises in this setup too. The regret can increase due to
either greedily choosing the current best action known, possibly missing better options, or
spending too much time collecting information about the reward distributions associated to
the actions. Treatment selection in medicine is an application of such problem formulations
and proposed solutions (Cappè et al. [2013]). For example, it is not known beforehand
which of the clinical trials of new drugs will lead to the best outcome for the patients. The
patients are allocated sequentially to each treatment and observations about the performance
of such treatment are taken, with the final goal of identifying the course that achieves the
most favourable outcomes.
In more complex problems, the environment is composed of more states and the outcome
of an action might change the state in which the agent is. A commonly used example is the
grid-world (Fig. 2.8).
Here the agent can move on a grid of adjacent states and each action can result in a reward
signal and a deterministic (or stochastic) movement to another state. To better understand
this learning procedure it is useful to discretise time and introduce the components of this
system. The agent is the decision-maker in the task (also known as the learner). Everything
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Fig. 2.8 An example of grid-world, A represent the agent, each square represents a state
where S is the start state and G is the end goal state. At each point in time the available
actions are the four cardinal directions (N,W,S,E).
which is not internal to the agent is the environment. The interaction between agent and
environment can be described as a cycle (Fig. 2.9). At time t the environment informs the
agent about which state st it is in, the agent takes an action at . In return the environment
produces a reward rt+1 and updates the state st+1 of the agent.
Markov property
Formally, for trials t = 1,2, · · ·T , state st ∈ S where S is the set of all possible states. The
available action at ∈ A(st) where A(st) is the set of actions available in state st . After taking
an action, the agent receives a real valued signal called the reward rt+1 ∈ IR and moves to state
st+1. This is a powerful abstraction that allows for many different tasks to be modelled and
tackled by RL agents. States, specifically, are a compelling concept of this framework. They
allow the agent to receive knowledge about its surroundings by encapsulating information
which can be more than basic perceptions. At the same time, a state should not inform an
agent about everything. It would be cheating, and ultimately counterproductive to provide
an agent with information about the unobservable future information. This would make
the agent an oracle and the task trivial and uninteresting. To make decisions incrementally
in a task, a RL agent must possess information about the environment that is necessary
and sufficient. What is required from the state is to represent the entire history of previous
interactions and nothing more. A state satisfying this property is said to be markovian. The
environment needs to possess the Markov property to allow this. This property is formally
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Fig. 2.9 The agent and environment interaction scheme
defined as follows. For a general environment, the state and reward at time t+1 depend on
all previous history:
P(st+1 = s′,rt+1 = r|st ,at ,rt ,st−1,at−1, · · · ,r1,s0,a0) (2.9)
for s′, r and all possible previous values of states, actions and rewards. A state is said to
be markovian if:
P(st+1 = s′,rt+1 = r|st ,at) (2.10)
For all s′,r,st and at . Meaning that the response of the environment at time t+1 depends
only on the previous state and action. A state is markovian if the equations 2.9 and 2.10 are
equal. If this holds true for all states st ∈ S and actions at ∈ A(st), the entire environment
can be considered markovian. The Markov property allows for prediction of future state and
expected reward based on the current state and action. It is possible indeed, to determine
the best policy for picking an action in a Markov state in the same way that it would be
possible to determine the best policy by knowing the entire history (Sutton and Barto [1998]).
This setup for the states is readily representable with a Markov decision process (MDP).
A MDP is generally defined as a stochastic control process in discrete-time satisfying the
Markov property. The set of states, the set of actions and the one-step interactions with the
environment define the MDP for a task. The interacting structure of a MDP is defined by two
quantities. Considering a state-action pair (s,a), the probability of the next state s′ is:
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Fig. 2.10 An example of transition graph for a stochastic MDP. In this simple example an
agent needs to learn which action maximises the reward in each state but in certain cases
the action can lead to a change in state according to some probability (actions search have
multiple output arrows).
Pass′ = Pr{st+1 = s′|st = s,at = a} (2.11)
This quantity represent the transition probability of going from state s to state s′ via action
a. Given the triplet defined by state s, action a and next state s′, the expected value of the
reward is:
Rass′ = E{rt+1|st = s,at = a,st+1 = s′} (2.12)
A useful graphical representation of an MDP is a transition graph which pictures states as
big hollow circles, and actions with small filled circles. These nodes are labelled respectively
with the states names and actions names. The dynamics of the MDP are depicted by the
arrows, which are labelled with the reward and can be labelled with the probabilities in case
of a stochastic environment.
Discounting
A task can be episodic or continuing, meaning that the discrete time interactions the agent
has with the environment can be finite or not. In a finite task the goal is to maximise the
expected return, which is usually defined as the sum of the rewards or a function of it. For
example:
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Rt = rt+1+ rt+2+ · · ·+ rT (2.13)
with T being the time step of the final interaction. For a continuing task instead, T = ∞
and a simple scenario in which the agent obtains a positive reward at each time step will
lead to an unbound return which cannot be maximised. To obviate to this, the concept of
discounting is introduced. This consists in multiplying each reward at each time step by a
discount rate:
Rt = rt+1+ γrt+2+ γ2rt+3+ · · ·=
∞
∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1 (2.14)
with γ being a parameter that can take values in the range (0,1). For γ = 0 the agent is
said to be myopic because at time t it will pick the action at trying to maximise the return
Rt = rt+1 (all terms after the first are multiplied by γ = 0). For such value of the discount
factor the agent is trying to maximise immediate rewards only. As γ → 1 the agent becomes
more far-sighted and is concerned with maximising rewards in the long term. Discounting
encapsulates a well documented human behaviour which violates the rationality principles
of rational theories such as Expected Utility Theory (Frederick et al. [2002]; Sanfey et al.
[2006]; Thaler [1981]). In many instances individuals show a preference for immediate or
short term rewards as opposed to delayed rewards. For example, individuals would consider
that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar in a year time, or in another formulation
they would choose to receive 10 dollars today instead of 11 tomorrow but at the same time
they would be happy to wait one more day when deciding between 10 dollars in a year or
11 in a year and a day. There are two main types of discounting that have been studied
in literature: exponential and hyperbolic (Fig. 2.11). Hyperbolic discounting has been
commonly presented as a more realistic alternative to exponential discounting (Azfar [1999];
Haith et al. [2012]; Kobayashi and Schultz [2008]) but it has also been found to fail in some
cases (Luhmann [2013]). Exponential discounting has been preferred in temporal difference
learning methods as it can be conveniently expressed with a recursive formulation (Alexander
and Brown [2010]). Discounting is believed to play a key role in impulsive behaviour which
can lead to addiction (Ahmed and Gutkin [2011]; Bickel and Marsch [2001]; Kurth-Nelson
and Redish [2010]; Story et al. [2014]).
Mapping states to actions: the policy
The problem for the agent is then to learn the probability of picking each of the available
actions, a probabilistic mapping of states to actions. This experience-based learning is
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Fig. 2.11 Exponential vs hyperbolic discounting
captured by the policy, denoted with πt . Formally π is the mapping of each state s ∈ S and
action a ∈ A(s) to the probability of picking a when the agent is in s, denoted π(s,a). The
learning problem is for the agent to modify this policy so to maximise the profit in the long
term. In order to assess how good a policy is, the RL algorithms first evaluate how good a
particular situation is for the agent. This is done with a value function. A value function V π
represents the expected return obtainable following policy π:
V π(s) = Eπ{Rt |st = s}= Eπ
{
∞
∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1
∣∣∣∣∣st = s
}
(2.15)
with Eπ denoting the expected value following policy π . While the value function
concerns states values, it is also possible to define an action-value function to evaluate
state-action pairs under a policy:
Qπ(s,a) = Eπ{Rt |st = s,at = a}= Eπ
{
∞
∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1
∣∣∣∣∣st = s,at = a
}
(2.16)
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The key feature of these value functions is that they possess a peculiar recursive property:
V π(s) = Eπ{Rt |st = s}
= Eπ
{
∞
∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1
∣∣∣∣∣st = s
}
= Eπ
{
rt+1+ γ
∞
∑
k=0
γkrt+k+2
∣∣∣∣∣st = s
}
=∑
a
π(s,a)∑
s′
Pass′
[
Rass′+ γEπ
{
∞
∑
k=0
γkrt+k+2
∣∣∣∣∣st+1 = s′
}]
=∑
a
π(s,a)∑
s′
Pass′
[
Rass′+ γV
π(s′)
]
(2.17)
The last equation is the Bellman equation and it shows the recursive connection between
a state and its successors. It can be used to evaluate a policy or extended to represent the
optimal value function. If the expected return under policy π , V π(s) is greater or equal
compared to another policy π ′ for all states s ∈ S, then policy π is better than or equal to
policy π ′:
V π(s)≥V π ′(s) =⇒ π ≥ π ′ (2.18)
Having defined an order of policies based on the expected return, it is possible to state
that there is at least one best policy, defined as π∗.
V ∗(s) = max
π
V π(s) (2.19)
where V ∗ is the optimal state-value function. There is always one optimal policy which is
better or equal to all other policies. An action-value function Q is associated to each policy π
and, in the specific, each optimal policy π∗ is associated to an optimal action-value function
Q∗ defined as:
Q∗(s,a) = max
π
Qπ(s,a) = E{rt+1+ γ V ∗(st+1)|st = s,at = a} (2.20)
for each state s ∈ S and for each action a ∈ A(s).
44 Literature Review
Now it is possible to reformulate the Bellman equation in terms of optimal value function
V ∗, also called the Bellman optimality equation:
V ∗(s) = max
a∈A(s)
Qπ
∗
(s,a)
= max
a
Eπ∗ {Rt |st = s,at = a}
= max
a
Eπ∗
{
∞
∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1
∣∣∣∣∣st = s,at = a
}
= max
a
Eπ∗
{
rt+1+ γ
∞
∑
k=0
γkrt+k+2
∣∣∣∣∣st = s,at = a
}
= max
a
E {rt+1+ γV ∗(st+1)|st = s,at = a}
= max
a∈A(s)∑s′
Pass′[R
a
ss′+ γV
∗(s′)]
(2.21)
The corresponding Bellman optimality equation for the action-value function can be
expressed as:
Q∗(s,a) = E
{
rt+1+ γmax
a′
Q∗(st+1,a)
∣∣∣∣st = s,at = a}
=∑
s′
Pass′[R
a
ss′+ γmaxa′
Q∗(s′,a′)]
(2.22)
It follows that, for a given MDP with known transition probabilities and rewards functions
(respectively Pass′ and R
a
ss′), it is possible to solve the Bellman optimality equation. Once the
V ∗ is known, then it suffices to decide greedily with respect to such optimal value function
to find an optimal policy π∗. In a similar fashion, having Q∗ allows the agent to search
over the available actions in each state, instead of having to do a look-ahead to find the next
best state, using the optimal value function V ∗. As state-action pairs encode information
about the future attainable rewards from the next time-step, the optimal action-value function
Q∗ is more efficient in that it allows for a compact search of best action at each time-step.
Of course, solving the Bellman optimality equation is quite demanding as it is a system of
equations directly dependent on the number of states in the MDP. Moreover, to solve the
equation, the dynamics of the environment (Pass′ and R
a
ss′) need to be known and this is not
always possible. Taking as an example the game of chess, each configuration of the pieces
on the board represents a state and it is evident that the dimensionality of the state-space
makes it computationally intractable to solve the Bellman optimality equation for this task.
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2.2.1 Model Free
Considering those cases in which the MDP is not completely known - that is either or both
the transition probability function and the reward function are unknown - it is impossible to
directly solve the Bellman optimality equation. In this type of scenario, the agent can still
achieve satisfactory learning in the environment via sampling. Incrementally updating its
internal belief of which states are best to visit and which actions are better to take in each
state. Model free solutions are characterised by the agent not trying to learn the environment
and its transition probabilities but only which action is the best to take in specific states. One
of the most important breakthroughs in the theory of reinforcement learning, which makes
the whole framework feasibly applicable to interesting problems, is the concept of temporal
difference (TD) learning.
TD Learning
The key concept at the basis of temporal-difference learning is the TD prediction error. The
prediction error refers to the quantity calculated as the difference between the predicted
reward and the actual observed reward for a specific state (or state-action pair). Instead
of waiting until the end of an episode (which sometimes is not feasible, as in continuing
problems), the agent updates its knowledge after each step. This class of learning models
are well suited to describe human learning because of the similarity between the concept
of prediction-error and the dopaminergic neuron activations in the brain (Daw [2003]; Daw
et al. [2005, 2006]; Doya [2000, 2007]; Houk and Wise [1995]; Joel et al. [2002]; Montague
et al. [1996]; O’Doherty et al. [2007]; Schultz et al. [1997]; Suri and Schultz [1998]). TD
learning is often compared with the Rescorla-Wagner model with the the notable difference
that the latter is concerned with single time-steps and not the entire course of interaction
between agent and environment (O’Doherty et al. [2003]; Schultz [1998]). Moreover, TD
learning allowed for studies involving both behavioural data and neurophysiological data
like functional magnetic resonance imaging data (fMRI) (Niv et al. [2012]; O’Doherty et al.
[2003, 2007]).
Using a small grid-world (Fig. 2.8) as example, a RL agent aiming at learning the
action-value function Qπ , will store the state values in a look-up table and update their values
after each time it moves. For instance, let’s consider an agent randomly moving and with
initial values for all state-action pairs equal to 0, V (s) = 0∀s ∈ S. Assuming each state yields
reward 0 except for the top-right state being the goal state with reward 1 and the terminal
state finalising the episode. Starting from bottom-left corner of the grid-world and taking
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action right, leads to a reward of 0. At this point the agent will operate the following update
rule:
V (st)←V (st)+α[rt+1+ γV (st+1)−V (st)] (2.23)
where α is the step-size parameter which tunes the rate of learning for the agent, rt+1 is
the reward obtained in the last movement, γ is the discount factor and the values V (st) and
V (st+1) are the value of the state from which the agent started and the value of the state in
which it arrived. The quantity rt+1+γV (st+1) is called the target of the update and represents
the knowledge acquired after the action the agent took. The difference between the target
and the value of V (st) is the TD prediction error and guides the learning towards the actual
state value. When the agent is one step away from the terminal state and moves right, finally
landing in the goal state, the update rule will move the value of the state just before the goal
V (s) slightly towards its actual value. Commonly for terminal states it is assumed that the
future reward V (st+1) = 0. This method is said to be a bootstrapping method because it
updates estimates of the value for each state based on previous estimates. In fact, during the
next episode, the agent will at some point move to the state just before the goal and will learn
that this state has a higher value leading to a back-propagation of the reward along the path
which lead to it. It is important to note that the values used in the update, within the target
quantity, are estimates of the expected value of a state V (st) and not the actual value under
the current policy V π(st). As this method does not require the agent to wait until the end of
its interactions during an episode, it is considered an on-line method. While the value of a
state is denoted V (s), the value of a state-action pair is called Q-value and is denoted Q(s,a).
This last quantity expresses the value of taking action a when in state s. The TD learning
update rule represent only the first half of the learning process. It is limited to improving
the knowledge of the value of each state (or state-action pair) but in the previous example
the agent was not allowed to make decisions about which action to take, as it was assumed
to move randomly. Now that the agent has a way of determining which state is better than
the others it should be allowed to decide in which direction to move, what was previously
defined as the policy π .
Action-Selection Policies
In the previous example the agent was assumed to be using a random strategy to decide
where to move at each time-step. Of course this is a poor strategy and other, more or less
refined, strategies can be taken into account. Supposing the correct value-function is known,
as mentioned at the end of section 2.2, the best strategy is to select what to do in a greedy
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fashion, that is always picking the action with the highest expected return. When the agent
does not posses full knowledge about the actual values of the states, it is best to include a
certain degree of exploration in the action-selection in order to acquire better information. To
explore, in this context, means to follow a course of actions which does not follow the known
best outcome. This is known as the exploitation-exploration trade-off. One of the possible
ways to address this problem is to act greedily most of the time but devote a certain amount
of time (i.e. interactions) to exploring the environment. Epsilon-greedy is an example of
this type of exploration: it consists in picking the best action with probability P = 1− ε
and exploring in the complementary P = ε cases. As an example, if ε = 0.1, the agent will
follow the best known strategy 90% of the time and explore the remaining 10%. This is not
very sophisticated as it does not allow for a sensible search through the available actions but
randomly selects one of them. In the previous grid-world example, if in a particular state
the best action is believed to be north, it might be worth exploring east instead of south or
west. Soft-max action-selection allows for a ranking of the probability of picking each action
based on their values. To achieve this more refined exploratory strategy it is possible to make
use of the Boltzmann distribution:
P(east) =
exp(Qt(east) ·β )
∑4a exp(Qt(a) ·β )
(2.24)
where P(east) is the probability of picking action east at time t, Qt(east) is the value
of action east in the current state at time t, the denominator represents the sum over all the
possible actions and β is a positive free parameter referred to as inverse temperature and
represents the greediness of the agent. High values of β (low temperature) lead to a wider
spread between the action values resulting in higher probability for the best action to be
selected. Low values of β (high temperature) indicate actions are equiprobable which leads
to exploratory behaviour. In the limit β → 0 the agent action selection becomes random. A
visualisation of the impact of beta on the probabilities is shown in Fig. 2.12. In the figure, the
best action is North (Q-value = 0.9), while the second best is East (Q = 0.8). For increasing
values of β the best action becomes the most likely to be picked while the others decrease,
the second best action is still more probable than the others to get selected. Exploration is
implemented in this way and is regulated by the parameter β , when β = 0 the actions have
the same probability of being taken (14 ) and the agent effectively follows a random policy.
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Fig. 2.12 Soft-Max graphical example: the value of the probability of an action being
picked is a function of the value of the inverse temperature free parameter β . The higher
the value of β becomes, the more greedy the policy becomes. Q-values of the actions:
North = 0.9,East = 0.8,South = 0.6,East = 0.4.
Q-Learning
One of the most adopted models which implements TD-learning is Q-Learning (Watkins
[1989], Watkins and Dayan [1992]). The learning model is based on the following update
rule:
Q(st ,at)← Q(st ,at)+α[rt+1+ γmax
a
Q(st+1,a)−Q(st ,at)] (2.25)
where α is the learning rate and γ is the discount factor. The difference with TD-learning
is that this update rule uses as target the best achievable reward (maxa Q(st+1)) from the
next state instead of an arbitrary estimate. In other words this update rule implements a
greedy action selection for the next step look-ahead. Because of this greedy update, which
is likely to be different from the one currently used by the agent, Q-learning is considered
an off-policy method. This is quite a powerful model as it has been proved to converge to
the correct Q∗ independently of the policy of the agent, with the only requirement being that
the state-action pairs are continuously updated (Sutton and Barto [1998]; Watkins [1989];
Watkins and Dayan [1992]).
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Sarsa
While Q-learning is an off-policy method, it is possible to use an update rule which is instead
on-policy. To do so let us consider the tuple representing a trial of interaction of an agent
with the environment. This is characterised by five values:
st a non-terminal state from which the interaction begins,
at the action taken for the interaction (at time t),
rt+1 the reward obtained as a result of the action taken,
st+1 the landing state where the interaction has led the agent at the next time-step t+1,
at+1 the action the agent will take at the next interaction, a look-ahead of one time-step into
the future.
This quintuple (st ,at ,rt+1,st+1,at+1) gives rise to the name of this on-policy algorithm:
Sarsa. In case the next state st+1 is the terminal state its Q-value is assumed to be 0,
Q(st+1,at+1) = 0. The update rule for this method is:
Q(st ,at)← Q(st ,at)+α[rt+1+ γQ(st+1,at+1)−Q(st ,at)] (2.26)
The difference between Q-learning and Sarsa is subtle in the calculation but meaningful
in the resulting behaviour. The only term which differs in the two update rules is the expected
return in the target: in Q-learning this is the estimate deriving from greedy behaviour while
in Sarsa this is the estimate deriving from the current policy behaviour. For Sarsa to converge,
it is required that the state-action pairs are updated continuously and that the action-selection
policy converges to greedy (Sutton and Barto [1998]). This can be achieved by using a time
dependent value for ε , such as ε = 1t where t is the current time-step.
2.2.2 Policy search
When expert knowledge is available it can be integrated in the the modelling by adopting
a different problem formulation, so that the policy of the agents becomes the focal point
of the learning problem. The structure of the problem, as well as the initialisation of the
policy itself, can be enriched to accommodate for the domain-specific information available.
This type of approach is of particular interest to the field of robotics (Kober et al. [2013]).
In addition to being able to integrate prior domain knowledge into the problem definition,
another advantage of policy search is that generally optimal policies present many fewer
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parameters as opposed to optimal value functions. Policy search is a valuable alternative
to methods based on value-functions in the field of robotics even if the optimal solution
cannot be directly derived from the Bellman optimality equations (Kober et al. [2013]).
Formally, policy search methods attempt at optimising a policy π , with parameter vector θi
by iteratively perturbing the parameters in the directions that leads to an increase of expected
return, following the rule:
θi+1 = θi+∆θi (2.27)
Multiple updates have been developed and tested, such as general stochastic optimisation
methods (Bagnell and Schneider [2001]), cross-entropy (Rubinstein, Reuven Y and Kroese
[2004]), population based methods (Goldberg, David E and Holland [1988]), pairwise
comparison (Ng et al. [2006]; Strens, Malcolm JA and Moore [2001]) and gradient estimation
with finite policy differences (Kohl, Nate and Stone [2004]; Roberts, John W and Moret,
Lionel and Zhang, Jun and Tedrake [2010]; Sato, Masa-aki and Nakamura, Yutaka and Ishii
[2002]).
Policy gradient
Policy gradient methods are based on the estimation of the likelihood-ratio (Sutton et al.
[1999]). This approach is based on the hill-climbing updating methodology, implying that
the updates are to be made, with a step-size αPG, according to the gradient of the expected
return, denoted with J:
θi+1 = θi+αPG∇θJ (2.28)
Several methods have been developed to estimate the gradient ∇θJ, with many depending
on the fine tuning of the step-size parameter αPG. One of such methods is called finite
difference gradients. This method requires tuning, not only of the step-size parameter, but
also of the number, type and magnitude of the perturbations to be performed on the policy
parameters. An estimate of the gradient is evaluated based on the policy parameters perturbed,
PPG:
∆Jˆp ≈ J(θi+∆θp)− Jre f (2.29)
with ∆Jˆp being the estimate of the influence that the perturbations have on the return,
p = [1, · · · ,PPG] 5 being the perturbations of the parameters and Jre f being the reference
5PG subscript omitted for spacing convenience in the following equations
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return when the parameters have not been perturbed. The gradient is estimated using linear
regression as follows:
∇θJ ≈ (∆ΘT∆Θ)−1∆ΘT∆Jˆ (2.30)
with the matrix ∆Θ being the collection of the stacked perturbations samples ∆θp. Even
if this straightforward approach can be applied to non differentiable policies, it is nonetheless
considered inefficient and noisy.
Likelihood ratio methods are an alternative class of methods, where the episodes of a task
are believed to be generated according to a particular distribution:
Pθ (τ) = P(τ|θ), (2.31)
with the return of a particular episode given by:
Jτ =
H
∑
h=1
Rh, (2.32)
where H is the number of steps in the episode. The expected return for a specific set of
policy parameters can be expressed as:
Jθ =∑
t
Pθ (τ)Jτ . (2.33)
While, the gradient of the episode distribution is expressed as follows:
∇θPθ (τ) = Pθ (τ)∇θ logPθ (τ) (2.34)
This update is known as the likelihood ratio or as the REINFORCE trick, which is an
acronym standing for REward Increment = Nonnegative Factor times Offset Reinforcement
times Characteristic Eligibility (Williams [1992]).
By combining the last two equations, the gradient of the expected return can be expressed
as follows:
∇θJθ =∑
τ
∇θPθ (τ)Jτ =∑
τ
Pθ (τ)∇θ logPθ (τ)Jτ (2.35)
= E{∇θ logPθ (τ)Jτ} (2.36)
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Considering a stochastic policy, denoted πθ (s,a), generating episodes τ , it is not neces-
sary to track the episodes’ probabilities as it is possible to specify the gradient in terms of the
policy:
∇θ logPθ (τ) =
H
∑
h=1
∇θ logπθ (s,a). (2.37)
While the gradient of the expected return with respect to the parameters of the policy is
calculated as follows:
∇θJθ = E
{(
H
∑
h=1
∇θ logπθ (sh,ah)
)
Jτ
}
. (2.38)
Since the rewards obtained at the beginning of an episodes are not due to the action
taken at the end of the previous episode, the return of the episode can be replaced by the
state-action value function in the following way (Peters and Schaal [2008]):
∇θJθ = E
{
H
∑
h=1
∇θ logπθ (sh,ah)Qπ(sh,ah)
}
, (2.39)
this is equivalent to the policy gradient theorem from Sutton et al. [1999]. In this context,
the exploration is achieved by the stochasticity intrinsic to the policy. Both REINFORCE
and finite differences gradients are considered to be slow (Kober et al. [2013]).
By considering the reward as an improper probability distribution, it is possible to derive a
different class of policy-search methods, inspired by Expectation Maximisation (Dayan, Peter
and Hinton [1997]). Some examples of approaches from this class that were demonstrated to
be effective in robotics research are reward-weighted regression by Peters and Schaal [2008],
MonteCarlo EM by Vlassis, Nikos and Toussaint, Marc and Kontes, Georgios and Piperidis
[2009], policy learning by weighting exploration with the returns and cost-regularised kernel
regression by Kober and Peters [2009]. By combining policy search with the principle of
optimality, Bagnell, J Andrew and Kakade, Sham M and Schneider, Jeff G and Ng [2004]
proposed a policy search by a dynamic programming method, consisting in learning a non-
stationary policy, without attempting to impose the Bellman equation. This approach is one
of the most reliable within function approximation, as reported by Kollar, Thomas and Roy
[2008], for trajectory selection in a robotic map exploration task.
Methods based on value-function search attempt to find an optimal value-function that
can be used to find optimal solutions by simply following a greedy policy, picking the best
action in each available state. This is often not achievable because of the high-dimensional
state-action spaces of particular tasks (e.g. in the field of robotics). The number of state-action
2.2 Reinforcement Learning 53
pairs becomes quickly intractable in moderately complex scenarios. Policy-search methods
instead are focused on the current policy and its surroundings. In a robotics context, this
approach has the desirable property of being able to accommodate for continuous features,
but at the same time it usually cannot find the global optima but is confined to a sub-optimal
solution local to the current policy.
In Kober et al. [2013], a robotic arm is used to learn the task of paddling a ball with
a ping-pong racket. The combinations of robot position, bearing, actuators’ velocity and
angles quickly leads to representational and computational intractability. For such tasks it is
therefore necessary to resort to function approximation.
2.2.3 Function Approximation
Function approximation is a class of methods which allows the representation of a function
which would otherwise be intractable, either computationally or from an information theory
point of view (Rivlin [1969]). In Reinforcement Learning, function approximation is often
necessary to be able to represent the problem in both continuous state-spaces and discrete,
large scale ones (Kober et al. [2013]; Sutton and Barto [2018]). In fact, it is impractical
and time consuming to visit all the available states and try all the possible action for each
one of these. It is likely that many of the available state-action pairs lead to similar results,
especially if they are neighbours. Therefore, function approximation can conveniently
generalise these, condensing the amount of information which needs to be stored. Parametric
function approximators attempt to fit the observed data as closely as possible by finding
the set of parameters which allows this. Linear basis functions and neural networks are
examples of this class of function approximators. The former is popular in literature mostly
because of its simplicity in approximating the value-function, which represents a state with
a scalar value. For example, a state-space for a grid-world can be represented with a grid
of Gaussian basis function centered in each of the states. The approximated function value
evaluated at each particular state point can be estimated as the weighted sum of the basis
functions. This type of approximation can also be applied in cases where the state is not
defined by coordinates of a discretised grid-world. For example, a robotic arm state can
be approximated with a linear combination of the features capturing the position, velocity,
angle of the actuators of the arm. The set of weights is chosen to minimise the distance
between the observed data and the approximation developed. Linear regression can be used
to estimate the weights when the mean squared error is used as distance measure. Tile coding
is another type of function approximation (Sutton and Barto [1998, 2018]), which consists
in subdividing the space in tiles which can be irregular to accommodate for portions of the
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space with different salience. This method is flexible because it allows a multi-dimensional
continuous space to be approximated with overlapping tilings at the desired level of detail.
Theoretically, any supervised learning technique can be used as a function approximation
method (Sutton and Barto [2018]), but some of these have not been studied extensively.
One common way to implement non-linear function approximation is with Artificial Neural
Networks (ANNs). Multi-layer networks provide a hierarchical mapping of input features
into output with a higher level of abstraction. This particular network topology does a
particularly good job as function approximator because works as a feature extractor (Duan
et al. [2007]; Gaskett et al. [2000]; Thrun [1995]). More complex features of the space can
be represented, instead of adopting only the hand-crafted ones designed or identified by the
human expert. In supervised learning ANNs are usually trained by changing the weights
according to the gradient leading in the direction which minimises the distance between a set
of labelled examples and predictions. In reinforcement learning, on the other hand, these
networks can learn value functions by using TD errors (Sutton and Barto [2018]). ANNs
are trained by backpropagation, an algorithm that combines forward and backward passes
of the network. In the forward pass the networks calculates through weights and activation
functions the prediction, while in the backward pass the partial derivatives for each weight is
computed and the weights updated. Alternatively, ANNs can be trained using principles from
reinforcement learning. This methodology is less efficient but could be closer to the real
computations happening in the brain (Sutton and Barto [2018]). Function approximation can
also benefit policy-search methods, by reducing the number of parameters and making the
problem tractable (Kober et al. [2013]). Again, neural networks can be used for this purpose,
for example in a robotic peg-in-hole insertion task and in a ball-balancing task (Gullapalli
et al. [1994]), as well as in a navigation task (Hailu and Sommer [1998]).
2.2.4 Partial observability
An extension of the reinforcement learning setup is possible by considering Markov Decision
Processes characterised by partial observability. Partially Observable Markov Decision
Processes (POMDPs) are an extension of MDPs. POMDPs differ from MDPs because the
partial observability implies that the agent does not have full information about the state.
This greatly increases the complexity, leading to an exact solution virtually impossible to
find (Braziunas [2003]). It is, in fact, not possible to include previous observations as stored
memories within the state representation (Sutton and Barto [2018]).
An MDP is enhanced to become a POMDP by extending it with the observation space O
and the observation function Z(·). The first is a set of observations which can be obtained by
the agent. Formally, the POMPD is a tuple < S,A,T,R,O,Z >, comprising the state-space
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S, the action space A, the transition function T (·), the reward function R(·), the observation
space O and the observation function Z(·). To draw a parallel, in an MDP the agent possesses
complete knowledge of the system state:
O≡ S. (2.40)
While in a POMDP, the observations depend on the underlying state in a probabilistic
fashion. There arises the problem of determining the state in which the agent is, as multiple
observations can be obtained in distinct states.
The observation function represents the relationship between the states of the environment
and the observations and is defined as:
Z : S×A→Π(O). (2.41)
The probability that observation o′ can be seen after the agent takes action a and arrives
in state s′ is denoted with:
Z(s′,a,o′) = P(Ot+1 = o′|St+1 = s′,At = a). (2.42)
Within the formulation of a POMDP, the agent has to decide if it has enough confidence
about the current state of the environment, so that it can take an action greedily. Alternatively,
the uncertainty is such that more exploration is needed to be able to take a better action at a
later time. Many applications can be identified for this stochastic-domain planning problem
formalisation: process control within factories, raw resources location exploration, elevator
control, marketing, logistics and transportation can all benefit from adopting POMDPs and
RL (Cassandra [1998]; Kaelbling et al. [1998]). While for MDPs it is possible to get the
optimal policy and act accordingly for each state, in POMDPs if the agent cannot have full
certainty of the state it is in, the action cannot be chosen deterministically. A mapping from
observations to probability distributions over actions is developed for this case (Kaelbling
et al. [1998]). This stochastic approach allows the agent to explore with some probability in
cases in which the state appears to be similar to other states. A formalisation of the tasks
examined in this thesis could adopt a POMDP, but considering the state-spaces which will be
proposed in the next chapters there is no necessity for this.
2.2.5 Inverse Reinforcement Learning
So far, the reinforcement learning techniques presented were all based on the assumption
that the agent has access to the reward function, has information about the environment
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and will learn a particular behaviour for the task specified. This type of learning is similar
to the trial-and-error that can be observed in animals and humans. There is an alternative
setup to this, called Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL). By providing an agent with the
information about the environment and examples of behaviour from an external source, it is
possible to teach the agent the reward function (Fig. 2.13, panel b)). This type of learning is
similar to another learning method exhibited by animals and humans, learning by imitation.
As an example, this is the type of learning mechanism people use initially when learning
martial arts. The instructor shows the movements in detail and the students observe and
repeat. They will then, by trial-and-error, perfect the movement and improve its efficiency.
The combination of this two learning points of view is called apprenticeship learning (Abbeel
and Ng [2004]; Kober et al. [2013]).
Fig. 2.13 The scheme of information flow in reinforcement learning in panel a), and inverse
reinforcement learning in panel b).
The expert trials shown to the agent can be used as training data, with a supervised
learning approach, to map states to actions (Kober et al. [2013]). Moreover, the available
information can be used to restrict the boundaries of the search and avoid global exploration
for both the state-space and the policy (Kober et al. [2013]). Naturally, if the expert knowledge
provided is not in the neighbourhood of the optimal solution, only local optima can be
achieved. In a robotics setup, the expert demonstrations can be performed by manipulating
the robot itself or by showing the movement and letting the agent observe it. The latter
case can sometimes be problematic due to limitations of degrees of freedom or simply
incomparable properties of human demonstrator and robot. Nevertheless, in a ball-in-a-cup
task by Kober et al. [2008] and in a pendulum swing-up task by Atkeson et al. [1997], motion-
capture technology has been used to record and encode the movements of the demonstrators
so that the robot could interpret them. Explicit expert demonstrations by direct manipulations
can be achieved by, for example, guiding a robot in a navigation task to initialise the Q-
function table in Conn and Peters [2007]. Alternatively, direct manipulation of the robot, also
known as kinesthetic teaching, has been used in several works: a reaching task (Bitzer et al.
[2010]; Guenter et al. [2007]), in a T-ball batting task (Peters et al. [2004]), in a ball-in-a-cup
task (Kober and Peters [2009]) and in a door opening and object pick-up task (Kalakrishnan
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et al. [2011]). State-of-the-art acrobatic helicopter flight learning was accomplished by
Coates et al. [2009], by a combination of trajectories demonstration by human experts,
extraction of approximate models via machine learning and locally optimal control methods
(Kober et al. [2013]).
Reinforcement learning has also been used to create Financial Trading Systems (FTS),
with promising results (Bertoluzzo and Corazza [2007, 2012]; Chen et al. [2007]; Lee
[2001]; Moody and Saffell [2001]; O et al. [2006]), and to develop agent-based Stock Market
Simulations (Rutkauskas and Ramanauskas [2009]). These works use RL as a predictive tool
for future prices but do not attempt to use RL as a descriptive account for describing investors’
behaviour. In an effort to provide a unified account of decision-making tasks involving
learning from experience we link computational models from reinforcement learning with
ideas from prospect theory. The former is a descriptive computational framework used
to capture the mechanisms behind the formation of biases DMs exhibit when operating
decisions in the tasks of interest. The latter is a descriptive theory of the psychological biases
which lead to deviations from maximisation and irrational behaviour in such tasks.

Chapter 3
Experimental studies of decisions from
experience
The first part of this study aims to clarify how decision-making behaviour deviates from
rationality for subjects learning from experience and the role of myopia and payoff variability
in this process. Relevant studies on decision tasks involving experience and feedback are
presented in this chapter, along with the modelling efforts and their findings. This review
will include details on the experimental data used in this thesis, which has been collected in
Barron and Erev [2003], partly replicating the experimental setup in Thaler et al. [1997].
Both these studies present some challenges: firstly the behaviour shown by the subjects
is quite varied, with some players performing opposite decisions. Moreover, the attempts to
model these decisions were based on aggregate modelling, which leads to lack of granularity.
The relationship between myopic behaviour and performance is studied with a method-
ological shift from these previous studies, by modelling participants separately. Another
methodological limitation is the adoption of a measure of distance between observed and
predicted choices as model estimation, which can be improved with a probabilistic approach.
Results from these studies identify Reinforcement Learning as a potential component of the
models studied, leading to the choice of testing subjective RL models in this thesis.
The previous studies do not try to model the influence of the history of the observed
payoffs on the preference of the subjects. This thesis’ first hypothesis is focused on this and
intends to shed light on the relationship between information previously obtained by a subject
and future choice preference. To do so, the RL models adopted will be augmented with a
two-state space setup. Confirming this association between previous outcomes and decision-
makers’ risk preference will inform future experiment designers that payoff information
is a crucial part of the environment and the modalities of presenting it should be carefully
evaluated.
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Loss aversion has been widely proven to affect choice behaviour. Even if some attempts
have been made to encapsulate this into the models adopted in previous studies, these never
tested alternatives. Multiple reward functions are adopted in this work to test the hypothesis
that subjects are loss averse and show diminishing sensitivity to gains and losses. This test
will help improve the understanding of the modalities with which decision-makers internalise
information about potential losses and act accordingly.
Similarly to how previous studies have attempted to model loss-aversion tendencies,
speed of learning has been included in the components of the models proposed. More
variability in the observed payoffs leads to an increase in the time required for a subject to
learn the correct action. This modelling approach is maintained in this thesis in order to
capture this phenomenon and as an attempt to confirm these findings within the RL modelling
framework.
According to these works, the variability in observed payoffs also influences the degree
of exploration of the subjects. A fourth hypothesis is proposed in order to better understand
this potential relationship within the proposed modelling scenario.
Finally, all the modelling attempts made in these studies decisions do not focus on time
discounting, which could prove a valuable addition to understanding individual decision-
making. Therefore, another hypothesis of this work is focused on the relationship between
far-sightedness and task performance. In case this relationship is confirmed, this work will be
evidence for a need of more complex models when attempting to describe choice behaviour.
An overview of the previous works is provided in the next sections. The modelling efforts
attempted will be detailed in section 3.3. The results of these studies are presented in section
3.2 while in the last section 3.4, a full critique about these works is presented.
3.1 Previous studies on loss aversion and myopia
In their study, Thaler et al. [1997] structured the experimental conditions in a way to test
two phenomena that affect the decision-making process in tasks involving experience and
direct feedback: loss aversion and myopia. Loss aversion is a phenomenon which leads to
the preference of decision-makers (DM) for safe options, even when these lead to suboptimal
results in the long term. Out of two prospects, the option that maximises the long term return
but also yields negative outcomes, is considered less worthy than the lower valued option
which consistently grants low but positive payoffs. In Gneezy and Potters [1997], Thaler
et al. [1997] and previously in Benartzi and Thaler [1995], the concept of myopia is defined
according to features of mental accounting, which according to PT, defines the framing of
the choices and the subsequent outcomes a DM faces. Individuals who frame decisions in a
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narrow way will have the tendency to operate short-term decisions, while those subjects who
have a wider framing will tend to follow long-term strategies. In the same fashion, individuals
will evaluate their gains and losses more frequently when they frame past outcomes in a
narrow way. According to Thaler et al. [1997], these two points of view combined - narrow
framing of decisions and of outcomes - define a myopic investor. These concepts are related
to the equity premium puzzle. Mehra and Prescott [1985] show that DMs prefer the less
volatile option (T-bills, bonds) as opposed to the risky one (equities, stocks), even if the risky
option has been proved to greatly outperform the risk-free counterpart. This can be explained
as a result of both loss aversion and myopic accounting (Benartzi and Thaler [1995]; Thaler
et al. [1997]). Investors are reluctant to take on assets which can lead to losses. At the same
time investors who do not wait enough time to assess their decisions outcomes might never
witness the higher average return of stocks achievable in the long-term.
The experimental design used to test these effects in Thaler et al. [1997] is the following:
80 students from University of California Berkeley were subjects in the task of portfolio
management. They were asked to allocate a portfolio comprising 100 shares between 2
available investment options. Fund A payoff was a draw from a normal distribution with
mean 0.25% and standard deviation 0.177%, truncated at 0 to avoid negative payoffs. This
option describes the safe option. Fund B payoff, which instead characterised the volatile
option, was a draw from a normal distribution with mean 1% and standard deviation 3.54%.
These distributions were chosen to characterise the real-world returns of five-year bonds
and value-weighted stock index over 6.5 weeks. The subject did not know the distributions
beforehand and had to acquire this information, learning about the returns of the options
through direct experience. The subjects were subdivided into four groups, each assigned to a
different condition. In the first group, named “monthly” condition, the subject had to decide
the portfolio allocation for 200 trials. In the second group, denominated “yearly” condition,
subjects did the same for 25 times, each decision was binding for the subsequent 8 trials. For
the third group, “five-yearly” condition, subjects made only 5 allocations, each one biding
for 40 trials. The last group, “inflated monthly” followed the same structure as the “monthly”
group but the payoffs were shifted by 10% in order to prevent the subject from experiencing
negative returns in any of the investments available. At the end of the 200 trials, subjects
were asked to make a final decision which would be binding for 400 trials and for which
there would be no intermediate feedback. Summarising, the available portfolio options were:
A : X ∼N (0.25, 0.177) truncated at 0
B : X ∼N (1, 3.54)
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The conditions to which the students were assigned were:
1 monthly: 200 allocations during 200 trials;
2 yearly: 25 allocations, binding for the following 8 trials;
3 five-yearly: 5 allocations, binding for the following 40 trials;
4 inflated monthly: same as monthly but with a positive shift of 10% for the payoffs.
Similar experimental conditions were studied in Barron and Erev [2003], to better
understand the deviations from maximisation that occur when DMs face a feedback-based
decision task, which are often in the opposite direction of the ones that happen when DMs face
decisions from description. Interestingly, two of the conditions examined are replications of
the first and the last scenarios from Thaler et al. [1997], respectively “monthly” and “inflated
monthly”. A third condition not studied in the original work is added. The design for the
replication study was similar but with substantial differences.
36 students participated in the experiment, most of them second or third year industrial
engineering or economics students with some knowledge of probability and economics from
their course. Subject were not told the experiment would last exactly 200 trials in order to
avoid a change in their risk attitude, but they knew the duration of the experiment would
be approximately 30 minutes to an hour. Subjects were randomly distributed in each of the
three conditions.
Fig. 3.1 A replication of the original experimental screen for the “gamble” tasks studied
in Barron and Erev [2003]. The buttons represent the two available choices and the two
numbers represent the outcome of the last action and the total accumulated reward.
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The baseline condition, a replication of the “monthly” condition in Thaler et al. [1997],
featured two unlabelled options (in this summary L for low risk and H for high risk):
L : X ∼N (25, 17.7) truncated at 0 to avoid negative payoffs (implied mean 25.63).
H : X ∼N (100, 354).
The second condition (replicating “inflated monthly” condition in Thaler et al. [1997])
displayed the same options, but their underlying payoff distributions were shifted of 1200
points, to avoid negative payoffs, while keeping the standard deviations the same:
L : X ∼N (1225, 17.7).
H : X ∼N (1300, 354).
In the third conditions, which was not tested in the original study, the options had the
same mean as in condition 2 but both had a standard deviation of 17.7.
L : X ∼N (1225, 17.7).
H : X ∼N (1300, 17.7).
The “money-machine” game interface presented to the subjects is replicated in Fig. 3.1
and consisted of two buttons and two feedback outputs: the latest payoff which appeared
after a choice was made and lasted for 1 second and the total accumulated payoff, which
was permanently displayed. Subjects only made a selection between the two options and
received only the payoff information about the selected option and an update of their history
payoff balance. No information was given about the forgone payoff (the payoff of the option
not selected). The accumulated points were then translated into real money at the end of the
trials with a conversion rate of 100 points = 0.05 Shekels, which at the time of date collection
corresponded to about 0.0125 USD. Subjects also received a flat reward of 5 Shekels for
having participated in the experiment. The final payoffs ranged from 6.25 to 15 Shekels,
corresponding to about 2 to 4 USD.
The proportion of maximisation (Pmax) performance measure in Barron and Erev [2003]
is calculated as:
Pmax =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
[ci = high] (3.1)
where [· · · ] are the Iverson brackets 1, ci is the choice at the i− th trial and N = 200 is the
total number of trials. This measure cannot be directly evaluated by the subjects as they are
1defined on a logical proposition P: [P] = 1 if P is true, 0 otherwise.
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not aware of which option is the one with the highest expected payoff. It is instead used as
the measure of task performance which the experiment designer considers to assess whether
individuals improve over the course of the trials (e.g. Barron and Erev [2003]; Erev and
Barron [2005]; Erev et al. [2012]; Thaler et al. [1997]).
The proportion of maximisation choices (Pmax, section 4.1.16, eq. 3.1) offers a measure
of the subjects performance in this task. It is used to track the overall change in behaviour
over the course of the entire duration of the subjects’ interaction with the money-machine.
Each subject choice dataset comprises 200 trials. The plots in Fig. 3.2 are obtained by
subdividing the choices in four blocks of 50 trials. Each panel of this figure represents a
condition and each line represents a subject’s Pmax across the four blocks. In the first two
panels of Fig. 3.2, which present the Pmax learning curves for the first two conditions, it can
be noted that the subjects produce quite diverse behaviour. This variability is what motivates
the proposed methodology for this study, analysing each subject separately and characterising
their strategy with the most appropriate model among the ones proposed. Previous analyses
aggregated the choice-data for each subset of subjects within a condition, producing an
“average subject”. As shown in the figures, there is quite a lot of variability among subjects,
therefore the average subject would not be representative of the experiences and decisions of
each individual subject and could only reflect a distorted version of the strategies composing
it. It is also interesting to note an overall shift of the learning curves towards a higher
proportion of maximisation choices between condition 1 and 2. As suggested in Barron
and Erev [2003], this is likely due to the loss aversion phenomenon. In fact, subjects in
condition 1 experienced either positive but low outcomes or a wide range of payoffs which
could also be negative. Even if the distance between the means and the payoff variance was
held constant between condition 1 and 2, the mean payoffs were shifted so that in the second
condition no negative payoff could be experienced. The third figure shows the Pmax learning
curves for the third condition and presents the strongest learning pattern exhibited across the
three conditions. It can be seen that the subjects learned to consistently choose the option
which would maximise their profit early in the first blocks and increased this preference
over the course of the remaining trials. These general patterns of learning behaviour are
in line with other studies (Hertwig and Pleskac [2010]; Mehlhorn et al. [2013]), where
the decision-makers showed an impaired ability to choose between two options when the
observed difference between the payoffs of the two was smaller.
Subject 9 in condition 2 (the blue line at the bottom) exhibits a compelling instance of
odd behaviour. It appears to briefly choose the best option in the first block before turning to
the lower one and continuously selecting it for the rest of the interaction. It could appear that
this subject represents an outlier. A more detailed inspection of the interactions pertaining to
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this individual revealed that in the first block the maximisation option was selected only at
a point, resulting in a much lower outcome compared to the payoffs obtained in the many
selections of the lower option up to that point. In substance, this subject briefly explored
but never witnessed an outcome which would appear to be truly worth switching choice.
Because this strategy is still reasonable, yet suboptimal, subject 9 was not removed from the
dataset analysed. Another interesting pattern is the one presented by subject 11 in the same
condition, portrayed by the purple line peaking during block 2 and 3, at the 100th and 150th
trial and then falling to a proportion of 10% of Pmax choices. This inversion of trend seems
counter-intuitive but it is readily explained by the outcomes obtained which are plotted as
average for each block in Fig. 3.3. Condition 2 subjects are all plotted with dashed lines
except for subject 11, in order for the comparison to be more immediate and readable. It can
be noted how for such subject the average payoff greatly reduced in block 3 (150 trials mark),
leading to a change in strategy in the subsequent 50 choices. This peculiar example shows
how the task in this condition, as well as in condition 1, was not trivial. On the contrary,
the graphical indications from condition 3 figure point in the direction of straightforward
learning for the majority of the individuals.
3.2 Findings and interpretation
The results in Thaler et al. [1997] support both myopic loss aversion predictions. The
first hypothesis predicted that the commitment of individuals to the low-risk option would
decrease as the evaluation time-frame increased. The percentage of final allocation is used to
evaluate the effect of longer evaluation periods. The monthly condition is used as baseline
for the comparison and all the values refer to the final allocations made by the participants.
In the monthly condition 21 subjects committed on average 59.1%±35.4% of their assets to
bonds (low-risk option). In the yearly condition 22 individuals chose on average to assign
to this option 30.4%±25.9% of their assets. The five-yearly condition group (22 subjects)
showed a similar response, with a mean of 33.8%±28.5% their portfolio devoted to bonds.
The two alternative time-frame conditions (yearly and five-yearly) are significantly different
to the baseline condition (monthly) but are not significantly different from each other. The
authors identify two potential explanations for the two mean values of bond-allocation being
similar in the yearly and five-yearly conditions. Firstly, the frequency of feedback for the
five-yearly condition is much less than the yearly condition, respectively 5 trials and 40
trials. Secondly, the negative feedback derived from stock oscillations is thought to be the
most insightful experience. These events are much less frequent in the yearly condition as
opposed to the monthly condition, respectively 14 % and 39 % of the trials yielded a negative
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Fig. 3.2 Proportion of maximisation choices aggregated over four blocks (50, 100, 150 and
200 trials marks).
Fig. 3.3 Average payoff obtained by subjects in each of the four blocks of 50 trials each. The
dashed lines are used to make subject 11 easier to visualise.
outcome. Negative feedback was completely absent in the five-yearly as no negative return
was experienced by the subjects. Therefore the difference in frequency between the two wider
time-range conditions is small enough not to produce a noticeable effect in choice behaviour.
The second hypothesis predicted that the low-risk option preferences would decrease when
all available options yield strictly positive outcomes. The 21 subjects in the inflated-monthly
condition presented an even greater reduction from the baseline monthly condition allocation
when compared to the longer time-frame conditions. The subjects chose bonds on average
for only 27.6%±23.2% of their allocation.
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The replication of these conditions by Barron and Erev [2003] leads to similar results
to those obtained in Thaler et al. [1997]. Conditions 1 and 2 replicated respectively the
monthly and inflated-monthly conditions from Thaler et al. [1997]. The aggregated results
of the experiment for the first two problems show similar choice behaviour. The overall
preference emerging from subjects’ aggregated proportion of choices for the risky option,
which corresponds to stocks in the previous study, is 30%(±22%) in condition 1 and 51%
(±21%) in condition 2. The preference for the low-risk options (corresponding to bonds)
decreases when the experienced outcomes are strictly positive in a similar way as in Thaler
et al. [1997]. The results for condition 3, in which the two payoffs have the same mean as in
condition 2 and both have the same variance, show a big increase in subjects’ commitment to
the risky option: 85%±8%. These results indicate that there are two possible explanations
for the deviation from maximisation behaviour in condition 1. The first explanation, as in
Thaler et al. [1997], is loss aversion while the second is payoff variability effect: subjects
deviation from maximisation increases when the payoff variability increases.
3.3 Modelling
In Barron and Erev [2003] the authors use a value assessment (VA) model to provide an
abstraction of the principles believed to cause the behaviour observed: loss-aversion and
reliance on recent outcomes. These are captured in the model with the following assumptions.
The adjusted value of a choice at each time is calculated as a weighted average of subjective
value of the obtained payoffs at previous times.
A j(t+1) = (1−wt)A j(t)+wtv(xt) (3.2)
where A j(t + 1) is the adjusted value of choice j at time t + 1, v(xt) is the subjective
value of payoff xt and wt ∈ (0,1) is the weight of the value. The model also assumes that the
weight wt is dependent on the trial type:
wt =
αVA if t is an exploration trialβVA otherwise (3.3)
where 0≤ β ≤ α < 1. The recency effect is captured by the fact that both α and β do
not decrease with time. The adjustment speed, corresponding to the weight wt , is constrained
to be independent of time t in order to capture the recency effect.
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To avoid the case in which repeated bad outcomes cancel the probability of choosing a
prospect, the model is assumed to explore and exploit based on probability:
P(explore at time t) =
κ
t+κ
(3.4)
where κ is a parameter regulating the strength of the exploration. The loss aversion
principle is captured by the subjective value function:
v(xi) =
xi if xi ≥ 0λxi if xi < 0 (3.5)
where λ is the loss-aversion coefficient of prospect theory’s subjective value function.
In Barron and Erev [2003], the authors did not estimate this coefficient but simply adopted
the value suggested from literature of λ = 2.25 (Tversky and Kahneman [1992]). For
exploitative trials the model will pick the choice with the best associated adjusted value. The
ability of this model to capture the results of the experiments in Barron and Erev [2003]
is estimated by means of minimisation of mean squared deviations (MSD) between the
observed maximisation rates and the model’s predictions.
In a following work, the same authors proposed a more complex model which assumes
REinforcement Learning Among Cognitive Strategies (RELACS). This more complex mod-
elling effort was made, among other purposes, to capture the V-shaped curve of condition
1 (Erev and Barron [2005]), characterised by the choice between L (X ∼ N (25, 17.7)
truncated at 0) and H (X ∼N (100, 354)). This model assumes that in each trial the DM
will follow one of the three cognitive strategies implemented and that the probability of
picking one of the three is based on previous reinforcements obtained in past experiences
with each rule. This model is based on four assumptions, some of which are based on the
observation that probability matching rules provide a good fit to the choice data. The first
rule, named “Fast Best Reply” is a weighted adjustment rule, like the one adopted in the VA
model (Eq. 3.2):
R j(t+1) = R j(t)[1−β ]+ v j(t)β (3.6)
where v(t) is the observed payoff from option j in trial t and β ∈ (0,1) is a recency
parameter which tunes the relevance of recent outcomes. High values of β indicate over-
weighting of recent outcomes. As the task follow the partial feedback paradigm, the value of
action j is updated only when the payoff resulting from action j is observed.
The second strategy considered in the RELACS model assumes a case-based reasoning
along with a loss-avoidance and is structured in two stages. In the first stage the DM randomly
3.4 Discussion and further modelling extensions 69
recalls one of the previous trials for each option and uses the outcomes from the selected
trials as basis for the belief forming process. The loss-aversion check is enforced in the
second stage, in which the DM checks if the action with higher payoff recalled from the first
stage is associated with larger and more frequent losses. This is done by recalling a set of
κ previous outcomes and computing the number of losses and the total losses from such
outcomes. κ is a free parameter which is intended to represent the sensitivity to rare losses.
The third assumption, named “Slow Best Reply”, assumes a stochastic strategy for action
selection which includes a decreasing but continuous exploration. The probability of action j
being picked is calculated with a soft-max rule (Boltzmann distribution):
p j(t) =
exp(Wj(t)λ/S(t))
∑2k=1 exp(Wj(t)λ/S(t))
(3.7)
where λ is the exploration-exploitation trade-off parameter; when λ assumes low values
the action selection becomes more exploratory. This parameter does not have any relation to
the homonym loss-aversion coefficient adopted in their previous work. Wj(t) is the weighted
average payoff for action j and S(t) is a value which measures the payoff variability. The
value of Wj(t) is calculated like in Eq. 3.6 but with a parameter 0 < α < β which implies
slower updating:
Wj(t+1) =Wj(t)[1−α]+ v j(t)α (3.8)
The value of the payoff variability S(t) is calculated as:
S(t+1) = S(t)[1−α]+ |v(t)−max(Last1,Last2)|α (3.9)
where the second term is the absolute value of the difference between the observed
payoff v(t) and the maximum between the last received payoffs of the two available actions,
multiplied by α . The last assumption is the rule for choosing among the three strategies,
which follows the same rule in Eq. 3.7 with the constraint that the weighted average for each
rule is updated only when such strategy was used.
3.4 Discussion and further modelling extensions
The analysis carried out in Thaler et al. [1997] is based on aggregate data but the distribution
of final allocation shows a great degree of difference in allocation among subjects within
each group as shown in Fig. 3.4.
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Fig. 3.4 Distributions of the final allocation to bond fund across subjects for each condition
in Thaler et al. [1997]. The x-axis represents the percentage of allocation to Bond Fund in
the final allocation (duration of 400 trials), the y-axis represents the number of subjects who
allocated that specific quantity of their portfolio to Bond Fund.
This experimental work showed that exposure to less frequent intermediate outcomes
elicits different responses from individuals as opposed to subjects receiving more frequent
feedback. Moreover the results show an increase in the propensity to pick the risky option
when there is no loss involved in doing so. These findings indicate that there is potential for
a more in depth analysis. In fact, examining the results from Thaler et al. [1997] reproduced
in Fig. 3.4, a large variability in choice is noticeable between subjects who learnt that the
stock fund would reward them with higher outcomes in the long term, and subjects who
kept acting sub-optimally, allocating consistent portions of their portfolio to bonds. This
split is particularly strong in the monthly condition (Fig. 3.4 A ), where the population
distribution appears bimodal and U-shaped but an irregular distribution of preference among
participants is also present in condition inflated-monthly (Fig. 3.4 B). A bimodal distribution
could indicate that there are two approaches to the task followed by subjects sub-groups. A
better understanding could be achieved by considering subjects individually and including
the evolution of the subject’s choices and their outcomes over the course of the trials into the
modelling. Even if the results from the aggregate analysis are statistically significant and
interesting in the context of this decision-making tasks, a deeper and quantitative examination
of individual differences could help clarify the potential connections between myopia and
performance. An alternative explanation for the non-normal distributions observed in Figs.
3.4, is the low number of subjects in the study. The number of subjects considered is
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restricted to the data obtained and extending the subject pool is a good starting point for
future improvements of the current analysis.
The approach in Barron and Erev [2003] provides an interesting graphical overall com-
parison for each condition but fails to explain inter-subject variability and does not attempt
to capture the degree to which subjects exhibit myopic behaviour. High values of standard
deviation scores are reported and the analysis of subjects singularly results, as in the previous
work by Thaler et al. [1997], in bimodal U-shaped distributions. The VA model in Barron and
Erev [2003] fails to address this as the analysis is based on the assumption that all subjects
share the same parameters. This model also fails to capture the long-term learning trend.
In condition 1 for example, the trend of observed choice data results in a V-shaped curve
while the VA model predicts a linear decreasing proportion of maximisation choices over
time. Moreover, the fitness of the model to the data is estimated with the mean squared
deviations (MSD) between observed and predicted choices probabilities, but this method has
an important shortcoming in that it aggregates choice data over a large set of experiments
and conditions (4 experiments and a total of 11 conditions). This failure to model subjective
preferences can be addressed with a personalised modelling approach based on maximum
likelihood estimation. This technique, which will be presented and formalised in the next
chapter, does not necessarily aggregate data over many subjects but can be used to maximise
the probability of a model being representative of a series of choices individually, for each
subject.
Finally, the RELACS model was fitted to the data by running 200 computer simulations
of the 40 tasks deriving from the experimental conditions in analysis and searching for the
optimal value for each parameter (Erev and Barron [2005]). The comparison to the observed
data is carried out by means of MSD value and the graphical depiction of the learning
curves for both observed and predicted choice data. The RELACS model is compared to
simpler models, including a reinforcement learning one, which can be described as simplified
versions of RELACS using only one of the strategies (Slow Best Reply). It is pointed out
how the Slow Best Reply learning rule is important as it captures the payoff variability
effect by means of the term S(t) in Eq. 3.7. A further analysis shows that the overall
assumption that the learning process switches among strategies is not very important as
random strategy choice has a fitting performance not much worse than the full RELACS
one. These findings indicates that the RL strategy with stochastic action selection (Slow Best
Reply) and accounting for payoff variability effect, could be the most important component
of RELACS, but the authors favour the full version of their model as it achieves better MSD
score on all the data sets tested. Moreover, the authors point out that the results expose
significant individual differences. The analysis of the individual choices gave rise to many
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disparate distributions of subjective preferences, for many of the problems considered; in
some cases resulting in bimodal U-shaped distributions (Erev and Barron [2005]). The
distribution of proportion of maximisation choices, for three conditions replicating the three
conditions in Thaler et al. [1997], is shown in Fig. 3.5.
After analysing the methods, findings and shortcomings of previous works and in order
to give a meaningful answer to the research questions of this thesis, it is necessary to develop
a different approach to analyse the available data. The proposed modelling methodology
could help link together two powerful descriptive framework of decision-making. Moreover,
the proposed approach is based on the individual fitting of subjects’ choice data, which will
allow for a more in-depth investigation of the differences of decision-makers and how their
strategies correlate to their task performance. In this regard, the suggested models are based
on the powerful reinforcement learning framework, which allows subjects characterisation
from a behavioural point of view, including their myopic or far-sighted tendencies. The details
of this modelling will be presented in Chapter 4. Along with Erev and Barron [2005], other
investigations have effectively used reinforcement learning computational models to describe
experimental decision-making behaviour, but these do not include time discounting into their
learning model (Frey et al. [2015]). The present investigation fills this gap by adopting more
complex models and a probabilistic model-selection methodology, respectively Q-learning
and maximum likelihood estimation.
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Fig. 3.5 Distributions of the subjects according to their proportion of maximisation choices
(Pmax) in all trials and in the second block of trials. The x-axis represent the midpoint of the
proportion of maximisation choices, while the y-axis represent the proportion of decision-
makers. The titles report the original problem number (from Erev and Barron [2005]), and
the gamble with the higher expected value, where N(x,y) is a draw from a normal distribution
with mean x and standard deviation y. The values inside the charts, on top of the figure
indicate the standard deviation of the Pmax. Panel a) presents this information estimated for
all the 200 trials, panel b) shows the same information calculated on the second block of
trials, the last 100 interactions and is a reproduction of Fig. 5 from Erev and Barron [2005].

Chapter 4
Methods and Modelling
This chapter presents the methodology adopted in this work, including the models proposed,
their fitting procedure and the approach adopted to evaluate said models. The first part of
the chapter presents the work focused on testing a series of candidate models, to describe a
dataset of choices and outcomes deriving from an experimental setup from Barron and Erev
[2003], replicating some of the conditions from Thaler et al. [1997]. 36 subjects subdivided
into 3 groups, one for each condition. The subjects interacted for 200 trials with a money-
machine, by selecting an option and received a payoff during each trial. This data is analysed
with a descriptive modelling approach on a subjective level. This method is chosen in order
to estimate the best description of learning process and choice strategy for each subject in
order to understand how these are influenced by other factors, such as the outcomes of the
options chosen by the subjects and their variability.
The second part of this chapter is focused on a quasi-field scenario. Data consisting of
a trading simulation from an online game is used to test some of the models developed in
the first part of the work. The subjects interacted with the game with different levels of
engagement, with the number of trials per subject ranging from 16 to 107. The subjects
would buy some of the available stocks and proceed to sell them at a later point in time. In a
similar fashion to the previous work, the data is analysed on a subjective basis, following a
descriptive modelling approach.
4.1 Subjective value perception, payoff variability, myopia
and performance
The experimental conditions adopted in Thaler et al. [1997] and Barron and Erev [2003],
further examined in Erev and Barron [2005], are good scenarios in which to investigate
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individual strategies. The aim of this work is to capture subjective strategies so to allow a
subject-based investigation. This proposed methodology allows the testing of the hypotheses
of this work, including whether myopia can be considered an explanation of deviations from
maximisation, specifically in the context of a binary choice task with partial feedback such
as the experimental conditions considered in chapter 3. The procedure adopted involves
estimating the best fitting reinforcement learning model for each participant, considered to
be the most representative of the choice set for each subject. This is achieved by determining
the set of parameters best describing their behaviour. Each parameter in these models relates
to a certain aspect of a subjects learning and decision-making behaviour. The parameters to
be estimated with this method are the following:
α : the learning rate parameter, representing the speed with which a subject learns;
β : the inverse temperature, representing the greediness of a subject when picking one of
the available actions;
γ : the discount factor, representing the far-sightedness of a subject.
The strategy of each subject can be therefore described by a set of parameters, which can
be then used to test the hypotheses proposed. By evaluating subjects’ strategies singularly it
is possible to compare individuals’ behaviour on a quantitative basis. This is a novel approach
to analyse the data, as previous efforts were focused on population-wide descriptions even if
large differences had been observed among the subjects.
4.1.1 The effect of previous outcomes on decision-making
The first hypothesis of this thesis is focused on the indication, provided by prospect theory,
that individuals evaluate options according to a relative, non-fixed reference point (Kahneman
and Tversky [1979]). In accordance with this view, a potential way to determine the current
reference point is to consider previous experiences. This part of the research attempts at
clarifying whether past decisions outcomes affect future choices. This concept is closely
related to the “house-money effect” and “break-even effect”, the increased risk-seeking
attitudes of subjects after incurring respectively in gains or losses. According to behavioural
economics, both these mental accounting phenomena could affect the behaviour of subjects
in this type of task (Erev et al. [2008]; Hsu and Chow [2013]; Thaler and Johnson [1990]).
The behavioural data from Barron and Erev [2003], which replicates the experimental
conditions in Thaler et al. [1997] is analysed in this thesis, in order to clarify whether
these phenomena could be affecting subjects in this decision-making tasks. To do so, a
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descriptive modelling framework is adopted and systematically modified to include different
environmental scenarios. When modelling a reinforcement learning task, the structure of
the environment is designed to include the information which are believed to be used by the
agents. Binary decision-making tasks are often modelled with descriptive learning algorithms
focusing only on the quality of the available options, thus neglecting how the information
about prior outcomes could affect the subjects in other ways. In previous works on the same
data, the subjects are modelled as RL agents and are assumed to use their decisions outcomes
to update their beliefs on which option is the best at any point in time (e.g. Barron and Erev
[2003]; Erev and Barron [2005]).
Using Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory shifting reference point as a foundation
concept, this thesis proposes that previous outcomes are considered, not only to update choice
preference, but also to assess the current state subjects consider themselves to be in. While
in previous work the environment is considered to be state-less, the modelling proposed in
this thesis involves expanding the state space to account for previous interaction information.
There is an exception in Plonsky et al. [2015], where dynamic environments are analysed.
In this work, outcomes depend on the current “state of nature” and the states are described
by a Markov chain with transition probabilities unknown to the agent. Their definition of
state-space is similar to the one developed in this thesis but it is substantially different because
the transitions depend on probabilities defined by the authors. In the state-space proposed in
this thesis instead, the transition probabilities are unknown and can only be estimated from
the outcomes received, which are draws from Gaussian distributions.
Considering the binary decision task, and looking from a decision-maker point of view,
previous outcomes information is provided by the money-machine. As shown in the example
in Fig. 4.4, the money machine shows the amount of virtual money gained or lost with the
last decision and keeps track of the total amount accrued to that point in time. This hypothesis
assumes that decision-makers are influenced by either of these two values. Because two
values are presented, this first hypothesis can be dissected into two tests. The first concerned
with testing whether the full history of previous outcomes influences the strategy the subjects
follow by shifting their reference for future actions. Similarly, the second investigation tests
whether subjects’ reference point is influenced by the latest-outcome. Both parts of this
hypothesis will test a version of the enhanced state-space against the traditional single-state
scenario. Three versions of the environment modelling are developed, each one representing
a different type of mental accounting. In the baseline case, subjects are assumed to consider
each choice solely on the value of the option learned over time. In this scenario subjects do
not consider their situation to be dependent on payoff history. In contrast to this simplistic
scenario, two enhanced configurations are proposed and developed. The first based on the
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sum of previous outcomes, the second only on the latest one. The information for both is
present in the graphical interface the subject used in the task (Fig. 4.4).
Both these setups encompass a two states environment, with the current state of the
system being determined based on either of the two values presented by the interface. In the
first case the subjects are assumed to determine their current state considering the entirety of
previous outcomes they experienced, the sum of gains and losses resulting from their previous
choices. Subjects have this information in the form of the sum of the payoffs obtained (Fig.
4.2, panel a, third row: “Total”). In the second modelling, only the latest outcome is used
to determine the reference point of a subject. Subjects have access to this value from the
money-machine (Fig. 4.2, panel a, second row: “Outcome”).
These state-space models represent a potential link between reinforcement learning
modelling framework with prospect theory’s (PT) reference points. The ability of the
reference system to shift and adapt to the psychophysical perception of an individual is
encapsulated in the RL model by defining the state-space accordingly.
The baseline state-less environment together with the two binary-state spaces gives rise to
three scenarios. These scenarios will be fitted to the data and their descriptive value estimated
probabilistically with the maximum likelihood estimate methodology described previously.
The results of this model fitting procedure will be used to compare the scenarios and test
both parts of the first hypothesis. More detailed information about the structure of the models
tested in this descriptive study is provided in modelling section 4.
4.1.2 The effect of subjective perception on option values
Descriptive modelling attempts have been made in the past with the intent to capture how
people perceive and internalise the outcome of their decisions, or the prospects of the available
options. Among the many models a explanatory account of decisions from description is
Prospect Theory. Loss aversion (LA) is one of the most representative and celebrated
ideas introduced by Prospect Theory. LA concept refers to the decision-makers’ subjective
perception of losses to be about twice as strong as gains of similar magnitude. The way this
effect is captured by PT is by introducing a kink in the origin of the value function. The value
function is a mapping of outcomes to the perceived value of that outcome and the origin is
the point of reference from which outcomes are assessed as profitable or detrimental by a
decision-maker. The subjective value function adopted by PT, portrayed in figure 4.1, is a
transformation function which takes as input the objective value of a payoff and translates
it into a value representing the perceived utility of that outcome. It is worth noting that
positive outcomes will be always perceived as positive yet decreasing in subjective value and
viceversa for the negative outcomes. This diminishing sensitivity to the magnitude of the
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outcomes is encoded in PT value function. Empirical evidence showed people behave as if
risk-averse in the gains domain while behaving as if risk-seeking in the losses, leading to the
the S-shape of the function which describes the pattern of diminishing utility of gains and
diminishing discomfort for losses.
In modelling studies a transformation function modifies the value of received payoff,
mapping it to the corresponding subjective perceived outcome. The second hypothesis
regards the subjective perception of the option values. This is tested by adopting different
types of subjective function and studying the most representative of the subjects in this
task. PT value function is a good candidate of reward function and represents a relatively
sophisticated description of the subjects’ internalisation of action values. The PT value
function adopted in this thesis will leverage the parameters estimated in previous studies
and rely on those so that the current work can focus on estimating the quantities of interest
for the hypotheses at hand. Therefore, the parametrisation of the PT value function follows
the parameters from Tversky and Kahneman [1992]: αPT = βPT = 0.88 and λPT = 2.25.
In order to test whether this is indeed an appropriate descriptive reward function, it will
be tested against least sophisticated functions. The simplest reward function to be tested
is the identity function, which does not modify the reward values and can be considered
the baseline reward function as it is the least refined. The adoption of raw payoffs within
the modelling of learning process and decision-making is still widely used in descriptive
modelling studies (e.g. in Erev and Barron [2005]). Another interesting reward function to
test is a transformation which fully saturates the value of payoffs. This can be achieved by
adopting an horizontally asymptotic sigmoidal. This last transformation function represents
an extreme version of decreasing utility, which for very high (or very low) values of payoff
saturates to a certain value. Such function would be able to capture extreme desensitisation to
gains and losses. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the three proposed
reward functions. The expectation for the outcome of the test of this second hypothesis is
that the prospect theory’s subjective value function will be the transformation function best
characterising the subjects in the dataset.
4.1.3 The effect of payoff variability on learning speed and choice ran-
domness
In Myers and Sadler [1960] a “card flipping” task was used to study decisions from experience.
In each trial, the participant had two cards, the first would be flipped and reveal a payoff
(the safe option in their scenario). The subject would then either accept that payoff or risk
flipping the second card. The paradigm adopted in their work was of minimal information:
80 Methods and Modelling
Fig. 4.1 An example of subjective value function from prospect theory, with the parameters
estimated in Tversky and Kahneman [1992]: αPT = βPT = 0.88 and λPT = 2.25.
subjects received information about the outcome of the cards flipped but were not shown the
forgone payoff of the risky alternative, in the case the safe card was chosen. Their results
showed that the proportion of maximisation choices was reduced when the variability of the
risky option was increased (Myers and Sadler [1960]). Years later Busemeyer and Townsend
[1993] named this phenomenon the “payoff variability effect”, and along with other studies
contributed to point out its robustness (Erev and Barron [2005]; Erev et al. [2012]; Haruvy
et al. [2001]). The third and fourth hypotheses of this dissertation regard the payoff variability
(PV) effect and its relationship on learning and decision-making.
Payoff variability is a measure of the fluctuations in the outcomes experienced by a subject.
Higher PV can lead to random choice behaviour (Myers and Sadler [1960]), potentially
originating from a slower learning effect (Erev and Barron [2005]). This can be ascribed to
the fact that in highly uncertain environments, an otherwise reasonable exploration can be
perceived as counterproductive, leading to purely random and non-exploratory behaviour
(Erev and Barron [2005]). The relationships between variability in the observed outcomes
and learning speed or decision-making randomness have not been tested systematically in
previous works. This thesis proposes a methodology to test two hypotheses concerned with
these two aspects of the learning and decision-making in the task at hand. The method
proposed is focused on using those components of the descriptive models which capture
and measure learning speed and choice randomness. Payoff variability is defined in Erev
and Barron [2005] and reported in this thesis in Chapter 3, section 4, Eq. 3.9. In their
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methodology the PV value is estimated on a trial-by-trial basis and serves as a scaling factor
in the proposed model’s action-selection policy. The estimation of PV in this thesis does not
need to track its evolution in time, a final value summarising each subject’s experience can
be used instead. Therefore a simplified version of PV consisting in the standard deviation of
the outcomes received by a subject over the course of the 200 trials will be adopted:
PVsub j = σsub j =
√
1
N
N
∑
i=1
(oi−µ)2 (4.1)
where oi is the outcome received during the i− th trial, N is the number of trials a subject
interacts with the money-machine and µ = 1N ∑
N
i=1 oi is the mean of the outcomes received
by the subject.
The third hypothesis involves studying the relationship between payoff variability and
speed of learning to clarify whether increased variability in the payoffs obtained by a subject
could result in impaired learning; the indication from literature is that an increase in payoff
variability leads to a slowing in the subjects learning process (Busemeyer and Townsend
[1993]; Erev and Barron [2005]). To test this hypothesis the subset of models best fitting
the choices is identified for each subject in the dataset. All models include a learning rule
which features a parameter representing the speed of learning. This parameter quantifies
the proportion of information subjects use when building their beliefs about action values.
The learning speed parameter estimate of each subject paired with the corresponding payoff
variability value will allow for a direct comparison of these two quantities. The correlation
between the PV and the learning rate parameter estimate values, and the significance level of
such relationship will be estimated in order to provide a statistically meaningful answer to the
question of interest. The expectation is that the results will confirm previous investigations
findings (Erev and Barron [2005]), that there is a significant negative correlation between the
two quantities.
In a similar fashion, the fourth hypothesis focuses on the relationship between payoff
variability and the subjects’ action-selection strategy. More precisely, it investigates whether
an increase in perceived payoff variability leads a subject to a more random choice behaviour.
All the proposed models that will be fit to the data include a probabilistic action-selection
policy, featuring a free-parameter that estimates the degree of randomness in a subject’s
choices set. This parameter is referred to as “inverse temperature” and the more random
choice is in the data, the close this parameter estimate is to 0. Higher values instead,
correspond to more exploitative behaviour, that is selecting the option which is believed to be
the best at a particular time without exploring the alternative. This behavioural pattern is also
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commonly referred to as “greedy”. The expectation for this test is that there is a significant
negative correlation between PV and the action-selection free-parameter, implying that when
the obtained payoffs variability is high the choice behaviour is more erratic.
Two components of the modelling proposed in this thesis are of central importance for
testing these two hypotheses. These were introduced in Chapter 2: the learning model and
the probabilistic action-selection policy. The estimation of the free-parameters of interest
is done following the model fitting procedure discussed earlier in this chapter, in section
4.1.14. The best fitting models for a subject are identified according to the Akaike weights
methodology presented in subsection 4.1.15 and formally defined in eq. 4.18 and eq. 4.19.
This setup allows to identify a single value for each free-parameter starting from the estimates
of each model in the best models subset and weighting these by the amount of evidence in
their favour. For both hypotheses the expectation is that payoff variability has a statistically
significant (p ≤ 0.05), negative (R < 0) correlation with both learning speed and choice.
The implications of these hypotheses being confirmed will strengthen previous literature
indications that higher uncertainty in the payoffs observed has an effect on speed of learning
and decision-making.
4.1.4 The effect of myopic behaviour on task performance
The fifth hypothesis targets the relationship between the degree of far-sightedness in subjects’
behaviour and their performance in the task. An intuitive measure of performance in the task
studied can be identified in the total accrued rewards. Another measure for performance is
the amount of time the best option has been selected, which directly influences the sum of
payoffs. This is what has been used in previous work on the same dataset (Erev and Barron
[2005]). Because these two are both meaningful ways to assess task performance they will
both be used in this test.
Myopic behaviour can be described as choice behaviour which seeks short-term goals,
disregarding the long-term implications of present-time choices. The opposite of myopic
behaviour is far-sighted behaviour and in Thaler et al. [1997] terminology it is referred
to as long-term framing relative to feedback frequency. Far-sighted individuals are not
concerned with gaining the highest immediate reward but with maximising the potential
long-term return, which sometimes includes exploration to discover better and previously
unknown alternatives. The null hypothesis for this fifth investigation is that there is no
correlation between the amount of far-sightedness subjects show and their task performance.
The alternative hypothesis is that far-sighted subjects achieve higher performance for the task
in analysis.
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The cumulative rewards based performance measure is defined as the sum of outcomes
accumulated during the 200 trials the subject interact with the money-machine:
CR =
N
∑
i=1
oi (4.2)
where oi is the outcome of the choice at the i− th trial and N = 200 is the total number
of trials. This measure represents a possible way subjects assess their performance: by using
the value “total” provided by the money-machine interface, as in Fig. 3.1 in the previous
chapter.
The myopic tendencies of the subjects are quantified by the value of a free-parameter in
the learning rule adopted by the models proposed. Specifically, this free-parameter is featured
in the Q-learning update rule and it can be viewed as a scaling factor for the term representing
potential future rewards. It is not necessary to restrict the subjects set to only those who are
best fit by a Q-learning model in order to test this hypothesis. All models can be considered
in the estimation because the average-tracking rule, which is also referred to as immediate
rewards learning, can be considered a particular case of Q-learning, in which the parameter
regulating the value of future rewards is set to 0, effectively considering average-tracking a
nested version of Q-learning. The Akaike weights methodology can be adopted directly to
the results of each discount factor parameter value by considering this value for the nested
model to be γ = 0 and keep it into account when evaluating the weighted-averaged single
estimate used to test the hypothesis. The hypothesis testing method will be similar to the
previous two, evaluating the correlation between the discount factor parameter estimate
and the final accumulated payoffs for each subject. The expectation for this hypothesis
is that there is a positive (R > 0) and significant (p-value ≤ 0.05) correlation between the
discount factor parameter values of the subjects and their payoffs performance. In other
words, the expectation is that subjects who are best fitted by short-sighted models achieve
lower cumulative payoffs in the task; viceversa far-sighted subjects have better performances.
This prediction can be interpreted as the following pattern: those subject who care more
about their final score explore more and learn to identify the option which yields the best
expected outcome (long-term reward) instead of focusing on the option which gives the
lowest outcome (short-term reward) but requires less exploration to be fully identified.
The implication of this hypothesis holding true is a confirmation of the suggestions from
previous work on myopic behaviour, helping to bridge the gap between the indication that
framing and feedback frequency impair financial decision-making at the population level
(Thaler et al. [1997]) and the evidence that subjective performance is indeed affected by
far-sightedness in binary choice tasks at individual level. As noted in the previous chapter, the
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idea that myopia influences performance in decision tasks has been put forward in literature
by Benartzi and Thaler [1995] and Thaler et al. [1997]. The present descriptive modelling
study of the relationship between the learning rule discount-factor, representing the degree to
which each subject is concerned with future rewards on a subjective level is novel to the best
of our knowledge.
4.1.5 Models details
The proposed models are based on the reinforcement learning framework, therefore this
section begins by defining the components of the framework corresponding to the real life
actors and features of the experiment. The details about the experiment setup are presented
in chapter 3. It involves a repeated choice task on a binary option money machine, spanning
200 interactions. The objective of the task is to maximise the sum of payoffs, which will
be reflected in the actual monetary payoff each subject received from the experimenter.
Subjects do not know the underlying payoff distribution associated with the two buttons.
They receive each payoff after selecting an option. This value is summed to their previous
balance and presented together with the latest payoff. Forgone payoffs, the outcomes of the
option not selected, are not shown. The experimental scenario can be modelled as a learning
problem where the subject, or decision-maker, is the agent and the experimental design is
the environment in which the agent/subject1 operates. The environment of the model can be
concretely derived from the observable features of the experiment.
4.1.6 Choices and Actions
The left and right buttons of the task interface shown in 4.2 (panel a, first row) can be
mapped, in a straightforward fashion, to the actions the agent can take in the modelled
world. The action space is therefore directly encoded from the two button choices to the
two actions. Subjects do not have information about the quality of the options available
as the buttons are unmarked and unlabelled, but for the sake of clarity in this thesis they
will be referred to as Le f t and Right. Each action is randomly associated to the high or
low expected return distribution. There are three conditions of payoff distributions. The
full experimental conditions are described in chapter 3 but will be summarised here for
convenience. In the first condition the returns linked to option High (the option with the
highest expected returns) are drawn from the Gaussian distributionN (100,354) while the
Low option outcomes are draws from the Gaussian distribution N (25,17.7) truncated at
0. In the second condition, both distributions are shifted of +1200 points and maintain the
1agent and subject are synonyms of decision-maker in this section
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Fig. 4.2 Drawing a parallel between the actions and states of the experiment and the details
and dynamics of the MDP modelling. Actions are portrayed with labelled filled dots and
states with labelled circles. Panel a) The task graphical interface with the buttons (first
row), latest outcome (second row) and sum of previous outcomes (third row). Panel b) The
simplest state-space, referred to as “single-state”, is modelled with an absorbing state where
the agent is assumed to be no matter the outcome of his actions. In this scenario the agent
is concerned with learning only the value of each action. Panel c) The two-state modelling
can be defined either on the latest payoff or on the sum of all payoff received. An agent can
remain in a state or move to the other one depending on the definition of the state-space and
the outcome deriving from the choices made in the past. These two configurations are going
to be compared to the single-state configuration to test the first hypothesis and determine
whether subjects are influenced by previous outcomes when making decisions.
same standard deviations: High∼N (1300,354) and Low∼N (1225,17.7). The third and
last condition, originally used to test payoff variability effects on the entire population, is
characterised as High∼N (1300,17.7) and Low∼N (1225,17.7). This last configuration
greatly reduces the uncertainty in decisions at the population level (Erev and Barron [2005])
and will help test the third and fourth hypotheses of this thesis, regarding the influence
of payoff variability on learning speed and randomness of action-selection. An intuitive
visualisation of this connection is shown in Fig. 4.2.
4.1.7 State-space
When modelling the environment of a problem, the states should include all the information
required by an agent to make a decision at any point in time. This is the Markov property.
In this thesis, the baseline model captures the simplest scenario, in which the agent is
concerned only with the value of the actions without assessing the current state of the world.
The learning problem is simply to learn which of the available actions is the best. This is
referred to as single-state and can be represented by a trivial state space model assuming a
dummy state, depicted in Fig. 4.2, panel b. This version of the model reflects the typical
two-armed bandit problem setup adopted in literature. In order to test the first hypothesis, that
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information about previous interactions influences decision-makers, the state-space needs to
be enhanced.
There are two ways to define this enhanced state-space, each considering a different
portion of the graphical interface. During the interaction (Fig. 4.4), the subjects are shown
the payoff obtained from the last choice and the accumulated payoffs, which is updated after
each choice. Both these quantities are directly observable by the subjects. The second row in
Fig. 4.2 panel a) highlights the portion of the money machine presenting the outcome of the
latest choice, while the third row of the same figure highlights the total accumulated payoffs.
These two quantities are used to define the states-space of the model relating to each of the
two parts of the first hypothesis.
As introduced in chapter 2, prospect theory (PT) suggests that the reference point from
which individuals assess the outcome of their decision shifts subjectively, this property is
also known as prospect theory’s relative reference point assessment (Kahneman and Tversky
[1979]). PT value function captures the subjective value of prospects based on a reference
point which is not fixed on general terms but moves based on the subjective perception of
these values. Integrating the ability of this reference point to shift into the learning model used
to describe decision-makers’ behaviour, constitutes the novelty in the approach proposed
in this work. In an effort to integrate this feature of PT into the reinforcement learning
framework, the modelling of the state-space will reflect the notion of changeable reference
point. Plonsky et al. [2015] work on dynamic environments considers states configurations
that depend on previous outcomes, focusing on the influence of the transition probabilities.
Integrating the reference point information into the learning model through the state-space is,
to the best of our knowledge, a novel idea that could help bridge the gap between prospect
theory’s shifting reference points, the reliance on recent samples observed in literature and
the reinforcement learning computational modelling framework. There is virtually no upper
bound to the amount of information that can be considered in the modelling process. Previous
life experiences, temperature of the room, hunger or thirst of a subject, can all affect the
state of a subject and the following decisions. According to the Markov property though, the
representation of a real-world scenario with a modelled version needs to capture all and only
the meaningful aspects of the learning problem. The house-money effect and the break-even
effect are potential explanations of the reference point shifting in either direction, more
or less risk-seeking depending on previous gains/losses. According to these phenomena,
a subject whose wealth increased during the trials will consider the value of the available
options in a different way than a subject who obtained poorer previous outcomes. Therefore,
in the proposed model it is assumed that previous outcomes affect a subject’s reference point,
leading to the representation of previous outcome experiences with a binary state-space.
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According to the two effects documented, a subject could become more risk-seeking in case
he gains money because of not yet having factored in the gains as owned (house-money
effect). In the opposite circumstance, if a subject loses money from previous interactions
he will feel the pressure to regain the lost money at the cost of being more risk-seeking
(break-even effect).
Two cases can be identified for this experiment-model translation: in the first the subject
considers the sum of all previous outcomes as reference point; in the second case the subject
uses the outcome from the previous decision as a reference point. The state-space defined on
total accumulated payoffs shifts according to the sign of total accumulated rewards, starting
from the initial wealth, considered to be 0 for all subjects. The other type of discretisation
refers to a change of state based on the sign of the latest experienced outcome.
Indication that the latest transaction outcome could model decision-making well comes
from experimental studies identifying recency to be a strong candidate to explain decision-
making biases (Erev and Barron [2005], Hertwig et al. [2004]). In these works recent
outcomes have been shown to be highly predictive of future choices and to be able to explain,
together with undersampling, phenomena like the underweighting of rare events. Both these
binary arrangements are also supported by the graphical representation of the task. In the
interface of the task both these information are presented to the subjects, in the form of last
choice outcome and total accumulated payoffs (Fig. 3.1 and 4.2). These modelling gives
rise to three configurations: state-less, two-state based on full history and on latest outcome.
The model fitting procedure will test each arrangement to determine the setups likelihood of
correctly describing each subject. This will allow for the testing of the first hypothesis. For
both binary scenarios, the state-space S of the experimental task is formally defined as:
S = {gain, loss} (4.3)
where gain and loss depend either on the history of rewards or on the last reward. Let
us consider the full history scenario, in which the sum of all previous outcomes defines
the current state. The balance Bt is defined as the sum of the outcomes received up to the
interaction at time t:
Bt =
t−1
∑
i=0
oi (4.4)
where oi is the outcome received during the i− th interaction.
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It follows that at time t+1, the agent can be in two situations:
state =
gain if Bt ≥ 0loss otherwise (4.5)
This information is provided by the task graphical interface, Fig. 4.2, panel a, third row.
This is the first of the two states-space setups and it serves to test the first part of the first
hypothesis, that individuals decision-making is influenced by information about the sum of
their prior achievements. For the scenario in which the states are defined based on the latest
outcome, the agent’s state at time-step t+1 is defined as:
state =
gain if ot ≥ 0loss otherwise (4.6)
meaning that the sign of the previous outcome determines the current state of the en-
vironment. The intuitive association of this version of the state-space based on the latest
outcome to the information presented to the subjects in the task is portrayed in Fig. 4.2, panel
a, second row.
These two methods to determine the current states, together with the simpler case in
which there is only one state (two-armed bandit problem) represent three configurations
of state-space to be examined. The Markov property holds true for all the configurations
of states proposed in this work. In the single-state case, modelled with a single absorbing
state, this is trivial as there is no history for the states, while information about actions and
associated rewards are incorporated in the policy. Previous rewards obtained for each action
are encoded in the option values the agent learns. In the full history two states scenario, the
sum of accumulated payoffs determines the state in which the agent is. This configuration
holds the Markovian property as well, because the balance Bt provides enough information
to the subjects to make choices in the future in the same way the position of the pieces on
a board of checkers allows a player to make a move. The dynamics of how the player or a
subject got to the current state is lost but they both have sufficient information to make the
next choice. In the relative two states scenario, instead, the Markov property is inherently
satisfied, because the agent considers the latest outcome alone to determine the state.
Each combination of state, action and following state is associated with a transition
probability and expected reward. An illustrative example considering a transition from the
state gain to the state loss by taking action Le f t:
s = gain, s′ = gain, a = Le f t, Pass′ = ρ, R
a
ss′ = R
Le f t (4.7)
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where ρ is the probability of staying in state gain by taking action Le f t. The Markov
Decision Process developed for this task is graphically represented in Fig. 4.2, panel c.
The transition model for the single-state scenario (Fig. 4.2, panel b) is trivial, because for
whichever action the agent will stay in the dummy state with probability 1. The transition
function is not statically defined by the environment, unlike in Plonsky et al. [2015] where
the probabilities for the triplets are predetermined. The transitions probabilities emerge from
the scenario of state discretisation adopted and the outcome of each action. As a result, there
are no predefined values of transition probabilities for each combination of state-action-state.
In the experimental design analysed in this work the MDP is finite as there is a finite
number of interactions (200 trials), even if the subjects were not told that they will interact
this precise number of times, which means that from the subjects’ point of view the task can
be considered as continuing. This characterisation of the task as continuing allows the use of
temporal-difference methods, such as Q-learning. To reconcile this notion with the adoption
of a finite MDP, it can be assumed that the final timestep t = ∞ is an absorbing state at the
end of the experiment (t = T = 200).
4.1.8 Reward functions
A numeric signal is required for the agent to update the actions values. Generally, in rein-
forcement learning tasks the environment provides this signal directly. In this experimental
task the signal can be identified to derive from each choice’s outcome. The goal of the
experimental task was to obtain the highest cumulative payoff. In the reinforcement learning
description, the reward represents the computational counterpart of the payoffs the subjects
seek to maximise in the task. The subjective reward is defined on the payoffs obtained after
each choice. This is convenient as the reinforcement learning framework operates with
real-valued signals and the decisions outcomes in the experiment are real-valued. These
signals can be then transformed by means of a reward function which translates the observed
raw payoffs into subjective utilities. The reward functions proposed in this thesis are used to
test the second hypothesis; that people are loss averse and show diminishing sensitivity to
gains and losses, instead of being insensitive to such effects. To test this hypothesis, three
reward functions are adopted and fitted separately to the choice data. Details about the three
proposed reward functions taken into consideration for this work, in order of complexity, are
provided in the next three subsections.
90 Methods and Modelling
Identity
The simplest reward function in exam is the identity function. It leaves the value and sign
of the payoff unaltered and feeds this value as reward signal to the learning model. This
can be considered the baseline for the modelling, representing an unrefined perception of
each outcome as-is. People who show a linear appreciation of reward values will be best
captured by this reward function as it does not scale nor it reduces the effect of increasing
(or decreasing) values. It is also worth noting that it carries a high potential for numerical
instabilities.
Hyperbolic tangent sigmoid
The second proposed reward function is the hyperbolic tangent function; this sigmoidal
function possesses some interesting features. This function maps unbounded inputs to a
range of values between −1 and +1 and is parametrised to change the slope of the S-shape.
Both range and slope are adjustable and this is convenient because it allows to customise the
function to the range of payoff values of the task. These features permit an easier handling of
extreme values by squashing them into a narrower range, compared to the initial values, at
the same time providing a handy way of capturing the variability of the payoff values in the
new range, by adjusting the slope. The parametric hyperbolic tangent (Tanh) is defined as:
tanh(ot) = η · 1− e
−oω
1+ e−oω
(4.8)
where o is the outcome received by a subject at any step, η is the minimum or maximum
value after the transformation and ω is the parameter regulating the squash of this sigmoidal
function. This is not a free parameter because it is kept constant over all the fitting procedures.
The values adopted are ω = 1/500 and η = 50.
Prospect theory’s subjective value function
The third reward function to be tested is prospect theory’s subjective value function, which
translates the reward obtained from a decision to the subjective utility perceived for such
reward (Kahneman and Tversky [1979]; Tversky and Kahneman [1992]). PT value function
is characterised by three features. It is concave in the gain domain, convex and steeper in
the loss domain, capturing the well documented diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion
individuals show in decisions from descriptions (Fig. 4.1).
The parameters of PT’s value function adopted in this thesis are the ones estimated
and used in previous works (Benartzi and Thaler [1995]; Thaler et al. [1997]; Tversky and
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Kahneman [1992]), and will be denoted with subscript PT to avoid ambiguity with other
parameters in other parts of the modelling. These parameters are fixed and therefore they
do not count towards the modelling fitting parameter search of this thesis. Adapting eq. 2.5
from chapter 2, the reward r obtained from outcome o at time t is:
r(ot) =
o
αPT
t if ot ≥ 0
−λPT (−ot)βPT if ot < 0
(4.9)
with αPT = βPT = 0.88 and λPT = 2.25 (Benartzi and Thaler [1995]; Thaler et al. [1997];
Tversky and Kahneman [1992]). These values of parameters produce the typical prospect
theory value function graphically presented in chapter 2, Fig. 2.2 and reproduced here,
for convenience in Fig. 4.1. This function depicts individuals presenting risk aversion for
choices in the gain domain and risk seeking preferences for gambles in the loss domain. The
parameter λPT captures the loss-aversion property, which makes a loss of a certain quantity
perceived more than twice as bad as if the same quantity would be perceived as good, had
it been a gain. Risk-aversion in the gain domain and risk-seeking preference in the loss
domain are less pronounced, and sometimes reversed, in decisions from experience. This has
been documented in Erev and Barron [2005]. In this regard, allowing three different reward
functions, each one capturing a distinct mapping of payoffs to subjective values allows a
more individualistic descriptive modelling. Prospect theory has another layer of pre-choice
mental accounting which decision-makers are assumed to undergo when evaluating prospects.
They are thought to apply a subjective probability weighting to the objective probabilities
stated in the described choices. As this feature is only qualitatively described in Kahneman
and Tversky [1979], but does not provide a numeric formulation, this would be hard to apply
in the proposed framework. Therefore, this is proposed as a future development in chapter 6,
along with more proposals deriving from the insights gained from this study.
Reward functions comparison
The three reward functions proposed are portrayed together in Fig. 4.3 for comparison. The
identity function (red line) represents the simplest reward function, also adopted in Erev and
Barron [2005]; it is therefore used as baseline for the comparisons. It makes no assumptions
about the subjective perception of action values or about any other sort of effect (e.g. loss
aversion or diminishing sensitivity) but it carries a risk of numerical instabilities. The
hyperbolic tangent (green line) is a sigmoidal function that allows to capture the saturation
of utility known in literature as diminishing marginal utility (Bernoulli [1954]; Dayan and
Niv [2008]; Jensen [1967]; Kahneman and Tversky [1979]; Loewenstein et al. [2008]; Real
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Fig. 4.3 The three reward transformation functions proposed. On the x-axis the original
payoff obtained by a subject choice, on the y-axis the transformed subjective utility of that
reward. The identity function (in red) leaves unaltered the reward value and does not saturate.
The hyperbolic tangent function (in green) saturates, reducing the range of rewards. Prospect
Theory’s subjective value function (in blue) shows a monotonic trend with a steeper slope in
the losses domain capturing both loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity (risk-aversion in
the gains and risk-seeking in the losses domains).
[1991]; Sharpe [1964]; Tobler et al. [2007]). This sigmoidal function has, to the best of
our knowledge, never been tested on choice data for similar tasks before. The most refined
reward function tested is PT’s subjective value function (blue line), which features the ability
to capture loss-aversion by punishing outcomes in the negative domain more strongly than
how equivalent outcomes in the positive domain are rewarded. This choice represents a
potential link between the reinforcement learning framework and prospect theory, together
with the state-space modelling representing PT’s shifting reference points. Hertwig et al.
[2006] already adopted this reward transformation when analysing choices from description.
In their work, as well as in this thesis, the parameters of PT’s value function are assumed to
be the ones estimated in Tversky and Kahneman [1992]. These three reward functions are
adopted to better capture the various subjective perceptions within the choice data analysed,
allowing the second hypothesis to be tested.
An alternative to these functions, which are deterministic and in some cases parametrised
is a stochastic reward function, which would transform the reward probabilistically. In
prospect theory, for example, the value of the available choices is estimated as a combination
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of the subjective value and a probabilistic weighting, denoted with pPT (p), as shown in eq.2.6.
This extension is not implemented in the current work since a probabilistic action-selection
policy is already in place for some of the models to be tested. The details of this component
will be presented later in this chapter, in section 4.1.11.
4.1.9 Learning Models: Average Tracking and Q-learning
The adaptive learning process by which the subjects learn which option provides the best
outcomes and leads to the highest overall payoff is modelled computationally with the
following two learning rules. A simple average tracking rule which considers immediate
rewards only, and Q-Learning as a more advanced learning model. The first rule is equivalent
to the “fast best reply” cognitive strategy in Erev and Barron [2005], and is formally defined
as:
Q(st ,at)← Q(st ,at)+α[rt+1−Q(st ,at)] (4.10)
where Q(st ,at) is the value of the option/action selected at time-step t, rt+1 is the outcome
of that action and α is a step-size parameter. The term in the square brackets represents
the error between the target (reward obtained from an action) and the previous estimate
(expectation of the reward obtainable). This quantity is scaled by α which can be considered
to tune the quantity of information of the error that gets propagated in the current belief
of the agent. According to this simple learning rule, the agent updates the estimate of the
available actions values directly with the numeric signal deriving from the outcomes of the
interactions.
Q-learning is a more advanced learning model which extends the previous method by
introducing a temporal difference term, an estimate of the return (sum of rewards) that can
be obtained choosing the best actions from the following time-step onwards. This term is
scaled by a value, termed discount factor and denoted with γ , which regulates the influence
of future rewards on learning and can be used as a measure of the myopic tendencies of
each participant. Q-learning, as delineated in chapter 2, section 2.25, is widely adopted in
literature because of a large body of evidence describing it as the computational account of
the neural processing counterpart in the brain. This accountability together with a dedicated
parameter which selectively tunes the temporal difference influence on the learning are
the reasons underlying this modelling decision. Moreover, the structure of the state-space
proposed, with previous outcomes modifying the current state a subject is considered to be
in, represents an attempt to link the house-money effect and the break-even effect to this
descriptive account of behaviour. Q-learning is also proposed to account for this linking,
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since it allows agents to take into account future rewards when making decisions in a more
complex binary state-space. For convenience of reading the Q-learning learning rule is
repeated here:
Q(st ,at)← Q(st ,at)+α[rt+1+ γmax
a
Q(st+1,a)−Q(st ,at)]
The simple model represents a baseline for testing as it has been used satisfactorily in
previous work. The Q-learning model is equivalent to the average tracking method in the
case γ = 0, therefore the baseline model can be considered nested within Q-learning update.
The average tracking method represents a simple learning procedure, the agent updates
the internal action values using new evidence and the pace of this process is conveniently
governed by a parameter. This simple approach, though, lacks the power to capture a potential
adaptive learning component, which is the concern with possible future outcomes. Hence the
need to introduce an enhanced model with a dedicated quantity designated to represent this
concern.
As for many other real-world tasks it is not necessary to learn the full state transitions
model as this is often computationally intensive, and intractable in certain cases. Even if
the computational cost of building an environment model for the experiment in analysis is
negligible, previous literature indicated that for such simple task individuals tend to rely on
faster brain computation circuitry (Daw et al. [2005]). The rationale behind this choice is that
model-free reinforcement learning techniques provide a well studied account of brain areas
such as dopaminergic neurons and their dorsolateral striatal projections (Daw et al. [2005];
Doya [2007]; Houk and Wise [1995]; Schultz et al. [1997]).
4.1.10 Initialisation
Considering the modelling of the environment comprising two states and two actions, their
combination gives rise to a two-by-two matrix storing the agents beliefs about the value of
each state-action pair. These values will be initialised to 0 because the experimental design
did not give any indication to the subjects of the range of values the rewards can take. It
cannot be assumed therefore that individuals begin their task interaction with high or low
hopes, respectively optimistic or sceptic initialisation. Another potential way of setting the
initial values is to set them to a high value. This is called optimistic initialisation (Sutton
and Barto [1998]) and is generally used to encourage exploration. These high initial values
are readily adjusted towards their real values after the agent first interactions but have the
effect of pushing an agent to “believe” actions are better than they are. Optimistic values are
a method to improve performance in a reinforcement learning problem. The main objective
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of this thesis is to develop and test descriptive models to better understand the underlying
decision-making processes, therefore this method of initialisation will not be used.
4.1.11 Action-selection: Soft-Max
Subjects in the experiment face a exploration-exploitation trade-off problem when choosing
between the two options. After collecting a certain amount of information, the subject knowl-
edge about which option is best to pick might be biased by an unlucky streak of unfavourable
outcomes. A subject might think they possess enough information to make choices in the
future, that is exploiting the knowledge gained. But to gain a better understanding of which
option leads to the best payoff, it might be necessary to explore by sampling the choice
believed to yield the poorer payoff. Undersampling has been proposed to be the cause
leading subjects to a biased learning of which option is better, in turn leading to suboptimal
behaviour (deviation from maximisation) (Barron and Erev [2003]; Erev and Barron [2005];
Erev et al. [2008]; Hau et al. [2008]; Hertwig and Erev [2009]; Rakow et al. [2008]). To
capture the degree to which each subject is more or less prone to exploration the learning
model needs to be combined with a probabilistic action-selection model. The proposed
policy for action-selection is Soft-Max (chapter 2, section 2.2.1, eq. 2.24). An example of
the formulation of this rule adapted to the model proposed, to calculate the probability of
picking action Le f t is:
P(Le f t) =
eQ(s,Le f t)·β
∑
a∈A(s)
eQ(s,a)·β
(4.11)
where P(Le f t) is the probability of selecting the action with the highest value (not known
to the subjects), e is the exponential function, Q(s,Le f t) is the value of taking action Le f t
when the agent is in state s, A(s) is the set of actions available when the agent is in state s, and
β is the inverse temperature free-parameter which regulates the greediness of the strategy.
This parametric, probability based rule translates the subjective value of actions into a
probability of the actions being selected by the agent. The parameter β allows this descriptive
model to fit the behaviour of the singular subject, identifying a quantitative representation
of the degree or exploration, which can also be read in terms of randomness. Another way
of reading this dimension continuum is the amount of sampling achieved by a subject, with
undersampling behaviour being linked to exploitative individuals.
At this level of detail in the modelling of the task, it is assumed that the level of abstraction
is articulated enough to capture the preferences for the available options expressed by the
subjects, in a probabilistic fashion. In future extensions of this work it would be interesting
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to construct a more complex version of this part of the system, which could factor in the
probability weighting function presented by prospect theory and its improvements (Kahneman
and Tversky [1979]; Tversky and Kahneman [1992]).
4.1.12 Models Summary
The combinations of learning rules, reward functions and state-space setups proposed gives
rise to a number of arrangements to be fitted and assessed against each other and in relation to
previous modelling efforts. These are summarised in table 4.2. Model number 1 (Single-state
with Average Tracking and using the raw payoffs as reward signal) is similar to the two
models tested in Erev and Barron [2005], “slow best reply” and “fast best reply” which have
been defined and analysed in Chapter 3, section 4. This represents the starting point for the
tests and will help determine which model best captures the individual subjects behavioural
data. These procedures are explained in detail in the next section.
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States Space
Single-state SS S = φ
Two-state (latest outcome) LO S = {gain, loss}; s =
{
gain if Bt ≥ 0
loss otherwise
Two-state (full history) FH S = {gain, loss}; s =
{
gain if ot ≥ 0
loss otherwise
Learning Rule
Average Tracking AT Q(st ,at)← Q(st ,at)+α[rt+1−Q(st ,at)]
Q-learning QL Q(st ,at)← Q(st ,at)+
α[rt+1+ γmaxa Q(st+1,a)−Q(st ,at)]
Reward Function
Payoff (raw) ID r(ot) = ot
Hyperbolic tangent TH r(ot) = tanh(ot) = η · 1−e−oω1+e−oω
PT subjective value function PT r(ot) =
{
oαPTt if ot ≥ 0
−λPT (−ot)βPT if ot < 0
Table 4.1 Models components, their abbreviations and their mathematical formulations.
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States Space Learning Rule Reward Function Parameters
1 SS AT ID α,β
2 SS AT TH α,β
3 SS AT PT α,β
4 LO AT ID α,β
5 LO AT TH α,β
6 LO AT PT α,β
7 LO QL ID α,β ,γ
8 LO QL TH α,β ,γ
9 LO QL PT α,β ,γ
10 FH AT ID α,β
11 FH AT TH α,β
12 FH AT PT α,β
13 FH QL ID α,β ,γ
14 FH QL TH α,β ,γ
15 FH QL PT α,β ,γ
Table 4.2 Models summary. Combinations of state-space, learning rule and reward function.
The action selection is soft-max for all the models proposed.
4.1.13 Fitting procedure
To test the hypotheses proposed it is necessary to determine which model best describes each
individual’s strategy, this is achieved by means of a widely adopted model fitting method,
known as Maximum Likelihood Estimation. This probabilistic approach evaluates models
with different sets of parameters against the data, and estimates the likelihood of each model
to be the one generating the data.
4.1.14 Maximum Likelihood Estimate
The Maximum Likelihood Estimate method is widely used in literature to assess how likely
a model is to fit a specific dataset. The formalisation of this approach adopted in this thesis
follows the description given in Daw [2009]. This method is a good choice because it is based
on a probabilistic approach which works well with the probability based modelling developed
in this thesis (e.g. Soft-Max). The fitting procedure results in a numerical value, termed the
maximum likelihood estimate (MLE), that summarises how likely a model is to generate
the data. In the context of the current modelling effort, the free parameters of the models to
be tested describe quantitatively the subjects’ learning and decision-making strategies. To
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evaluate the parameters that best represent a subject’s behaviour, a series of models are fitted
to the data and their quality is described by their MLE. The procedure for a general case
is formalised as follows. Let M be the proposed model with θM, the associated vector of
free parameters and D the data set, it is possible to compute the probability distribution over
possible data sets D as P(D|M,θM). Then, by means of the Bayes’ rule:
P(θM | D,M) ∝ P(D |M,θM) ·P(θM |M) (4.12)
The term on the left hand side of the proportionality is the posterior probability distribution
over the vector of free parameters given the data and the model. This quantity is proportional
to the likelihood function multiplied by the prior probability of the parameters. As there is no
prior knowledge of which parameters values best fit the data, the last term can be considered
uninfluential in the proportionality. Therefore, by maximising the likelihood of the data
given the parameters it is possible to know which parameters best fit the data (the posterior
probability). The most probable values of θM is the maximum likelihood estimate and is
denoted with θˆM. In the case of a dataset comprising choices, the MLE value linked to a
specific vector of free parameters is calculated by iteratively updating the actions’ values
based on the outcomes of the decisions using the learning model in analysis. Subsequently,
these values are used to estimate the probability of picking each of the two options. The
probability of the entire dataset is the product of the probability of each choice ct = c1, · · · ,cT .
Supposing Le f t and Right are two available actions, the probability of each choice ct is
calculated with the Soft-Max rule (eq. 2.24). These values are then multiplied as follows:
∏
t
P(ct = Le f t|Qt(Le f t),Qt(Right)) (4.13)
with ct , the choice at time-step t, being action Le f t as in the example in Fig. 4.4.
The calculation of this product can lead to computational underflow issues due to the
multiplication of probability values in the range (0,1). To obviate this potential drawback it
is possible to take the logarithm of this quantity and compute the sum of the logarithms of
the probabilities instead:
log∏
t
P(ct = high|Qt(high),Qt(low)) =∑
t
logP(ct = high|Qt(high),Qt(low)) (4.14)
where log is the natural logarithm function (base e). This operation is allowed as
the logarithm is a monotonic function which does not alter the relationship between two
estimates. A value in the range (0,1) is simply translated to a value in the range (−∞,0)
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Fig. 4.4 Example of interaction with the money-machine game.
maintaining the magnitude relationships among values. The lower limit is unlikely to be
reached in this specific case, as it is uncommon for options to have probability of being
chosen P(ct) = 0. The result of this transformation is called log likelihood; traditionally
the negative of this value (negative log likelihood) is used instead, making the objective of
the fitting procedure the minimisation of this quantity. The aim is then to minimise this
positive estimate to best fit the data. This reversal is convenient in the context of the fitting
procedure, because the optimisation routine is based on minimisation techniques that use
gradient descent algorithms to estimate the parameter vector best fitting the data. The MLE,
denoted as θˆM, is the set of parameters that maximises the likelihood of the observed data
being generated by the model. Let θˆp be the maximum likelihood estimate for subject p ∈P
whereP is the set of subjects in the dataset. The best model for each subject is estimated
individually by minimising the MLE among the set of potential parameter vectors. The
models evaluated for each subject represent a descriptive account of the individuals strategies,
captured by the explanatory quantities of the estimated parameters. This technique results in
a characterisation of decision-makers behaviour that allows for further subjective analysis
and hypotheses testing.
From a practical standpoint, applying this methodology consists in multiplying the
logarithm of the probabilities of the actions selected by subjects at each time-step. Then
using the outcome associated with the action selected at the current time-step, together with
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the learning rule, to update the value of the state-action pairs, which in turn are used to update
the probability of the actions using the soft-max rule. This dual update is iterated a number
of times equal to the trials of interaction of the subjects.
To understand whether the models proposed in this work are a good descriptive account
of the behavioural data they will be compared to a baseline random model. This comparison
is necessary since the models proposed are all variation of a reinforcement learning model
and the MLE score for each one of these is a comparative measure of a model fitness to the
data, but does not indicate how good it is on an absolute scale. The MLE for the random
model is denoted with (MLERand) and is estimated in the same way as the rest of the models
with the exception that the model offers a 50-50 chance of selecting either of the two available
actions. The probability of picking an action is Pa = 0.5 and there are 200 trials, therefore
the MLE of the model is defined as:
MLERand = log
N
∏
t
P(ct) =
N
∑
t
logP(ct) = N · log(0.5) =−138.63 (4.15)
where N = 200 is the number of trials and P(ct) = 0.5 is the probability of the model
selecting each option. This leads to a value of MLERand = −138.63 which represents the
baseline MLE score: models which present an MLE higher than this can be considered
better than random. Because MLE on its own does not account for model complexity
the significance of the model comparison with the random baseline model is tested by
means of Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike [1974]), a complexity penalising
method compensating the Likelihood of models which include different numbers of free-
parameters. This methodology will be adopted for hypothesis testing, therefore its details
will be extensively discussed in the following section.
4.1.15 Model comparison
Two model-selection criteria are used in literature to assess which model best describes the
data: the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike [1974]) and Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC; Schwarz [1978]). These scores are used to measure the model fitness to
the data and provide methods of hypothesis testing that are extensively used in literature
(Burnham and Anderson [2002, 2004]; Iigaya et al. [2016]; Lau and Glimcher [2005];
Symonds and Moussalli [2011]). The MLE values alone cannot be used to determine the best
fitting model because they do not provide a parsimonious approach to model selection, and
are known to favour overly complicated models (Gelfand and Dey [1994]). Conversely, AIC
and BIC allow the comparison of non-nested models, keeping into account the number of
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parameters and penalising overly complex models (Burnham and Anderson [2002]; Raftery
[1995]). The AIC score of a model M is calculated as:
AIC = 2 ·κ−2 · log(θˆM) (4.16)
where log(θˆM) is the maximum likelihood estimate, calculated as described in section
4.1.14 and κ is the number of free parameters of the model. The BIC score of a model M is
calculated as:
BIC = κ · log(n)−2 · log(θˆM) (4.17)
where n is the number of choices made by the subject. The method to determine which
of the models best describes the data is by evaluating the absolute difference of the AIC
or BIC associated with each model (Burnham and Anderson [2002]; Raftery [1995]). The
greater this difference, the stronger the evidence against the model with higher AIC/BIC.
A difference of 2 is considered to show weak support while a difference of 6 or higher
corresponds to strong evidence in favour of the model with the lower AIC/BIC (Burnham
and Anderson [2002, 2004]; Kass and Raftery [1995]; Raftery [1995]).
There has been debate in literature on whether to use AIC or BIC for model selection.
None of the two criteria is inherently better than the other and the difference is more
philosophical than practical (Burnham and Anderson [2002, 2004]). The case for BIC being
favoured over AIC is that it is grounded in Bayesian inference (Kass and Raftery [1995];
Raftery [1995]). Burnham and Anderson [2002] and Burnham and Anderson [2004] pointed
out that the difference between the two approaches concerns only the prior distribution over
the model set, which represents the initial belief of which model is more likely to be the one
better representing reality. Moreover, it is also shown that both criteria can be derived under
a frequentist, non-Bayesian procedure. The case for choosing one or the other is therefore
strongly connected to the context in which the model selection is carried out. From a practical
point of view, BIC applies a stronger penalisation to the number of parameters of a model,
which grows logarithmically with the number of samples. BIC penalty is guaranteed to select
the true model, if this is included in the set of models compared, as the sample size grows
infinitely (Vrieze [2012]). AIC instead does not assume the true model is among the ones
analysed. Being grounded in information theory, specifically on the Kullback-Leibler (K-L)
divergence, AIC would intrinsically estimate the distance between the true model and the
proposed models; being the true model generally unknown, such comparison is not possible
but AIC can be used to rank the candidate models according to their relative differences
(Vrieze [2012]). AIC is known to perform badly when the number of parameters κ is high
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compared to the number of samples n. In such cases a corrected form of AIC is used, denoted
with AICc. The fitting procedure performed in this work is carried out over a sample size
n = 200 with a small set of parameters κ = 2,3. As the number of parameters is lower than
the number of samples used for the estimation by a factor of 40 (Burnham and Anderson
[2002]; Symonds and Moussalli [2011]; Wagenmakers and Farrell [2004]), the standard AIC
formulation is adequate and will be used. The different nature and the distinct assumptions
of each criterion make it hard to readily decide which of the two should be adopted: BIC
is guaranteed to select the true model as n approaches infinity, as long as the true model is
among the candidates, which is rarely the case; AIC is preferred in scenarios in which the
underlying process generating the data is simple but the risk of selecting a model with higher
complexity than the true model is high (Aho et al. [2014]). Other factors contributing to the
preference of a criterion over the other one include whether the research has an exploratory
vs confirmatory reason, whether the candidate models are more or less known, and whether
the goal is to make predictions or to find the true model (Aho et al. [2014]).
A reasonable method for model selection based on AIC criterion is the use of Akaike
weights. Adopting Akaike weights avoids bluntly disregarding models which are potentially
good descriptive candidates, only because their AIC score is slightly higher than the best.
Akaike weights are based on the likelihood of a model, given the data and the set of models R
(Burnham and Anderson [2002] p.75). They can be interpreted as the quantity of evidence in
favour of a model, representing the conditional probabilities for each model (Wagenmakers
and Farrell [2004]). Akaike weights are calculated as follows:
wi =
exp(−12∆i)
∑Rr=1 exp(−12∆r)
(4.18)
where ∆i is the AIC difference of model i and the best model (the model with the lowest
AIC score). Two AIC based model selection criteria often used in literature are to either select
the single best model or to consider the models subset with AIC score within 2 units of the
best model, then proceed with a case-by-case inspection to determine potential overfitting due
to a larger number of parameters (Burnham and Anderson [2002] p.131 and Wagenmakers
and Farrell [2004]). Akaike weights allow to overcome this inconvenience by attributing a
representativeness factor to each model. Considering two or more models which barely differ
in their descriptive power as quantified by AIC scores, i.e. when ∆i ≤ 2, to base inference on
the parameters estimates of the single best model is likely to misrepresent the true parameter
value (Burnham and Anderson [2002] p.150).
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The Akaike weights can be used to compute a weighted average of the parameters of
interest:
θˆ =
R
∑
i=1
wiθi (4.19)
where θi is one of the parameters of the model. The model averaged estimate of a
parameter is the weighted average of the estimates up to the point where the sum of weights
for the most likely models is ≥ 0.95, representing a 95% confidence set; by doing so the
Akaike weight are construed as a posterior probability, given the data and the set of a priori
models (Burnham and Anderson [2002] p. 169). This procedure is grounded in the Kullback-
Leibler information theory and represents a best model confidence set based on the data, in
a similar way to a parameter estimation of a confidence interval based on the model and
the data (Burnham and Anderson [2002], p. 169). This weighting scheme also provides a
convenient method to identify a single estimate for each parameter, as these will be needed
to test the next hypotheses.
Having laid out the methodology that will be used for fitting and comparing models, this
first hypothesis section is wrapped by offering the according predictions. The expectation
is that enhanced state-spaces will better represent the choice data examined. Moreover, the
state-space modelling based on the full history of previous outcomes is expected to be the
most likely description of the reference point system adopted for most of the subjects. The
comparison between reference point based on complete historical information and latest
outcome alone is expected to also be significant, with the former being the most descriptive.
If these expectations are confirmed by the results, this work will represent evidence of the
possibility of connection between the reinforcement learning descriptive framework and
prospect theory’s relative reference points. In case the state-less solution is the most likely
descriptive account of the data, the assumption that individuals use previous interactions
information when making decision is wrong and this work would provide evidence that
decision-makers in binary decision tasks follow a simplistic approach and do not make use
of past information to shift their reference system.
4.1.16 Predictive value comparison with previous results
While the hypotheses to be tested in this chapter are focused on descriptive quantities
regarding the subjects behaviour, it is also interesting to compare the predictive power of
the models proposed in this thesis with the RELACS model developed in previous work
on the same choice data (Erev and Barron [2005]). The procedures based on prediction
accuracy measurements used in the RELACS paper will be adopted in this thesis to achieve
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an informative comparison. The predictiveness of the model will be estimated in the same
way as in the original RELACS work (Erev and Barron [2005]). Simulations will be run
200 times for each proposed model and for each subject. The search procedure adopted,
consistent with the one adopted in Erev and Barron [2005], is to discretise the space of
parameters and use the subset of values to perform a grid search on the permutations of
such values. The free parameters vector is composed of the combinations of a set of values.
Specifically, the range of values that the free parameters can take is:
α,β ,γ ∈ {0.0001,0.0003,0.001,0.003,0.01,0.03,0.1,0.5,0.7}.
This procedure will produce a set of choices for each simulation run; these will then be
split in two blocks dividing the number of interactions evenly. The choices within each block
will be aggregated and contrasted with the observed choice data. To do so in a comparable
way with the original paper the proportion of maximisation choices Pmax is estimated for
each subject as described in eq. 3.1 in the previous section. The mean squared deviation
(MSD; or mean squared error, MSE) of the predicted and observed Pmax for each block
is adopted as measure of prediction. For every subject in each condition, the MSD score
associated with a tested model M and its relative set of parameters θM is defined as:
MSDM =
1
2
2
∑
b=1
(Predicted Pmaxb−Observed Pmaxb)2 (4.20)
where b is the Pmax block. The best model according to MSD score is selected and
and compared. The MSD scores presented in Erev and Barron [2005] are cumulative;
they result from averaging the MSD aggregating over the problems analysed. The MSD
score for the model proposed will be calculated cumulatively, averaging the best score for
each participant, in order to be compared to the score presented in the original paper. It
is not possible to directly compare the two measures because the score presented in their
work spans 40 different problems, of which only a subset has been analysed in this thesis.
Moreover the parameter fitting procedures are substantially different. This work intentionally
aimed at a descriptive modelling on an individual level, while in Erev and Barron [2005] the
parameters have been fitted on the aggregated dataset of subjects and experiments, focusing
on a population-wide characterisation. Nevertheless, this comparison can give a qualitative
insight into how good the models proposed in this work are for prediction when compared
to the RELACS. The following section will describe the details about the modelling efforts
proposed in this thesis along with the rationale behind the implementation choices. The last
section will present the results of the hypotheses tests along with considerations and potential
explanations.
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4.2 Online Investment Game: Virtual Trader
Modelling Stock-market Investors as Reinforcement Learning Agents
The game examined is an online trading simulation called Virtual Trader2. The platform
is publicly accessible and managed by IEX Media Group BV in the Netherlands; it allows
players to register for free and participate in the trading simulation game. The players who
subscribe to the game are endowed with an initial balance of GBP 100,000 and can trade the
stocks featured in the Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index (FTSE100, pronounced
“footsie”) pool. During the time range when data was collected, 107 stocks were available to
trade in the game. Players would compose a portfolio (i.e. a collection of assets) by selecting
stocks which are believed to be likely to appreciate in value in the future. Players are ranked
on the cumulative assets, which are composed of “holdings” and “cash”. The holdings are
the shares (i.e. stocks) owned by a player, which can increase in value following stocks’ rise
in price or, conversely, lose value when the stocks’ price plummets. The cash component
of a player’s assets does not change in value over time; it consists of either the amount of
money which was never invested or the result of shares being sold.
This game simulation follows the evolution of real world stock data, including the
fluctuations of stock’s prices and their price splits or reverse splits3. These events are
reproduced in the simulation with a slight delay of about 10-15 minutes; this delay does not
result in information advantages to players following real world data, as the Virtual Trader
orders are fulfilled taking into account the delay. Players are provided with an interactive
graphical interface (Fig. 4.5), which features a time series for each stock with different time
resolutions.
The transactions made by the players are recorded and can be publicly accessed by
browsing the website. The dataset adopted for this study was generated by automatically
crawling the transaction web pages. The transactions considered are the ones that happened
in the time-range between the 1st of January 2014 and the 31st of May of the same year.
The reason for choosing this specific time-range is because during these months the Virtual
Trader game organised a prize give away. Players’ portfolios were ranked according to
their cumulative assets and the best achiever for each month was gifted with men grooming
products, as shown in Fig.4.6.
2http://www.virtualtrader.co.uk - Copyright IEX Media Group BV
3A company can decide to issue more shares, simultaneously reducing their price, in order to, for example,
allow more liquidity in the market. For instance, a 2-for-1 split would double the number of a company’s shares
in the market, halving their price. This procedure affects all the outstanding shares, including the ones owned
by investors.
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Fig. 4.5 The interactive graphical interface for the Virtual Trader online game simulation.
This example shows the price time-series for the Coca-Cola HBC stock. The online website
offers an interactive interface: moving the mouse cursor along the x-axis locks the pointer
on the curve; the cursor’s position, identified by the blue dot, shows the date and price
information for the stock. In this example, the 30th December 2013 Coca-Cola stocks were
priced at GBP 1,747.00. Different time resolutions are available by selecting the relative
time-frame in the Zoom tab on the top left corner of the interface. The options on the top
right corner of the interface instead, allow a player to swap between visualising prices during
the current trading day or on longer historical periods, like the one shown of 1 year.
The structure of the prize system in Virtual Trader allows for two possible rewards to be
identified: the first being the psychological reward of being ranked among the top players,
the second being the tangible prize awarded to the winner of the competition each month (i.e.
perfumes, etc). These rewards are the objective the players are supposed to aim at during the
interaction with the game. Hence, in this attempt to map this task to a reinforcement learning
process, the players are represented by RL agents.
The transactions have been stored in a database so that they can be preprocessed and
later used to fit models of learning and decision-making. Each transaction is stored as a row
composed of 6 fields: the date of the transaction, the type (i.e. sell/buy), the name of the
stock traded, the volume and unitary price of the stock traded and total consisting of the
money involved in the transaction. The dataset initially comprised ∼ 100,000 transactions
and 3381 players, but these numbers were greatly reduced after preprocessing. In fact, after
removing the many inactive players and those players who engaged only at the beginning
and/or at the end of the time-frame considered, the dataset featured 1420 transactions and
46 players. The average amount of transactions per player is 30.87, with the most engaging
player having produced 107 transactions and the least active having made 16 transactions.
This variability in number of transactions represents one of the key differences between this
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quasi-field study from a laboratory experiment. The distribution of transactions made by the
players is shown in Fig. 4.7
4.2.1 Hypotheses and testing methods
Among the many instances of human decision-making tasks, stock-market trading is a
complicated and interesting one. The objective for financial-market’s investors is to increase
their wealth, by investing in shares of a company when their belief is that the company’s
stocks will increase in value over time. Investors would then proceed to sell their stocks
when these are believed to have reached their peak. The famous sentence “buy low, sell high”
represents this type of investing strategy. Investors are characterised by all sorts of degrees
of competence and different strategies adopted. Researchers in the fields of economics
and psychology focused on studying the behaviour of investors, as described in chapter 2,
section 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 2.1.2. In this part of the thesis the focus is on a set of subjects who
played the Virtual Trader online game, described in the previous section. These players are
decision-makers within the stock-market simulation offered by the game. Even if the players
are anonymous and there is no certain way to know their level of knowledge of the markets
or investment experience, the Virtual Trader game presents an interesting structure and a
promising scenario, on which to test the following assumptions.
Some findings from both economics literature, including Choi et al. [2009] and Huang
[2012], indicate that non-professional investors appear to make financial choices which are
correlated to the outcomes of their previous choices. Choi et al. [2009] studied American
workers’ behaviour in a real-life scenario; specifically, their commitment to savings invest-
ments accounts called 401(k). The investor in their dataset could be considered unskilled as
saving investments are not generally among the preferences of active investors or day-traders,
who represent the more skilled financial agents, since savings investments are characterised
Fig. 4.6 Examples of prizes for the Virtual Trader online game simulation. The highest
ranked player for each month wins a package of perfumes and other man grooming products.
4.2 Online Investment Game: Virtual Trader 109
Fig. 4.7 Histogram of the transactions made by the players in the dataset. Transactions
total = 1420 , maximum = 106, minimum = 16, mean = 30.87, median = 27.
by low risk and low potential returns. The results in Choi et al. [2009] indicated that those
investors who experienced a positive return from their saving account, increased their com-
mitment to that particular savings plan the following year. Conversely, those investors whose
saving accounts investments returned discouraging results, reduced their pledge to the 401(k)
plan. In their paper, Choi et al. describe this pattern of behaviour as “naive” reinforcement
learning. The term “naive”, in Choi et al. [2009], is used in the sense that decision-making
is based only on previous personal experience and not on other information which could
lead to potentially higher future profit. By dissecting their observation, it is possible to
identify two questions: one concerned with understanding whether unskilled investors learn
by reinforcement, the other focused on investigating whether their learning is indeed naive
and short-sighted.
4.2.2 Risk based stock classification
The indications lead to some interesting questions regarding the behaviour of unskilled
investors. Firstly, it would be interesting to know whether they group the available stocks
into classes, for example according to a shared feature. The first hypothesis is, therefore,
focused on testing the assumption that the players of this trading simulation game perceive
the tradable stocks as grouped into discrete classes of risk. In order to clarify whether this
is indeed the case, we develop part of the modelling to test this assumption. To do so, a
classification of stocks based on risk is developed and compared to 500 randomly generated
classifications. The classification of stocks into discrete categories developed in this work is
110 Methods and Modelling
based on a measure of the risk of an asset in comparison to the market, deriving from the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM, Sharpe [1964]) and called the “beta coefficient”. This
measure provides an indication of the risk of an asset, in comparison with the market and
is widely used in financial modelling (Beninga [2000]; Black et al. [1972]; Merton [1973]).
By evaluating the volatility (standard deviation) of the returns for an asset and the relative
benchmark, this measure expresses how sensitive the returns of the asset are in comparison
to the returns of the benchmark. The beta coefficient, also referred to as “financial elasticity”
of a security, is calculated using historical price data and represents how much the security
price movements are correlated with the benchmark, which is usually defined as the market
index4 underlying the security considered. A security is said to have lower volatility than the
market if the price movements are less pronounced than the market and viceversa, when a
stock presents higher volatility than the market, it presents more marked price fluctuation in
relation to the market.
The assumption that players perceive the available trading options as classified according
to their risk is tested by comparing the best fitting model which uses the risk-based clas-
sification, against the best fitting model which uses one of the 500 random classifications.
This comparisons are based on the Akaike Information Criterion measure of the models
goodness-of-fit to the data. This set of comparisons is treated as a series of binomial outcomes
and the Clopper-Pearson binomial confidence interval methodology (Clopper and Pearson
[1934]) is used to evaluate the probability that the risk-based categorisation is better than
the 500 randomly generated ones at describing the players. The first hypothesis will test the
risk-classification assumption within a RL framework.
4.2.3 Reinforcement learning as a descriptive model
Since the test of the first hypothesis requires RL models to be fitted to the subjects, it is
important to test whether the learning and decision-making behaviour players exhibit in this
dataset does indeed follow a reinforcement learning pattern. Therefore, the second hypothesis
is focused on testing whether the behavioural data collected for the players of the Virtual
Trader online game can be described with a reinforcement learning model. In a series of
economics experiments in Erev and Roth [1998], RL is a found to be a good predictor of the
evolution of play in a series of economics experiments and games. In case this hypothesis is
confirmed, this work would provide new evidence that RL accounts for unskilled investors’
4A stock market index is a mathematical construct which represents a portion of the stock market. Its value
is often calculated as the weighted average of the stocks included. It is used as a representation of the market,
against which to asses the return of other investments or single stocks. FTSE100 is an example of British
stock index, Standards & Poor 500 is an American stock market index. They are both based on the market
capitalisation of, respectively, the 100 and 500 largest companies in the relative stock market.
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behaviour. Formally, the second hypothesis is that the Virtual Trader investment game players
behave following a reinforcement learning pattern. To test whether this is the case, a simple
average-tracking RL model will be fitted to the individual players decision data, which consist
of the players choices made in the game and their corresponding outcomes. This model
represents a myopic strategy, where a player is concerned with maximising the immediate
rewards, but does not care about the potential long-term rewards. The fitting procedure
follows the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) methodology presented previously in
chapter 4, section 4.1.14, eq. 4.12. The Bayes’ rule used in this methodology is replicated
here:
P(θM|D,M) ∝ P(D|M,θM) ·P(θM|M) (4.21)
where D is the data, M is the model, and θM is the parameter set associated with model
M. The best fitting models are identified by evaluating different parameter sets, with the aim
of maximising the likelihood of the data being generated by the model tested, represented
by the term P(D|M,θM). This quantity, multiplied by the prior, indicated by the term
P(θM|M), is proportional to the posterior likelihood, represented by the left-hand side of
the proportionality, P(θM|D,M). Therefore, if treating the prior as constant (since there
is no a-priori knowledge of which parameter set is the most representative), maximising
the likelihood achieves the same objective as maximising the posterior likelihood. This
second hypothesis will be tested by comparing the RL models against a baseline random
model which assumes equal probability of picking any available action. The parameter
set associated with a model is denoted with θM, the maximum likelihood estimate is the
parameter set which maximises the goodness-of-fit of a model to the data and is denoted with
θˆM, therefore the MLE values for these two models are compared by means of a Likelihood
Ratio Test (LRT; Huelsenbeck and Crandall [1997]; Wilks [1938]). The LRT is a statistical
test which uses the ratio of the likelihood scores of two nested models, defined as the null
model and the alternative model. The likelihood ratio quantity represents the amount of
support in favour of the more complex model (Edwards [1972]). The LRT test takes into
account the difference in the numbers of parameters, using it as a penalising factor for the
more complex model, when estimating the evidence in its favour. Formally, the likelihood
ratio test is defined as:
LR = 2 · (L(θˆalt)−L(θˆnull)) (4.22)
where θˆ = MLE is the maximum likelihood estimate, alt is the unrestricted model, null
is the restricted model, and L is the log-likelihood of these values. This test statistic is χ2
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distributed with degrees of freedom depending on the difference of parameters between
the null and the alternative model. The outcome of the LRT is evaluated against the χ2
distribution with the number of degrees of freedom equal to the difference in parameter
between the two models, and at the 5% significance level. If its value exceeds the critical
value then the null model is rejected in favour of the unrestricted model.
If a subject best fitting RL model does not fit the data significantly better than a random
model, then, for that subject, it is assumed that the strategy adopted in the game is not based
on reinforcement learning. Once the most representative model is found, for each subject
in the dataset, a χ2 test is performed on the frequencies of the two models, to provide an
answer to the hypothesis. If the number of players best fitted by a RL model is significantly
higher than the number of players whose RL models failed to fit significantly better than
random, then the null hypothesis is rejected. Conversely, if not enough players are described
satisfactorily by a RL model, as opposed to a random model, the alternative hypothesis is
rejected. The third hypothesis further investigates the players, to understand whether a more
complex strategy is more descriptive of their behaviour, when compared to the random or
myopic strategy.
4.2.4 Naive behaviour as short-sighted learning
Literature provides indications that individuals tend to follow personal experience, instead
of other more sophisticated methods, when making investment decisions. For example, the
analysis of saving accounts’ data, in Choi et al. [2009], provided evidence that unskilled
investors make decisions in a way which appears to overweight personal experiences, there-
fore referred to as naive reinforcement learning. Similar conclusions are found in Huang
[2012]: investors are more likely to trade in those industries in which they had positive
experiences (i.e. trades resulting in gains). Moreover, higher sophistication levels or longer
time-ranges reduce this effect. Therefore, the third hypothesis is to test whether unskilled
investors behave in a naive way, by short-sightedly aiming to maximise their immediate
rewards. The method to test this hypothesis involves fitting RL models which represent
different strategies. Following the same structure as in the second hypothesis test, the Virtual
Trader players choice data will be fit with a more complex RL model which characterises
far-sighted behaviour. The average-tracking RL model adopted previously in this work,
outlined in section 4.1.9, captures myopic behaviour because its update rule is only focused
on current rewards, hence the name immediate-rewards RL.
Far-sighted strategies instead, can be captured by temporal difference learning (TD-
learning), which includes a future rewards term in the learning rule. The model supposed
to capture long-term strategies is Q-learning, first introduced in chapter 2, section 2.25 and
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adopted in the modelling performed in the previous chapter, in section 4.1.9. Q-learning is a
widely adopted implementation of TD-learning, which a large body of evidence describes
as a computational account of the dopaminergic activity in areas of the brain associated
with decision-making and learning (Cohen et al. [2007]; Joel et al. [2002]; Lohrenz et al.
[2007]; O’Doherty et al. [2003]). More details about the learning rules used by these models
are provided later in this chapter, in section 4.2.8. To test this hypothesis the myopic RL
model and the far-sighted RL model are fitted to the subjects’ data, and a likelihood ratio
test is carried out on the corresponding MLE values. The most representative models is
evaluated by means of the Likelihood Ratio test, as the immediate-reward RL model is nested
in Q-learning. Finally, two χ2 tests will be carried out on the frequencies of each model
within the players dataset, to provide an answer to the hypothesis. The number of players
well fitted by the far-sighted model will be compared first to the myopic RL model and
then to the random model. The first comparison will provide an indication of how many
subjects adopted a far-sighted strategy in the game. The second comparison will indicate
whether the players are actually better represented by a far-sighted strategy. If the number
of players better fitted by the model representing a far-sighted strategy is higher than the
alternative simpler models in both tests, then the hypothesis that unskilled investors behave in
a naive reinforcement learning way is rejected. Alternatively, if the number of players fitted
by a myopic strategy model is higher, then it can be concluded that unskilled investors are
indeed naive. Finally, if the tests indicate that the players are not well fitted by either of these
two strategies, then no indication can be offered on whether players follow a reinforcement
learning process, being it naive or far-sighted. The details of the models used to test these
hypotheses are presented in the following section.
Models details
Similarly to the binary decision task models developed in the previous chapter, this task is
modelled using the reinforcement learning framework; this section describes the components
adopted to model the scenario and the rationale behind them. The game analysed consists of
repeated interactions with a financial stock market simulation, which follows the Financial
Times Stock Exchange 100 Index price movements. A player corresponds to a reinforcement
learning agent while the trading simulation game represents the observable portion of the
environment.
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4.2.5 State-space
The investigation of state-space configurations performed in the previous chapter provided
some indication about the type of state-space which best describes the mental accounting
operated by the subjects in the binary-choice task analysed. The environment for the Virtual
Trader game is modelled as a binary state-space because this proved to be the scenario which
best represented subjects in the investigation carried out for the previous task, both in absolute
terms and when statistically compared to the other proposed state-space cases. Moreover, by
using only one state-space modelling, this investigation can focus on other research questions.
The state-space consists of two states: S ∈ {gain, loss}, shown in Fig.4.10. The players’
state of the world is determined by their balance, which is the sum of the outcomes from the
transactions made up to that point:
Bt =
t−1
∑
i=0
oi (4.23)
with oi being the i-th transaction outcome and Bt being the balance at the time t. The
state of a player at time t is defined by the balance sign:
statet =
gain if Bt ≥ 0loss otherwise (4.24)
A player’s current balance is estimated as the outcome of the sell transactions. Purchase
transactions only offer information on the amount spent but this is not enough to tell how
good the transaction is. Therefore, the current state depends only on the sales outcomes, a
player’s cash flow; while the holdings, which are the shares owned by a player at any time,
are not accounted for.
4.2.6 Reward signal and transformation
The decision to use the players cash but not their holdings has also implications in the
definition of reward. The information accessible by the players needs to be considered when
defining what is considered to be the reward signal. In Virtual Trader, players are presented
with the outcomes of their trades in the game graphical interface. Therefore, a reasonable way
to adapt this information to the RL modelling is to consider the outcome of each transaction
as the reward signal for the RL agent. The assumption that the reward signal is based on
the cash flow arising from the sales is also linked to a well known phenomenon known in
literature as the “disposition effect” (Barber and Odean [2013]; Odean [1998]). Investors tend
to sell securities which appreciated since the time they were bought, while holding positions
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which lost value since purchase time. The disposition effect is more evident for individual
investors, but is present also in bigger investing firms such as corporations or mutual funds
(Barber et al. [2007]; Brown et al. [2006]; Frazzini [2006]; Grinblatt and Keloharju [2001];
Heath et al. [1999]; Odean [1998]; Shapira and Venezia [2001]). Therefore, the “holdings”
component of a player’s wealth, in the Virtual Trader simulation is not considered as part of
a reward signal, while the sell transaction outcomes are considered, since these are likely to
represent a player’s will and because it realises a measurable gain (or loss). Furthermore, the
impracticality of estimating the exact value of a player’s portfolio holdings at each transaction
time is another reason why only the cash component is considered. The scope of the model
is reduced to what can be considered a “Sell-model”.
The reward is defined on the sell transactions, with the purchasing transactions used to
keep track of the player’s portfolio and to estimate the price spread at the time of sell. The
reward r at time-step t+1 is defined as:
rt+1 = vt+1
(
pt+1− 1t
t
∑
i=1
vi pi
)
(4.25)
where vi is the volume and pi the price of the stock sold at the i-th time step. The
difference in the brackets represents the price spread, where pt+1 is the current sell price,
while the summation term represents the weighted average price of previous purchases, with
the prices weighted on the volumes of previous transactions. The result of this calculation
rt+1 is the raw reward, which is then transformed via the hyperbolic tangent.
Three reward transformation functions have been proposed and tested in the previous work
chapter; in this chapter instead, the modelling focuses only on the hyperbolic tangent. For
the binary task examined, this function has been shown to be the least representative reward
transformation in the development of descriptive models of decision-making. Nonetheless,
the hyperbolic tangent presents properties which make it a good choice for the current
modelling attempt; its sigmoidal nature captures decreasing utility in both gains and losses
domains, and its saturating property restricts the magnitude of the rewards in the range
[−1,+1]. This last property is necessary to analyse this dataset, because the other non-
saturating functions, previously tested, lead to numerical instabilities, due to the extreme
values in the range of original rewards. The range of the original rewards is [−5695,79264],
with mean = 477 and median = 93. The original and transformed reward distributions are
shown in Fig. 4.8.
Several attempts to fit the models using both the identity function and prospect theory’s
subjective value function produced numerical overflows, resulting in computational insta-
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Fig. 4.8 The distribution of rewards before and after the hyperbolic tangent transformation.
Panel a, the original range on the x-axis [−5695,79264] with frequencies on the y-axis and
in log scale. Panel b, the new range on the x-axis, reduced to [−1,+1], y-axis showing the
frequencies in linear scale. As a result, rewards r > 5,000 are collapsed to 1. Similarly when
r <−5000 the values are collapsed to 1.
bilities, which broke the model fitting routines. The hyperbolic tangent adopted is defined
as:
tanh(r) =
1− e−rω
1+ e−rω
(4.26)
where r is the reward signal, e is the exponential function and ω = 1/500 is the parameter
which regulates the slope of this sigmoid function. The resulting slope allows to maintain
most of the variability of the rewards, only flattening the extreme values which caused the
numerical issues. This choice resulted in only 12 out of 1420 (<0.008%) rewards being
collapsed on a single value, rewards above GBP 5,000 being flattened to 1: r> 5,000→ r= 1.
4.2.7 Stocks and Actions
Players are endowed with a virtual lump sum of GBP 100,000 at the moment of subscription
and are allowed to trade (buy or sell) stocks over time, with the objective of increasing the
value of their portfolio.
The payoff distribution behind each stock is unknown and non-stationary, for example a
security which appreciated at a certain time, providing a positive return to a player, might
plummet in value later on. As this is not a controlled experiment, the number of available
actions depends solely on the particular stock price movements and there is no a-priori good
or bad choice, unlike in the binary choice task examined in the previous chapter.
The FTSE100 is a stock market index which includes the 100 companies with the highest
capitalisation listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). At the time of data collection
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Fig. 4.9 The hyperbolic tangent function used to reduce the range of rewards from
[−5695,79264] to [−1,+1]. The slope of the function has been chosen so that as much
possible reward variability is still portrayed in the transformed values. Rewards r > 5,000
are collapsed to 1. Similarly when r <−5000 the value is collapsed to 1, which happened
for only one transaction in the dataset.
the FTSE100 included “Royal Dutch Shell” stocks which are composed of class A and B
shares therefore listing 101 available options. Moreover, because the index is evaluated every
quarter of a year it could happen that new companies are added while others are excluded.
During the time range considered for this study, these changes led to a total of 107 companies
available to be traded in the game. If every tradable stock is considered as a potential action,
and the players are supposed to be in either of the two states previously defined, the total
amount of available actions would be 107× 2 = 214. Considering such a high number
of actions over a relatively short time-frame, during which players interacted on average
30 times, would represent a learning process potentially too hard to model. Therefore, a
dimensionality reduction on the action space is required to make this model numerically
treatable. The reduction of the action-space dimensionality offers a chance to test the first
hypothesis, that players group the available stocks according to their risk.
The categorisation adopted to test this hypothesis and to tackle the action-space dimen-
sionality reduction is defined on a measure of the stocks’ risk, called financial elasticity and
representing the risk of a security in comparison to the market. The Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM, Sharpe [1964]) is a security pricing model developed independently, by
several economists including Merton Miller, Jan Markowitz and William F. Sharpe who
jointly received a Nobel Prize in Economics for their work. The CAPM model is particularly
suited for the purpose of assessing the risk of a security because it features a quantity called
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beta coefficient, denoted with βF 5. This quantity measures the elasticity of a security in
comparison to a benchmark index. This method of assessing an asset’s risk is used in financial
modelling to evaluate the risk of the components in a portfolio (Beninga [2000]; Black et al.
[1972]; Merton [1973]). The beta coefficient risk measure βF is defined as:
βF =
Cov(ra,rb)
Var(rb)
(4.27)
where ra are the returns of a security a, rb are the returns of the benchmark index
b, Cov(ra,rb) is the covariance of these two quantities and Var(rb) is the variance of the
benchmark index returns. To better understand how this measure represents the volatility of
stocks in comparison to the market, it is useful to provide some examples. Gas and power
related stocks are relatively safe investments as it is rare for hugely disruptive events to
happen that can affect the price trend of these utilities stocks, hence such stocks present a low
βF . On the other hand, high-tech stocks are highly susceptible of events, such as innovative
start-ups or new technologies being introduced, which would destabilise these markets; these
stocks are characterised by a high βF . A beta coefficient βF = 1 corresponds to perfect
synchrony in price fluctuations. When βF ∈ (0,1), the asset manifests lower volatility (or low
correlation) of the price movements compared to the benchmark. If the value of βF > 1 the
security is characterised by higher volatility than the market. Applying this to the examples
provided, high-tech stocks with a βF > 1 would outperform the benchmark index during an
upward trending market. This high value also means that when the market is going down the
high-tech security would depreciate at a higher rate than the market. Hence, higher values
of βF coefficient indicate higher risk in the security. The beta coefficient is a measure of
intrinsic, or systematic, risk which can also be estimated by regression:
ra ≈ αF +βFrb (4.28)
where ra and rb are the returns of an asset and the benchmark, and αF represents the
active return (which is what skilled investors often attempt to optimise in their trades). The
beta coefficient of each stock is calculated and used, in this thesis, to classify the stocks into
three risk categories. This procedure reduces the action-space from 107 to 3 (classification
described in 4.3, globally reducing the total of 214 actions available in 2 states, to 6 actions in
2 states). The estimation of the stocks’ beta coefficient is achieved by gathering daily returns
from the 1st June 2013 to the 31st of May 2014. This choice of time-range and price interval
guarantees an extension covering the months before the players’ interactions with the game,
5the original beta coefficient is denoted with β but to avoid confusion with other parameters previously
introduced in this thesis, it will be referred to as βF
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also providing some overlap with the game time-range, and a daily granularity. The stocks
are then ranked and subdivided in three categories: low- and mid-risk featuring 36 stocks
and high-risk class which contains 35 stocks. The state-space is therefore composed of two
states and three actions, with the relative Markov decision process (MDP) shown in Fig 4.10.
Fig. 4.10 The transition graph describing the Markov decision process used to model the
structure of the Virtual Trader online financial trading simulation game. The actions the
agent can take are represented by labelled black solid circles (Low, Mid and High), while the
states are shown as labelled empty circles (gain and loss). The modelling is based on two
states: loss and profit, which are defined on the sum of previous transaction outcomes. The
modelling assumes three actions which correspond to the three discrete degrees of risk. The
stocks are classified based on their financial elasticity, beta coefficient βF , a measure of risk
of a security in comparison to the market.
It is important to note that different numbers of classes have been tested in the categorisa-
tion of stocks, specifically 2 and 4 classes of risk; these produced results consistent with the
3 class categorisation and will therefore not be discussed further.
4.2.8 Learning models and policy
This dataset of choices and outcomes collected for this study has never been analysed
before; no previous descriptive modelling attempt is known for such data. The purpose of
the analysis carried out in this work is to understand whether the Virtual Trader players
operated in a reinforcement learning manner and whether they have done so in a myopic way.
To test the hypotheses of this chapter, the players are described as reinforcement learning
agents who operate decisions following a probabilistic strategy. One way to assess if this is
indeed the case is to compare the goodness-of-fit for the models proposed against a baseline.
Since these choices have never been modelled before, a random model is used as baseline
comparison. The attempt at modelling myopic behaviour is done by adopting the average-
tracking (immediate-reward) reinforcement learning model. The comparison between such
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Table 4.3 List of stocks classified according to their risk (financial elasticity, beta coefficient
βF )
Low-risk Mid-risk High-risk
Kazakhmys Plc Johnson Matthey Lloyds Banking Group Plc
Serco Group Croda International Kingfisher
Centrica Plc Intu Properties Aviva Plc
SSE Carnival Plc Hargreaves Lansdown Plc
G4S Plc AstraZeneca Plc TUI Travel Plc
Imperial Tobacco BAE Systems Burberry Group
Admiral Group Plc Friends Life Group ITV Plc
RSA Insurance Group Plc Aggreko Melrose Industries
British Sky Broadcasting Group Vodafone Group Plc Barclays
United Utilities Group Tullow Oil Plc Wolseley
Pearson Rexam Plc SABMiller Plc
Randgold Resources Ltd Compass Group Plc WPP Plc
Severn Trent British American Tobacco Plc Travis Perkins Plc
Morrison Wm Supermarkets Rolls-Royce Holding Standard Chartered
Sainsbury (J.) Unilever Antofagasta
Capita Sports Direct International Plc BHP Billiton Plc
Next Smiths Group Plc Schroders Plc
Reed Elsevier Plc Marks&Spencer Group Standard Life Plc
Royal Dutch Shell-B Shs Land Securities Group Glencore
Royal Dutch Shell-A Shs Diageo Plc Rio Tinto
Intertek Group Experian International Consolidated Air
National Grid Plc BG Group Plc Old Mutual
Sage Group Plc IMI Prudential
AMEC Plc Hammerson ARM Holdings
BP Fresnillo Plc GKN
Tesco Shire Plc easyJet Plc
Reckitt Benckiser Group British Land Royal Bank of Scotland Group
Smith & Nephew William Hill Persimmon
Bunzl Weir Group Vedanta Resources Plc
Tate & Lyle HSBC Holdings Plc CRH
Associated British Foods Plc Wood Group (John) Mondi Plc
GlaxoSmithKline InterContinental Hotels Group Anglo American Plc
Meggitt Plc London Stock Exchange Group Polymetal International
Babcock Intl Group Legal & General Evraz
Coca-Cola HBC Petrofac Ltd Aberdeen Asset Management Plc
BT Group Plc Whitbread ’A’
RL model and the random baseline will provide an answer to the second hypothesis, that
Virtual Trader players behave following a reinforcement learning pattern.
From a probabilistic point of view, a random model is described with an agent whose
action-selection policy selects, at any time-step, one of the available actions with equal
probability. Formally, the baseline random model can be estimated as:
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P(D|MRand) = MLERand =
N
∑
t
logP(ct) = N · log
(
1
3
)
(4.29)
where D is the data, MRand is the random model, log is the natural logarithm function
(with base e), N is the number of transactions a player executed, and 13 is the probability of
selecting an action in the scenario encompassing three available risk-classified actions.
The immediate-rewards RL model to be tested against this baseline uses the average-
tracking rule described in chapter 4, section 4.1.9 and formalised in eq. 4.10, reproduced
here for convenience:
Q(st ,at)← Q(st ,at)+α[rt+1−Q(st ,at)] (4.30)
where st and at are the state and action at time-step t, Q(st ,at) is the Q-value associated
with this state-action pair, rt+1 is the reward obtained from the interaction happened at
time-step t + 1 and α is a step-size parameter, known as learning rate, which indicates
the amount of new information used to update the agent’s belief about the Q-value of the
current state-action pair. This rule is based on a bootstrapping method, because it builds
estimates (left-hand side of the assignment) based on previous estimates (right-hand side of
the assignment), eventually converging to the actual value when more and more experience is
accumulated (formally denoted with Q∗). This learning rule modifies the Q-values estimates
by considering a portion (scaling by α) of the numeric signal from the immediate reward
(rt+1), and how much this value differs from the previous estimate. No information about
potential future rewards is taken into account in this model, which explains why it is called
“immediate-rewards”.
The third hypothesis tests whether the Virtual Trader players who behaved in a reinforce-
ment learning way did so by operating unsophisticatedly, as suggested by Choi et al. [2009]
and Huang [2012]. In these work, unskilled investors are found to rely too much on their
previous personal experience, attributing less importance to the long term implication of their
actions. From a descriptive point of view, the immediate-rewards learning model previously
introduced represents an attempt to capture the players who acted short-sightedly. A good
candidate model for capturing far-sighted behaviour, representing non-naivety, is temporal
difference learning (TD-learning). This learning model incorporates a future reward term
in the update rule and provides a free-parameter to tune the degree to which an agent is
concerned with future rewards. Q-learning, described in 4, section 4.1.9, formalised in eq.
4.1.9, is an off-policy implementation of TD-learning:
Q(st ,at)← Q(st ,at)+α[rt+1+ γmax
a
Q(st+1,a)−Q(st ,at)]
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where the term maxa Q(st+1,a) represents the future rewards obtainable following a
greedy policy (i.e. selecting the actions believed to yield the best outcome in future in-
teractions), and with γ being the discount factor parameter which adjusts how much this
information influences the current update.
Q-learning update rule is also based on bootstrapping, with the future reward term being
an estimate of the actual return (cumulative rewards) obtainable from the next time-step. The
addition of a term representing future rewards is important because it allows this model to
capture more complex behaviour, including strategies aimed at learning the behaviour leading
to the best return in the long-term. This type of RL has been considered a computational
account of dopaminergic neurons activations in the striatum and orbito-frontal cortex (Cohen
et al. [2007]; Joel et al. [2002]; Lohrenz et al. [2007]; O’Doherty et al. [2003]). Q-learning
is an off-policy implementation of TD-learning, which has been previously used to model
instrumental conditioning (Dayan et al. [2006]), to generate individual behaviour in the
development of an artificial stock market (Rutkauskas and Ramanauskas [2009]), or to
optimise trade execution (Nevmyvaka et al. [2006]).
These two RL models, previously adopted for the analysis of the behavioural data in
the experimental scenario studied in chapter 4, will also be adopted in this quasi-field study.
In the previous work these were both fitted with the intent of finding the most descriptive
computational account of subjects behaviour, in order to further study the characteristics of
the captured strategies. In the present work they are tested against each other and against a
baseline random model, to find if they can provide a good descriptive account of behaviour
and, in such case, which one is the most descriptive. The comparison of the RL models
against the random baseline will help clarify if Virtual Trader players learn by reinforcement
with their interactions; the head-to-head comparison between the myopic and the far-sighted
RL models will help clarify whether the unskilled investors in the Virtual Trader dataset
behave naively, as suggested by literature.
Action-selection: Soft-Max
In a similar way to the previous part of the work, the hypotheses testing methodology is
based on comparing measures of descriptiveness of the models tested. Maximum likelihood
estimates are the starting point for such methodology. These are measures of the quality of a
model in describing a dataset, based on a probabilistic approach. In order to estimate MLE
scores it is necessary to adopt a probabilistic model of action-selection, which quantifies the
probability of each choice made by players. This is conveniently achieved by using Soft-Max
action-selection policy, previously described in chapter 2, section 2.2.1, eq. 2.24 and applied
in the previous work chapter 4, section 4.1.11, eq. 4.11. This rule transforms an agent’s
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beliefs about the Q-values (quality of state-action pairs) into probability values. This process
allows the estimation of a model likelihood, the probability that a model with a specific set
of parameters generates a specific set of choices. The Soft-Max rule adapted to the current
analysis is:
P(high) =
eQ(s,high)·β
∑
a∈A(s)
eQ(s,a)·β
(4.31)
where P(high) is the probability of selecting the action with the highest risk, e is the
exponential function, Q(s,high) is the value of taking action high when the agent is in state s,
A(s) is the set of actions available when the agent is in state s, and β is the inverse temperature
free-parameter which regulates the greediness of the strategy.
4.2.9 Model Comparison
Equally complex models are compared to test the first hypothesis; these differ in that they
are fitted considering the action-space built on different arrangements of stocks in discrete
categories. The objective of this first inquiry is to find out if the risk-based classification of
stocks proposed in this work is a good account of the players’ risk perception. To accomplish
this task, the model fitted using the risk-based classification is tested against models trained
using the 500 randomly generated classifications. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC;
Akaike [1974]) is used to evaluate the goodness-of-fit for the models tested on either the risk-
based classification or on the “scrambled” stocks (i.e. the randomly-classified arrangements).
The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz [1978]) has been tested as well; the
AIC produced consistent results with the BIC, therefore only the AIC based results will
be presented. 500 comparisons are performed for each of the 46 players. For each player,
the AIC score of the risk-based model is compared to the AIC scores of the models fitted
using the 500 scrambled stocks. The comparison is carried out between the best fitting
models for each stock-arrangement; this means that the parameters sets representing the
maximum likelihood estimate for one model could differ from the ones of another model.
This comparison was chosen to be executed in this way to avoid biasing the scrambled
arrangements with parameters sets which do not necessarily represent the most descriptive
for these random classification. The result of these 500 comparison generate a binary vector,
which can be seen as a series of trials, with each element indicating whether the risk-based
model fits the data better than the i-th randomly-generated model:
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vi =
1 if AICrisk < AICi0 otherwise (4.32)
where vi is the outcome of the i-th comparison, with i = {1, · · · ,N} and N = 500 the
number of randomly generated stock arrangements; AICrisk is the AIC score associated with
the best model which uses the risk-based classification and AICi is the AIC score for the
i-th randomised classification. Given the binary vector resulting from the AIC comparisons
between risk-based classification and scrambled versions.
v⃗p = [v1,v2, · · · ,vi,vN ]′ (4.33)
where v⃗p is the vector of comparisons for player p, vi is the i-th comparison result, which
can be 1 in case the risk-classified model fitting performed better than then scrambled one
and 0 in the opposite case, as described in eq. 4.32.
The Clopper-Pearson binomial confidence interval (Clopper and Pearson [1934]) is a
method for calculating binomial confidence intervals; it is referred to as an “exact” method
since it is not based on an approximation of the binomial distribution, unlike for example,
the normal approximation method (Clopper and Pearson [1934]; Neyman [1935]). The
Clopper-Pearson interval method is adopted in this work to estimate the probability, and
the relative confidence intervals, that the proposed stock classification is better than the 500
random classifications. To test the first hypothesis, the resulting confidence intervals will
be evaluated against the 50% chance threshold; players whose confidence interval lies fully
above this threshold are likely to perceive the tradable stocks as belonging to discrete classes
defined on the stocks risk, estimated with a measure of their volatility in comparison to the
market.
In order to test the second hypothesis, that players behave in a reinforcement learning
way, an immediate-reward RL model will be compared to a baseline random model, for each
player in the dataset. In order to test the third hypothesis, that unskilled investors behave in a
naive way, a temporal-difference RL model will also be fitted to the data, so that a comparison
between naive strategy and far-sighted strategy can be performed. As described previously,
average-tracking RL will be used as the computational counterpart of naive behaviour, while
Q-learning will be adopted to represent the far-sighted strategy.
The best parameter set for the models is identified by means of a bounded gradient
descent searching algorithm. Gradient descent is an optimisation algorithm which aims at
finding the minimum of a function. For this work, the function to be minimised is the model
fitting routine, which corresponds to the iterative estimation of Q-values and the subsequent
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estimation of the probability of the actions taken by the players. The maximum likelihood
estimate represents the output of this function and the objective of the minimisation. The
gradient descent algorithm implemented to fit the models to the data is performed on a
bounded space defined for the three free-parameters of the models and with 27 combinations
of initial guess-points. The guess-points are the starting values each free parameter takes at
the beginning of the gradient descent search routine. It is extremely important to distribute
these initial points across the search space, because this reduces the chance of the gradient
descent routine getting stuck in local optima.
The boundaries for the parameters in the gradient descent search procedure are α ∈
(0.0001,2), β ∈ (0,50), γ ∈ (0,0.9999) (for the myopic model γ = 0).
The guess points are combinations of < α,β ,γ > from the values in the following sets:
α ∈ {0,0.5,2}, β ∈ {0,25,50}, γ ∈ {0,0.5,0.9999}.
The immediate-reward RL model features only the first two free-parameters, α and
β which represent the speed of learning and the propensity to select the best action (i.e.
greediness). The MLE for these models will be compared to the MLE of the random model
which can be calculated analytically as shown in eq. 4.29. The evaluation of random model
MLE is similar to the one established in the previous chapter (eq: 4.15), with the difference
that, in the controlled experiment scenario, the number of trials (i.e. subject’s decisions)
was fixed by the experimental design, while in this work it is derived by the quantity of
transactions made by each subject. This leads to different values of MLERND for each player,
depending on the number of interactions that particular player has produced.
The immediate-rewards RL model includes two parameters, while the random model
has no parameters; since the random model can be considered nested, in the case when the
free-parameters α = 0 and β = 0, this comparison can be carried out with the Likelihood
Ratio Test. The LRT comparison, similarly to the Akaike Information Criterion adopted
in the previous work, penalises the more complex model. The probability distribution of
this test statistic is approximated by a χ2 distribution with the degrees of freedom (d.o. f .)
equal to the difference between the number of parameters of the models tested (Huelsenbeck
and Crandall [1997]; Wilks [1938]). The LRT is convenient because it also provides a
straightforward way to estimate a p-value for the statistical significance of the comparison.
The third hypothesis will be tested in the same way by comparing a model representing
long-term strategies, which features three parameters, including a long-term discounting
factor, against the naive immediate-reward RL model. For this comparison the d.o. f .= 1,
while in the comparison between immediate-reward RL and random model the d.o. f .= 2.
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4.2.10 Models summary
Table 4.4 presents a summary of the three models which will be fitted to the Virtual Trader
players dataset. The baseline is represented by the random model, which trivially considers
the available actions equiprobable, not making any assumption about the subjects decision-
making or learning processes and therefore not featuring any parameter. The random model
does not represent any particular strategy but provides a starting point against which to
compare the descriptive achievements of the other proposed RL models.
The second model is the immediate-reward reinforcement learning, also known as average-
tracking, representing the naive strategy. This model features a simple learning rule which
focuses only on the maximisation of the reward available at the current time-step. This model
represents a short-sighted reinforcement learning model, which does not take into account
future rewards, therefore representing the myopic, naive strategy of an agent focused on
short-term goals. This simple RL model includes a step-size parameter representing the
speed of learning, denoted with α , which scales the new evidence obtained when applying
the learning rule.
The last model is Q-learning, an off-policy implementation of temporal-difference learn-
ing. This model learning rule incorporates a future reward term in the prediction error, which
allows to capture far-sighted strategies. The information about future attainable rewards
from the current time-step is scaled by a parameter called discount factor and denoted with γ ,
which is not included in the myopic RL model. Its value indicates the degree to which poten-
tial future rewards are considered when updating the belief about the current state-actions
pairs. With values closer to 1 indicating a more far-sighted time horizon and values closer to
0 being indicating a more myopic approach. This type of model has the power to capture
more complex and far-sighted strategies, as opposed to its nested myopic version.
Both the proposed RL models operate with Soft-Max as the probabilistic action-selection
policy, described previously in this chapter, in section 4.2.8, eq. 4.31. This stochastic rule
translates the value of state-action pairs into probabilities and involves a free-parameter
called inverse temperature, denoted with β and representing the greediness of an agent when
deciding which action to take; it tunes the probability of picking actions according to their
previously computed values. The extreme values of this parameter result in either completely
random behaviour (i.e. β = 0), or greedy behaviour (i.e. β → ∞), selecting only the action
believed to be the best and never exploring.
Each model is nested within the more complex one: the myopic RL is equivalent to
Q-learning when one of the parameters, the discount factor γ is set to 0; similarly if both
the parameters of the myopic RL, α and β , are set to 0 it reverts to a random model, as no
learning can happen and the action-selection strategy is to pick an action randomly.
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Table 4.4 Models summary. Each row represents a model to be fit to the behavioural data,
consisting of the players transactions. The table shows the model name, the number of
parameters featured and the type of behaviour captured.
Model # parameters
Behaviour
captured
Random 0 No strategy
Immediate-reward
Reinforcement Learning 2 Myopic / Naive
Q-learning (TD-learning) 3 Far-sighted

Chapter 5
Results
The next section of this chapter summarises the conditions studied in the decision-making
tasks from Barron and Erev [2003]; Erev and Barron [2005]. After this, both a qualitative
and a quantitative analysis will show that the models tested in this work achieve comparable
predictive performance as the more complex system developed in Erev and Barron [2005].
The second part of this chapter will examine the results of the descriptive modelling approach
developed, applied to a more realistic decision-making scenario. The data for this part of
the study is obtained from an online stock trading simulation, and includes the transactions
made by the subjects and the associated outcomes.
5.1 Experimental binary decision task results
36 subjects are subdivided into three groups, each characterised by different payoff conditions.
The underlying distribution of payoffs for the two option in each condition are:
Condition 1
High: Draw from the Gaussian distributionN (100,354)
Low : Draw from the truncated Gaussian distributionN (25,17.7)
Condition 2
High: Draw from the Gaussian distributionN (1300,354)
Low : Draw from the truncated Gaussian distributionN (1225,17.7)
Condition 3
High: Draw from the Gaussian distributionN (1300,17.7)
Low : Draw from the truncated Gaussian distributionN (1225,17.7)
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The subjects interact with the money-machine (shown in Fig. 3.1) for 200 trials, by
selecting one of the two options and receiving a payoff. This quantity is visualised temporarily
in the lower part of the game interface. It is then summed to the total payoff, this information
is shown constantly in the lower part of the interface.
5.1.1 Predictive value
This section presents the results of the comparisons between the models proposed and the
RELACS, developed in Erev and Barron [2005]. A qualitative comparison is provided in
Fig. 5.1. In this figure, the observed proportions of maximisation choices are compared with
the ones predicted by the models proposed in this thesis alongside the RELACS (Erev and
Barron [2005]). The observed choices show an upward trend in each condition, indicating
that subjects learned over the course of the trials for each problem formulation. The markers
for the Pmax values are coded with the symbols: diamonds for condition 1, squares for
condition 2 and triangles for condition 3. Examining the observed choices in the leftmost
graph, the Pmax in condition 3 is represented in the figure by triangles and shows both the
highest initial Pmax in block 1 and the strongest increase over the two blocks. Condition
3 is in fact the simplest problem, in which the two choices are easily distinguished. The
other two conditions exhibit an overall increment in proportion of maximisation choices
but not as marked. This is due to the fact that the outcome variability in these conditions
was higher. The RELACS predictions are summarised in the rightmost graph in the same
figure. The Pmax predictions trends are qualitatively similar to the ones observed from the
data, but slightly differ from the observed values. The markers are all positively shifted
for the RELACS panel in relation to the observed data. The Pmax predicted by the models
proposed in this thesis, similarly to the RELACS, capture the overall trend of learning over
the four blocks in each condition. As opposed to the RELACS Pmax predictions in the first
two conditions (diamonds and squares respectively), this thesis models predict values of
Pmax closer to the observed choices. It is also interesting how in condition 2 (squares) the
prediction captures the shift in preference, crossing the threshold of proportions at 50%. The
predictions of the proposed models for condition 3 (triangles) are negatively shifted. This
could indicate a potentially slower or more exploratory learning by the proposed models in
condition 3. The subjects in this condition acted quite greedily in the first block, picking the
maximising option more than 75% of the trials. Their preference for such condition increased
to almost 100% in the second block, indicating that their behaviour became more greedy
with time. In fact, in this condition the two payoff distributions are quite distinguishable,
leading to more consistent choice.
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Fig. 5.1 Comparison of observed and predicted proportions of maximisation choice (Pmax).
Each graph shows the evolution of the Pmax in four blocks of 50 trials each. The different
symbols individuate the different conditions. On the x-axis the trials, on the y-axis the Pmax.
The left panel shows the observed Pmax from the choice data. The central panel shows the
Pmax predicted by the models examined in this thesis. The panel on the right reproduces the
predicted Pmax from RELACS (Erev and Barron [2005]).
Considering a quantitative comparison, the MSD scores of the RELACS are reported as
0.0036 for the full model, which includes all the learning components as detailed in the pre-
vious chapter. There are also scores for variants of RELACS. A one-strategy, reinforcement
learning based variant performed poorly, scoring 0.0213. For example, a two-strategy model
which does not include the “slow best reply” rule presents a MSD of 0.0169. The excluded
strategy represents the reinforcement learning component combined with a stochastic action
selection rule. This dramatic increment in predictive score shows how important these
components are. The models examined in this thesis are variations of these rules enhanced
with notions from prospect theory. The MSD score achieved by this thesis models on the
entire dataset is 0.0066. This score is the average of the three MSD scores achieved for every
condition analysed. In the first condition the model scored 0.0021, in the second 0.0054 and
in the third 0.0124. The predictive performance in the third problem is lower relatively to the
other two conditions but still better than the RL or no-RL variants of RELACS. Even if the
general RELACS MSD score is lower than the average MSD score for the proposed models it
is necessary to point out that RELACS is a model with 4 free parameters while the proposed
models all have 3 or 2 parameters. The predictive MSD score does not provide a way to
account for this difference in comparing models. It is also worth noting how this predictive
assessment is not the central focus of this thesis but a necessary comparison with previous
modelling efforts. The rest of this work is concerned with studying the subjects’ behaviour
on an individual basis in order to understand its relationships with payoff variability (PV),
subjective perception of value and myopic behaviour. For these reasons, the analysis in the
next section follows a descriptive model fitting procedure. This is based on the maximum
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likelihood estimate approach, which is a probability based assessment of the descriptive
power of a model. Furthermore, this approach can be extended with AIC scores and weights,
which provide a framework for model comparison, including in those cases where the models
compared have different numbers of free parameters. The remaining sections of this chapter
focus on providing the results obtained following this precise approach, elucidating the
findings in relation to the hypotheses proposed in this chapter.
Fig. 5.2 Proportion of maximisation choices predicted by the model for each subject, aggre-
gated over four blocks (50, 100, 150 and 200 trials marks).
Fig. 5.3 Proportion of maximisation choices aggregated over four blocks (50, 100, 150 and
200 trials marks), reproduced from chapter 3 for convenience of comparison.
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5.1.2 Descriptive value
The results of model fitting and hypotheses testing are presented and analysed in this section.
The model fitting procedure estimated the descriptive performance for each of the 15 models
deriving from the combinations of environments, learning rules and reward functions. A
subset of these models is evaluated for each subject, in order to test the hypotheses presented
at the beginning of this chapter. It is worth noting that, when comparing the models proposed
with a baseline random model, 100% of the 36 subjects have at least 2 models which are
better than random and have been considered for further analysis. This comparison with a
baseline random model is carried out by comparing the AIC score of each tested model, with
the AIC score of the parameter-less random model. The random model is assumed to have a
probability p= 0.5 of picking either option. The MLE for such model is estimated according
to the same methodology as in the other cases. The AIC is calculated with no penalty for
model complexity, as the model has no free-parameters tuned.
AICRand = 2 ·κ−2 ·MLERand =
= 2 ·0−2 ·−138.63 = 277.28
(5.1)
where κ = 0 is the number of parameters and MLERand is the MLE score for the random
model which is calculated at the end of 4.1.14, eq. 4.15. The median AIC score for the
proposed models is 201.95 while the mean is 191.5239. The AIC difference method was
used to compare each reinforcement learning model fitted with the random baseline. A
threshold of significance for this comparison has been identified in ∆i = 5, which is deemed
as a considerable evidence in Burnham and Anderson [2002]. A further inspection with a
threshold twice as high ∆i = 10 lead to only two subjects being worse than random with
the majority of subjects being described by the models proposed significantly better than a
random model (34 out of 36 subjects: 94.4%).
The Akaike weights methodology described in section 4.1.15 has been used to select
the subset of models, in conjunction with the comparison with the baseline random model.
Examples of this procedure’s outcome for the first subjects in each condition, are shown
in Fig. 5.4, with full figures reported in Appendix A. The figures show the AIC score for
each of the 15 models fitted to each subject as a bar chart. These are presented in ascending
order, with the lowest, leftmost bar representing the best fitting model. The colour of the bars
indicates the configuration of state-space scenario and learning rule. The red bars represent
the AIC scores of the models discarded. The coloured bars to the left represent the models
whose summed Akaike weights crossed the 95% confidence set threshold. As it is often
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the case in multiple model fitting procedures, there is no single best model for each subject,
but a subset of the candidate models. These are the best fitting and the ones which best
capture the behavioural data. The summaries of model scores and weights for the subjects
1, 5 and 10 in condition 1 are presented in tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 (the rest of the subjects
model comparison is reported in appendix A). In these tables the first column is divided in
three acronyms according to the following scheme: Configurations are summarised with the
following scheme:
Table 5.1 Abbreviations for model components
State space Learning Rule Reward Function
SS: Single state AT: Average Tracking ID: Identity
FH: Full history QL: Q-learning TH: Hyperbolic tangentLO: Latest outcome PT: Prospect theory’s value function
The three subjects reported in Fig. 5.4 and tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 are chosen to illustrate
the diversity of models describing the individual behaviour. Subject 1 is well fitted by
five models, all based on a full-history state space. Subject 5 strategy is captured by two
full-history and one single-state models, combined always with the prospect theory’s value
function. Subject 10 is described by 2 models based on the latest-outcome state space, both
encompassing a Q-learning rule. Both predictive and descriptive analyses show that the
reinforcement learning models adopted in this work achieve human-level performance on
prediction and are a good descriptive account of their learning processes and actions for the
task analysed.
Fig. 5.4 Comparison of AIC scores of the 15 models fitted to subjects 1, 5 and 10 in condition
1. For this comparison of state-space arrangements, the three subjects have been chosen
specifically to show that each subject is characterised by models based on different types of
environment and learning rule.
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Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 1.000 0.003 0.000 -123.161 252.321 6.089 0.022
FH QL TH 3 1.000 0.058 0.000 -122.692 251.384 5.152 0.035
SS AT TH 2 1.000 0.038 0.000 -132.259 268.517 22.285 0.000
SS AT ID 2 1.000 0.002 0.000 -132.347 268.694 22.461 0.000
LO AT PT 2 0.056 0.010 0.000 -133.679 271.358 25.125 0.000
LO AT TH 2 1.000 0.019 0.000 -137.078 278.157 31.924 0.000
LO QL PT 3 0.919 0.002 1.000 -126.542 259.085 12.852 0.001
FH QL PT 3 1.000 0.003 1.000 -120.499 246.998 0.766 0.317
LO QL ID 3 0.817 0.002 1.000 -126.766 259.532 13.299 0.001
FH AT PT 2 1.000 0.003 0.000 -121.116 246.233 0.000 0.466
FH AT ID 2 1.000 0.003 0.000 -123.161 250.321 4.088 0.060
FH AT TH 2 1.000 0.058 0.000 -122.692 249.384 3.151 0.096
LO QL TH 3 0.813 0.038 1.000 -126.090 258.179 11.947 0.001
SS AT PT 2 0.062 0.014 0.000 -128.736 261.472 15.239 0.000
LO AT ID 2 1.000 0.001 0.000 -137.044 278.087 31.855 0.000
Table 5.2 Models summary: problem 1 - subject 1
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.001 1.000 1.000 -128.453 262.907 54.218 0.000
FH QL TH 3 0.022 1.000 1.000 -121.058 248.117 39.428 0.000
SS AT TH 2 0.873 0.014 0.000 -137.683 279.365 70.676 0.000
SS AT ID 2 1.000 0.000 0.000 -138.103 280.206 71.517 0.000
LO AT PT 2 0.004 0.140 0.000 -109.989 223.979 15.290 0.000
LO AT TH 2 0.003 1.000 0.000 -137.364 278.729 70.040 0.000
LO QL PT 3 0.276 0.007 1.000 -105.719 217.437 8.748 0.007
FH QL PT 3 0.007 0.091 0.000 -102.344 210.689 2.000 0.195
LO QL ID 3 0.315 0.004 1.000 -111.161 228.322 19.633 0.000
FH AT PT 2 0.007 0.091 0.000 -102.344 208.689 0.000 0.529
FH AT ID 2 0.001 1.000 0.000 -131.249 266.497 57.808 0.000
FH AT TH 2 0.004 1.000 0.000 -134.978 273.956 65.267 0.000
LO QL TH 3 0.271 0.108 1.000 -110.226 226.451 17.762 0.000
SS AT PT 2 0.007 0.103 0.000 -103.023 210.046 1.357 0.269
LO AT ID 2 0.000 1.000 0.000 -138.231 280.461 71.772 0.000
Table 5.3 Models summary: problem 1 - subject 5
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Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.000 1.000 0.000 -128.227 262.454 9.963 0.003
FH QL TH 3 0.002 1.000 1.000 -128.381 262.762 10.271 0.003
SS AT TH 2 0.002 1.000 0.000 -128.371 260.742 8.252 0.008
SS AT ID 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -128.172 260.344 7.854 0.010
LO AT PT 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 28.769 0.000
LO AT TH 2 0.017 0.309 0.000 -129.781 263.562 11.072 0.002
LO QL PT 3 1.000 0.001 1.000 -132.700 271.401 18.910 0.000
FH QL PT 3 0.000 0.000 0.719 -138.629 283.259 30.769 0.000
LO QL ID 3 0.144 0.004 1.000 -123.245 252.490 0.000 0.509
FH AT PT 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 28.769 0.000
FH AT ID 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -128.229 260.458 7.967 0.009
FH AT TH 2 0.002 1.000 0.000 -128.425 260.850 8.359 0.008
LO QL TH 3 0.145 0.081 1.000 -123.381 252.762 0.272 0.445
SS AT PT 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 28.769 0.000
LO AT ID 2 0.018 0.013 0.000 -129.909 263.818 11.328 0.002
Table 5.4 Models summary: problem 1 - subject 10
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis is concerned with clarifying whether decision-makers in binary choice
tasks use historical payoff information to assess their current status when making decisions.
This investigation stems from prospect theory’s idea that decision-makers have a shifting
reference point that moves according to previous experiences. This hypothesis proposes
that subjects take into account the historical information shown by the money machine (Fig.
3.1 in chapter 3), in order to decide which action to take next. This information is the
outcome of the latest choice and the sum of the payoffs accumulated over the course of all
previous interactions. This section focuses on the results of this hypothesis’ tests. To test this
hypothesis with a descriptive modelling approach, three state-spaces have been identified
(section 4.1.7) and will be used to represent the various approaches the decision-makers
could adopt in the task.
The single-state scenario represents the case in which a subject does not consider previous
outcomes in any form and therefore behaves only according to the perceived value of the
available options. The alternative scenarios are both represented by two-state modelling;
the latest outcome model captures the behaviour influenced by the last payoff value while
the full-history scenario captures the behaviour influenced by the total accumulated payoffs
information. The null hypothesis is that subjects do not use information about previous
outcomes when making decisions. This can be investigated within this modelling framework
by testing whether there is a difference in the distribution of single-state models and two-state
5.1 Experimental binary decision task results 137
variations. Alternatively, a significant difference in the number of subjects described by
either of the improved state-spaces would reject the null hypothesis. The prediction linked
to prospect theory’s shifting reference point suggestion is that the state-space environments
based on previous information are more likely to be descriptive of the behavioural data
because these scenarios describe the subjects’ decision-making more realistically.
This hypothesis is centred on comparing the single-state scenario to the enhanced state-
spaces. The full-history scenario is compared with the single-state one and with the latest
outcome. To test this hypothesis, the choice data for each subject is fitted with each of the
models deriving from the combinations of learning rules, reward functions and state-spaces.
This setup allows the subset of best descriptive models to be identified. The ones which are
best at describing the data are identified according to the AIC weights criterion. Firstly, the
best model, which is the one with the lowest AIC score, is identified as the most descriptive.
Then the Akaike weights for each model are calculated, as described in section 4.1.15, eq.
4.18. These are used to determine the subset of models which are less likely than the best
model (lowest AIC), but are still likely to provide significant description of the choice data.
The distance between the AIC score of the best model and the others is used to calculate
the weights which represent a probabilistic account of the evidence in favour of each model.
This methodology provides a confidence set for the best model, based on AIC scores which
are grounded in the Kullback-Leibler information theory; this confidence set can be used in a
similar way as to the evaluation of a parameter confidence interval based on a model and a
set of data (Burnham and Anderson [2002], p. 169). The Akaike weights method are also
helpful in estimating parameters more reliably, avoiding abruptly disregarding potentially
meaningful parameter sets. This is crucial for testing the other hypotheses. This procedure
results in a different number of models selected for each subject. An alternative approach
would be restricting the model selection with a specific threshold, for example accepting only
the three best models for each subject. This cut-off method was not adopted because it would
introduce an arbitrary bias in the model selection unsubstantiated by literature. Moreover,
arbitrarily capping the number of models considered would also break the Akaike weights
confidence set theory.
The next step is to estimate the frequency of each type of scenario. The configurations
tested and summarised in table 4.2 result in five configurations with equal number of models
being tested. The first configuration is single-state and is combined with average-tracking
learning rule (models 1-3 in table 4.2). For the baseline state-space scenario, this is the only
combination possible. The alternative rule Q-learning, being a type of temporal-difference
learning, requires more than one state to be applied. Therefore, both the two-state scenarios
are combined with the two learning rules. This TD-learning rule is included in the modelling
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to accommodate the possibility that subjects behave in a more far-sighted fashion, in the
case their perception is described with a two-state environment. The resulting configurations
combinations are latest-outcome combined with the average-tracking (models 4-6), latest-
outcome and Q-learning (7-9), full-history in combination with average-tracking (10-12) and
full-history combined with Q-learning (13-15).
The frequency of the model combinations fitted to the data and selected by the criteria
described above resulted in the following distributions:
Single-state & Average-tracking: 57 models, 17.87%;
Full-history & Average-tracking: 60 models, 18.81%;
Full-history & Q-learning: 82 models, 25.71%;
Latest-outcome & Average-tracking: 50 models, 15.67%;
Latest-outcome & Q-learning: 70 models, 21.94%.
These results are graphically presented in Fig. 5.5.
Fig. 5.5 The comparison of the state-space configurations. Each bar represents the model
frequency for a specific configuration obtained selecting the subset of models with the sum of
Akaike weights ≥ 95%. The red line is the expected count for a uniform distribution. Each
bar is colour coded with the model type.
5.1 Experimental binary decision task results 139
Multiple Pearson Chi-squared (χ2) “goodness of fit” tests have been carried out on
the frequencies of the subset of subjects’ best models in order to test the first hypothesis.
The results of the tests confirm that configurations of two-state scenarios combined with
Q-learning are more likely to be representative of the decision-makers’ behaviour when
compared with single-state configuration or latest-outcome scenario combined with average-
tracking learning rule:
The overall five-way χ2 test shows a significant difference across the five categories:
Combined five categories: χ2(4,N = 319) = 9.730, p = 0.045 < 0.05
Further pairwise tests between the full-history model with Q-learning (QL) rule and the
other configurations provide evidence against the single-state version and the latest-outcome
model with average-tracking (AT):
Full-history QL vs Single-state: χ2(1,N = 139) = 4.496, p = 0.034 < 0.05;
Full-history QL vs Latest-outcome AT: χ2(1,N = 132) = 7.758, p = 0.005 < 0.05.
Full-history QL vs Full-history AT: χ2(1,N = 142) = 3.409, p = 0.064 > 0.05.
Full-history QL vs Latest-outcome QL: χ2(1,N = 152) = 0.947, p= 0.330> 0.05.
The comparison between full-history QL and full-history AT does not indicate a signif-
icant difference. The same result emerges from the comparison between full-history QL
and latest-outcome QL. Moreover, none of the remaining comparisons achieves a significant
result (full details in the box at the end of this section).
These results provide evidence that a configuration encompassing a two-state version of
the environment, in conjunction with a long-term learning strategy, is more representative
than either a single-state version or an immediate reward learning strategy paired with a
short-term memory state-space. From the rest of the comparisons there is no strong indication
on which state-space modelling is more representative of the subjects’ reference system in
this binary choice task.
The results obtained reject the null hypothesis, that subjects do not use information
about previous outcomes when making decisions. Furthermore, two of the comparisons -
FH-QL vs single-state and FH-QL vs LO-AT - provide support for the alternative hypothesis,
that subjects use previous outcomes information offered from the interface when making
decisions in this binary task. The rest of the results do not provide enough evidence to
support other alternative explanations.
Even if these findings point in the direction of subjects showing a higher degree of
sophistication in their learning and decision-making processes, they also indicate that more
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research is needed to clarify what type of information is taken into account by decision-
makers when faced by similar binary decision tasks. Even if it was not possible to identify
one single method the decision-makers use to assess their current status, it is clear from
the results that historical information influences the reference point decision-makers use.
This indication is of crucial importance for future developments. Future environment design
for similar tasks in descriptive modelling studies should take into account the information
provided to the subjects, because the current work indicates that it affects the DM’s behaviour.
This descriptive investigation allowed for a comparison between models based on different
reinforcement learning environments. Each of the tested scenarios represented a possible
approach the subjects could use. The results indicate that in many instances subjects are
well modelled with environments considering previous outcomes. The integration of such
information into a reinforcement learning setup represents a novel approach into the study of
decisions from experience, and an encouraging link with prospect theory. According to the
results, prospect theory’s shifting reference point does play a role for a number of subjects
in this task. This subjective shifting phenomenon is in-line with the indications from the
literature. In fact, subjects shift their preference depending on their previous experiences, as
predicted by the “house-money effect” and the “break-even effect”. These phenomena are
described in chapter 2, section 2.1.2.
Hypothesis 1: State-space configuration.
FH-QL vs SS: χ2(1,N = 139) = 4.496, p = 0.034 < 0.05 significant;
FH-QL vs LO-AT: χ2(1,N = 132) = 7.758, p = 0.005 < 0.05 significant;
FH-QL vs FH-AT: χ2(1,N = 142) = 3.409, p = 0.064 > 0.05 not significant;
FH-QL vs LO-QL: χ2(1,N = 152) = 0.947, p = 0.330 > 0.05 not significant;
FH-AT vs SS: χ2(1,N = 117) = 0.077, p = 0.782 > 0.05 not significant;
FH-AT vs LO-QL: χ2(1,N = 130) = 0.769, p = 0.380 > 0.05 not significant;
FH-AT vs LO-AT: χ2(1,N = 110) = 0.909, p = 0.340 > 0.05 not significant;
LO-QL vs SS: χ2(1,N = 127) = 1.331, p = 0.249 > 0.05 not significant;
LO-AT vs SS: χ2(1,N = 107) = 0.458, p = 0.499 > 0.05 not significant.
All state-spaces: χ2(4,N = 319) = 9.730, p = 0.045 < 0.05 significant.
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Hypothesis 2
This section presents the results of the tests relative to the second hypothesis. The hypothesis
is concerned with the way subjects perceive and internalise the values of the available options.
The prediction, expressed also in section 4.1.2, is that prospect theory’s subjective value
function would be the most descriptive among the three reward functions tested; the other
two being the identity function (raw payoffs) and the hyperbolic tangent (fully saturating). In
order to answer the question on whether PT’s value function is the most descriptive account
of subjects’ payoffs perception for this task, a similar procedure to hypothesis 1 has been
carried out. A subset of best models has been identified for each subject according to the AIC
weights methodology. In a similar manner to the previous test the models considered are the
ones with the lowest AIC and whose Akaike weights summed crosses the 95% confidence
threshold. Using these model subsets as a starting point, the frequencies for each reward
function have been estimated. A Pearson Chi-squared χ2 (goodness of fit) test is performed
on such frequencies. Fig. 5.6, provides a graphical representation of the distributions of the
three reward function classes tested.
The first three-way Chi-squared test carried out resulted in χ2(2,N = 319) = 8.418 and
p = 0.004 < 0.05. This test provides strong and statistically significant evidence against the
null hypothesis, that there is no difference in the representativeness of the reward functions
tested. The pairwise tests confirm the evidence against the hyperbolic tangent (Tanh) function
when compared to PT value function. The same cannot be said for the comparison between
raw and saturating payoff transformations.
Fig. 5.6 The comparison of the subjective reward functions configurations. The bars depict
the frequency for a specific configuration obtained in the same way as in the state-space test.
The red line is the expected count for a uniform distribution in each comparison panel.
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Moreover, even if the frequency of selected models featuring PT value function is higher
than the ones with the identity function, this difference is not statistically significant and does
not provide enough evidence to undoubtedly consider PT value function more representative
than raw rewards.
These results provide an indication that decision-makers, in this particular task, do not
perceive utility as a fully saturating function of payoffs. The same results cannot confirm
that PT value function has a stronger descriptive power when compared to unaltered payoff
values. One potential explanation for such lack of descriptive power is that the subjective
value function fitted to the individual choices in this study followed the parametrisation
with values from literature. These values were estimated from data obtained in decisions
from description scenarios and could suffer from the discrepancy between decisions from
experience and decisions from description. More work is required in this direction, which
will be examined in chapter 6, when discussing the future developments.
Hypothesis 2: Reward function.
Tanh vs Identity: χ2(1,N = 181) = 2.9227, p = 0.087 > 0.05 not significant;
Tanh vs Identity: χ2(1,N = 181) = 2.9227, p = 0.087 > 0.05
PT vs Tanh: χ2(1,N = 199) = 8.447, p = 0.003 < 0.05 significant.
Three-way test:: χ2(2,N = 319) = 8.418 and p = 0.004 < 0.05 significant;
Hypothesis 3
This section presents the results for the analysis of the third hypothesis, focused on the study
of the relationship between payoff variability (PV) and the subjects’ speed of learning. The
payoff variability is calculated as the standard deviation of the observed outcomes (eq. 4.1).
The PV measures the variability of the outcomes experienced by a subject during the 200
trials. The learning speed is estimated with a free-parameter in the learning rule of the models
fitted to the subject’s choice data. It provides a measure of the quantity of information the
subjects consider when learning about the option values, ultimately describing how fast they
learn.
Because the subjects were subdivided in three substantially different conditions, this
hypothesis is broken down into three tests, one for each condition, plus a cumulative test.
This is done because each condition presents a payoff variability range different from the
other conditions by design. The data is presented in Fig. 5.7, panel a) in the form of a scatter
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plot with marginal distributions. The data points for each condition are colour-coded and are
shown with different symbols. These points are identified as the pairs of outcome standard
deviation experienced by a subject and the associated learning rate parameter α , which
estimates the subject’s speed of learning. The parameter values are combined into a single
figure as the weighted average of the parameter estimates within each model selected by the
Akaike weights criterion. This procedure allows inference based on a single estimate, which
is the combination of the parameters estimated for each model within the 95% confidence
set. An alternative approach, which is widely used in literature even if its limitations have
been pointed out in multiple instances (Burnham and Anderson [2002]; Wagenmakers and
Farrell [2004]), is to use the parameter estimate from the single best model (lowest AIC
score); doing so would neglect the importance of the remaining models and their parameters
estimates, which are likely to still be good candidates for describing the data. Subjects were
fitted by a different number of models, as shown in Fig. 5.4, and in the tables A.2, A.6
and A.11. This does not affect the results because the model’s parameter estimates were
combined into a single value with the Akaike weights effectively balancing the amount of
evidence for each of these estimates. The parameter which is then identified for a subject is
an estimate that keeps into consideration the amount of evidence in favour of each estimate
from the models subset. This is an important part of the methodology adopted which is used
for this hypothesis as much as in the next ones.
In order to estimate the correlation of two quantities with the Pearson test of correlation
the data for each variable is required to be normally distributed. Three tests of normality have
been carried out on each variable: Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Anderson-Darling and Bera-Jarque
tests. The Pearson test of correlation could not be adopted because all the normality tests
results are negative, confirming the data being non-normally distributed. As the normality
assumption does not hold true, the Spearman’s test of rank correlation is used instead. This
non-parametric test does not assume the data follows a particular distribution but relies
instead on the ranks of the values, measuring the direction and the strength of the relationship
between the two variables. It is important to remember that while Pearson’s test establishes
the linear correlation between two variables, Spearman’s correlation instead focuses on
monotonic relationships.
The null hypothesis for this relationship is that there is no correlation between the
two quantities. The correlations between payoff variability with the parameters describing
learning speed have been tested for each condition with the following results.
The results indicate that there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis, when
considering each condition separately. The Spearman’s rank correlation test in condition
1 resulted in ρ = 0.042 with non significant p value = 0.897 > 0.05. The same test on
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Fig. 5.7 For both panels, on the x-axis the Payoff Variability (subjective observed outcomes
standard deviation). On the y-axis in panel a) the values of learning rate parameter estimated
by model fitting procedure and Akaike weighted average of the best models; in panel b) the
values of inverse temperature parameter (action-selection greediness) estimated in the same
way as the learning rate. Data for each comparison is plotted on the same scatter and is colour
and symbol coded for each condition. On the left hand side of each panel the box-plot of the
marginal distribution for the parameter plotted. On the bottom of each panel the marginal
distribution of the outcomes standard deviations values. As this information is presented
twice, panel a) shows it in the form of kernel density plot while panel b) shows it as box-plot.
condition 2 produces ρ = 0.281 with non significant p value = 0.377> 0.05. Finally, the test
on the data for condition 3 yielded ρ = 0.476 with non significant p value = 0.121 > 0.05.
It is worth noting however, that by pooling together the data across the three condition
and analysing it in the same way, the results obtained are much different. The Spearman’s
rank correlation test across the three conditions is ρ = 0.443 with p value = 0.007 < 0.05,
indicating moderate positive correlation with strong statistical significance.
According to the outcome of this test, subjects who experienced more variability were
quicker in their learning. This indication is also noticeable from a graphical inspection of
Fig. 5.7 panel a); in fact, the individuals who experienced low variability are clustered in the
bottom left corner of the figure, while the subjects who encountered more variation appear
grouped in the top right corner. This result is in contrast with previous suggestions from
Erev and Barron [2005], that payoff variability has an impairing effect on learning. The
datapoints in condition 2 and 3 appear clustered in distinctly opposite areas: Fig. 5.7 panel
a), red circles in top-right corner and yellow diamonds in bottom-left corner. The reason
why significance is achieved for the entire dataset is that, when pooling the data together,
these datapoints lead to a dataset with a more marked ranking and orientation, as opposed to
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condition data subsets. An attempt to reconcile the findings obtained so far with the results
of the next investigation is provided at the end of the next section.
Hypothesis 3: correlation between payoff variability and speed of learning (α).
Condition 1: ρ = 0.042, p value = 0.897 > 0.05 not significant;
Condition 2: ρ = 0.281, p value = 0.377 > 0.05 not significant;
Condition 3: ρ = 0.476, p value = 0.121 > 0.05 not significant.
All conditions: ρ = 0.443 with p value = 0.007 < 0.05 significant.
Hypothesis 4
This hypothesis focuses on studying the relationship between payoff variability and the degree
of greediness in decision-making behaviour exhibited by the subject in their interactions. In
decision-making tasks’ action-selection can be divided in exploitative and explorative. The
former consists of choices favouring the option believed to be the best at a certain point in
time, the latter selects alternatives that are believed not to be the best in order to acquire
more knowledge about them, in case they are actually better than they are believed to be.
Exploitative behaviour is also described as greedy because it is concerned with maximising
the immediate reward and is based on the current level of information; on the other hand,
extreme explorative behaviour results in random action-selection. The choice data for each
subject lies somewhere on this continuum. Greediness (or randomness) is quantified by a
free parameter in the probabilistic action-selection policy adopted in this thesis modelling.
This parameter is called β and it is estimated as previously described for the learning-speed
parameter, with the weighted average of the parameters identified by the subset of best models
for each subject. The closer the values of β are to 0, the more random the behaviour, while
high values indicate a greedier behaviour. The null hypothesis for this part of the investigation
is that there is no correlation between the amount of payoff variability experienced by a
subject and the corresponding greediness in choice behaviour. In other words, there is no
correlation between the standard deviation of the outcomes attained by a subject and the
greediness parameter estimated for that subject. Similarly to the previous analysis on payoff
variability and learning speed, this hypothesis is broken down into three tests, since the
subjects were subdivided in three conditions designed with different observable variability,
plus a fourth cumulative test. The data about this hypothesis is presented in Fig. 5.7, panel
b) and follows the same legend as in panel a). The datapoints identify the pairs of payoff
146 Results
standard deviation and greediness estimate for each subject and are shown with different
symbols and colours according to the experimental condition they belong to.
The Spearman rank correlation test in condition 1 indicates that there is no correlation
between the two quantities with ρ =−0.182 and p value = 0.572> 0.05 not significant. For
condition 2 the test results in a negative correlation score ρ =−0.566 with non-significant
p value = 0.059 > 0.05. The test on date in condition 3 produces even stronger negative
correlation with ρ =−0.657, this time with a significant p value = 0.024 < 0.05. A zoomed
in version of the scatter plot, for the datapoints from condition 3, is shown in Fig. 5.8.
Fig. 5.8 Scatter plot with marginal distribution histograms of payoff variability against
greediness parameter estimate, for subjects in condition 3.
The negative ρ indicates that subjects experiencing low payoff variability choose more
greedily while for those subjects who experienced higher payoff variability behaviour was
more exploratory. This relationship is not significant in the first two conditions and statis-
tically significant in the third. A potential explanation of these results lies in the design
of the third condition, portrayed in Fig. 5.9, Condition 3, where the two options’ payoff
distributions are quite distinct and only minimally overlap.
Among the subjects in condition 3, the ones who experienced more payoff variability
were less greedy and more random in their action selection; this finding is in line with
previous indications from Erev and Barron [2005]. The subjects in the conditions 1 and 2
have experienced a much greater payoff variability due to the structure of payoffs distributions
in those conditions. Following previous suggestions from literature (Erev and Barron [2005]),
more experienced payoff variability leads to an impairment in learning, slowing it down. The
analysis carried out in this work does not support this, providing little evidence against it.
Analysing the entirety of the scatter plot in Fig 5.7 panel a), it is worth noting that subjects
who experienced more variability are generally better fitted by faster learning models (red
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Fig. 5.9 Payoff probability density functions for each condition (top row) and observed
payoffs distributions (bottom row). In blue the PDF and observed outcome frequency of the
option yielding low expected payoffs, in red the high option. In condition 1 the outcomes of
option low are truncated in 0 therefore never yielding negative rewards.
circles, top right corner), as opposed to subjects who experienced lower variability and are
better fitted by models featuring slow learning rates (yellow diamonds, bottom left corner).
Moving on to panel b) in the same figure, the subjects better fitted by fast learning models
are also described with high randomness (red circles, bottom right corner). A possible
explanation for these results is that those individuals who experienced high payoff variability
tended to become more random in their decision-making, exploring their options and trying
to achieve a better understanding of which option was the best. This effect, which confirms
the indications in Erev and Barron [2005], has been proven to be significant in the subset of
subjects facing the easiest of the three conditions. At the same time, these subjects appear to
be quicker in learning their perceived best action, which not necessarily coincides with the
true high return option. When considering the subjects from all conditions, the Spearman’s
test results in ρ =−0.343 with significant p value = 0.041 < 0.05, indicating a moderate
negative correlation between subjects’ experienced payoff variability and their exhibited
greediness in action-selection strategy. The direction of this result agrees with the trend of
the other test results. Moreover, together with the result for the last condition it provides
evidence towards a negative relationship, indicating that subjects who experienced more
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variability became less greedy, and more random. This finding corroborates the indications
from literature (Erev and Barron [2005]).
Hypothesis 4: correlation between payoff variability and action-selection
behaviour (β ).
Condition 1: ρ =−0.182, p value = 0.572 > 0.05 not significant;
Condition 2: ρ =−0.566, p value = 0.059 > 0.05 not significant;
Condition 3: ρ =−0.657, p value = 0.024 < 0.05 significant.
All conditions: ρ =−0.343 with p value = 0.041 < 0.05 significant.
Hypothesis 5
The fifth and last hypothesis of this chapter regards the relationship between subjects’ perfor-
mance in the task and the degree of far-sightedness captured by the models fitted to the choice
data. This last quantity is based on the estimation of the subjects’ interest in future rewards
when learning the task and it is encapsulated by a free-parameter called discount factor, or γ ,
in the models fitted to the subjects’ choice data. In the reinforcement learning framework,
and specifically in temporal difference learning, this parameter regulates the amount of
future rewards considered during an agent’s learning process. A value γ = 0 represents fully
myopic behaviour with an agent being concerned only with obtaining immediate rewards.
Values close to 0 indicate somewhat myopic tendencies, while values close to 1 describe
far-sighted behaviour. In the context of the descriptive modelling performed in this work,
this parameter provides a numerical representation of the myopia or far-sightedness of the
subjects behavioural data.
Like in the previous hypotheses investigations, the estimation of this parameter is achieved
by fitting the 15 models, identifying the most descriptive according to Akaike weights method
and averaging these estimates according to the weights (section 4.1.15, eq. 4.19). Even if the
models in the dataset do not all feature this parameter the estimation can still be performed.
For those models based on average-tracking as learning rule, the discount factor parameter
is not considered because this learning rule can be considered a special case of Q-learning
where the discount factor parameter is set to 0, effectively reducing to a nested version as
described in Burnham and Anderson [2002], pp 150-152.
This hypothesis test is structured in a similar way to the procedures adopted for the
previous hypotheses. The model’s parameter of interest for this comparison is the discount
factor, while the other variable for the correlation test is the task performance, which can
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Fig. 5.10 On the y-axis, for all panels, the value of the discount factor parameter γ estimated
by model fitting procedure and Akaike weighted average of the best models. Values of γ
close to 1 indicate more far-sighted behaviour, while values close to 0 indicate more myopic
behaviour. Each column depicts a condition. Top row shows the scatter plot of these values
along with the cumulative rewards performance measure for each subject. The bottom row
shows the scatter plot of discount factor values and corresponding Pmax (proportion of
maximisation choices, section 4.1.16, eq. 3.1) for each subject. On the left hand side and at
the bottom of each panel is pictured the marginal distribution of each variable in the form of
kernel density estimates.
be measured in two different ways. From a subject’s perspective, the performance can be
interpreted and quantified as the final cumulative outcome, consisting of the sum of the
200 payoffs received at each time step. From the omniscient standpoint of the experiment
designer, the performance can be identified as the proportion of maximisation choices (Pmax):
a subject is performing well if she chooses the option with the highest expected return even if
this yields poor short-term results. This measure has been used in literature (e.g. Barron and
Erev [2003]; Erev and Barron [2005]; Erev et al. [2012]; Thaler et al. [1997]) and was also
used to compare the predictive power of the models developed in this thesis against previous
work (Erev and Barron [2005]). Because the structure of the experiment contemplated
different ranges of payoffs in each condition, the correlation analysis is performed on each
subset of subjects belonging to the three conditions. For completeness the correlation test
is also performed on the aggregated subjects dataset. The null hypothesis is that there is no
correlation between how myopic or far-sighted subjects are and their performance, being it
quantified as the amount of money accrued or the portion of maximisation choices performed
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over the course of the task. The alternative hypothesis is that there is a significant correlation
between these quantities.
The scatter plot of the data for each condition is presented in Fig. 5.10. Top row panels a),
b) and c) show the scatter plot and kernel density plots for the three conditions (first to third,
left to right) when comparing discount factor γ and cumulative rewards performance. The
figures on the bottom row, panels d), e) and f) show the comparisons for the three conditions,
in the same order as in the previous three panels, of discount factor against proportion of
maximisation performance.
Four Spearman’s rank correlation tests have been carried out on the data subsets for
each of the three conditions and on the entire dataset. Each datapoint represents the pair of
estimated discount-factor parameter and performance, measured as sum of the outcomes
received, for each subject. This first measure of performance can be considered as a subjective
perception of success, because it is based on the information the subjects were able to see on
the interface of the money-machine.
Furthermore, this was the quantity which translated the task performance into real-life
monetary reward at the end of the experiment (Barron and Erev [2003]; Thaler et al. [1997]).
The test in condition 1 resulted in ρ = 0.315 with non-significant p value = 0.318 > 0.05.
The results for condition 2 are ρ = 0.552 with p value = 0.067 > 0.05, not significant. The
third condition data resulted in a negative correlation with ρ = −0.476, again with non-
significant p value = 0.121 > 0.05. If the data from the three conditions is pooled together
and analysed in the same way, it results in ρ =−0.008 with a p value = 0.965 > 0.05. This
final result indicates that the contrasting trends for the three conditions, positive for the first
two and negative for the third, produces an uncorrelated and non significant dataset according
to the Spearman’s test. The results provided so far show that there is not enough evidence
to support the alternative hypothesis in each of the three conditions and in the aggregated
dataset, when using cumulative rewards as measure of the performance.
Because the performance can also be identified to be the amount of correct decisions
a subject makes this hypothesis has been also tested with a measure of the performance
based on this metric. This measure of the performance is not immediately accessible to the
subjects, as they are not provided with a description of which option yields the best payoff
on average. Subjects could find this information only by exploring the options and gauging
information about their quality. Therefore, the Pmax represents a measure of performance
from the experiment designer’s point of view. These correlations tests have been evaluated
with the same procedure as in the previous four tests. The same discount-factor estimates
are used, but instead of the sum of payoffs obtained by the subject, the proportion of high
choices has been used.
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Four Spearman’s correlation tests have been performed, one for each condition plus
the test on the aggregated data. In the first condition the test resulted in ρ = 0.508 with
non significant p value = 0.091 > 0.05 In the second condition a marginally significant,
moderate positive correlation was found with ρ = 0.581 and p value = 0.047 < 0.05. The
third condition test resulted in a non significant negative correlation, ρ = −0.419 and p
value = 0.177 > 0.05. A final Spearman’s test on the data aggregated from the three
condition resulted in ρ =−0.010 with p value = 0.955 > 0.05. This final correlation test
suffers from the same aggregation effect as in the previous tests. The aggregation of data
from the conditions which presented opposite correlation trends resulted in a very weak
correlation with the trends from the different conditions, substantially cancelling each other
and producing the least significant result.
Most of these tests do not show enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Except
for the second condition with Pmax as performance measure, all comparisons were non
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Therefore it can be concluded that for both mea-
sures of performance and for most of the conditions tested there is no correlation between
myopic behaviour and task performance, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. A possible
explanation of these results is that for this type of tasks the time horizon is not long enough
to influence subjects’ decision-making too much, because the reward obtained from each
action is obtained immediately. Therefore, as the correlation tests results suggest, there is
no relationship between the degree of myopia subjects are best described with and their
achievements measured either internally or externally.
In this regard it would be interesting to investigate a more realistic scenario in which
an action’s repercussion is not immediate but delayed. Investigating a task similar to the
one examined in Thaler et al. [1997], could in fact produce more informative findings on
the effect of myopic behaviour. The next chapter is focused on this type of investigation.
Building on the conclusions drawn from the results of this chapter and extending them to a
realistic scenario.
Hypothesis 5: correlation between myopic behaviour (γ) and task
performance (cumulative rewards).
Condition 1: ρ = 0.315, p value = 0.318 > 0.05 not significant;
Condition 2: ρ = 0.552, p value = 0.067 > 0.05 not significant;
Condition 3: ρ =−0.476, p value = 0.121 > 0.05 not significant.
All conditions: ρ =−0.008 with p value = 0.965 > 0.05 not significant.
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Hypothesis 5: correlation between myopic behaviour (γ) and task
performance (Pmax).
Condition 1: ρ = 0.508, p value = 0.091 > 0.05 not significant;
Condition 2: ρ = 0.581, p value = 0.047 < 0.05 significant;
Condition 3: ρ =−0.419, p value = 0.177 > 0.05 not significant.
All conditions: ρ =−0.010 with p value = 0.955 > 0.05 not significant.
5.1.3 Discussion
The first part of the work presented in this thesis, described in chapter 4, analyses an
experimental dataset developed by Barron and Erev (Barron and Erev [2003]; Erev and
Barron [2005]) which replicated with some modifications the three experimental conditions
previously adopted in Thaler et al. [1997]. This scenario represents an ideal starting point for
this investigation, as it provides a controlled environment in which subjects were asked to
make decisions and were allowed to observe the corresponding outcomes. These repeated,
direct-experience partial-feedback interactions have been modelled with the reinforcement
learning models proposed, following indications from the original papers. The attempt to
connect this computational modelling framework with a theory of decision-making developed
by Kahneman and Tversky [1979], which describes decision-making in risky situations, is
part of the novelty of this work since no previous attempt to do this is known.
Prospect theory indicates that decision-makers shift their reference point according to
previous experiences; this suggestion has been implemented through a two-state environment
within the reinforcement learning framework. This point of view is also grounded in two
behavioural phenomena regarding risk preferences, the “house-money” and “break-even”
effects, according to which decision-makers change their attitude towards risk following
previous gains or losses. The results of this investigation provided evidence that these subjects
were best represented by models encompassing two-state environments based on previous
outcomes, indicating a potential link between the RL modelling framework and prospect
theory. Specifically, the comparison of the state-spaces proposed indicated that a two-states
full-history model is more representative than either a two-states previous-outcomes model
or a single-state trivial scenario. This indication offers an interesting starting point for
future research efforts. When modelling subjects in this type of task, it is important to take
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into account the way information is provided to the decision-makers, as this affects their
perception and behaviour.
Using the same dataset and descriptive modelling approach, a set of three reward functions
has been tested; the structures of these functions includes desirable features of decision-
making identified in literature, such as decreasing sensitivity to extreme outcomes or loss-
aversion. The results provide evidence towards prospect theory’s subjective value function,
a non-saturating decreasing function which also captures loss-aversion. Even if the results
point in this direction, more research could improve descriptive studies of behaviour. In
fact, the PT value function adopted in the present work has been parametrised according
to the estimates from literature, in Tversky and Kahneman [1992]. These parameters have
been estimated on decisions from description tasks and can potentially be improved by
designing a similar experiment to identify more appropriate values for experience-based
choice behaviour.
Three more research questions focused on the same data, with all three analysing the
correlation between behaviour as described by the models’ parameters and either the payoff
variability experienced or the performance achieved. The payoff variability (PV) is a measure
of the spread of outcomes experienced during the interactions. According to indications from
the work in which the dataset was generated (Erev and Barron [2005]), a higher variability
in observed outcomes leads to an impairment in learning associated with a more random
behaviour. To better address this, the PV is compared to the values of parameter estimates,
which describe speed of learning and randomness in action-selection for each subject.
In the first comparison, between PV and learning speed, the results indicate no correlation
between these two quantities when considering the three experimental conditions separately.
When pooling the data from these three conditions together, a significant moderate correlation
is found. This could be the case because the Spearman correlation test adopted is based on the
ranks of the datapoints; when pooling the data the arrangement of these datapoints follows a
more monotonic distribution, leading to a significant result according to this test. This result
indicates that those subjects who experienced more variability in the outcomes also behaved
as if learning very fast. In Erev and Barron [2005] it was suggested the opposite, that when
the payoff variability experienced by a subject increased, the learning was impaired. As the
results obtained in the present analyses are at odds with the suggestions from previous work,
more research is needed in this direction. A study encompassing two groups characterised by
two distinct degrees of payoff variability could help shed light upon this open question.
The second comparison analyses the correlation between payoff variability and the
greediness exhibited by the subjects. The parameter estimate for this behavioural feature
indicates the strategy followed in choosing the actions; extreme values indicate random
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choice in one end of the spectrum and greedy choice in the opposite end. The results from
this comparison indicate that there is no correlation between the outcome variability observed
by a subject and the action-selection policy followed, except for the third condition. In this
last experimental setup, the underlying distributions for the two choices are very distinct.
A small negative correlation has been found in this condition, indicating that subjects who
experience higher variability tend to behave more randomly. The same tendency is observed
when pooling the data from the three conditions together. These results provide some
evidence confirming the indications from Erev and Barron [2005], that when outcomes are
more spread people tend to become less efficient and act more erratically.
The last research question addressed in the first part of the work presented looks at
the relationship between far-sightedness in the strategy adopted by the subjects and their
performance in the task. Both an internal and an external measure of performance have
been used to test the hypothesis that far-sighted subjects achieve better performance in this
ambiguous binary decision task. The internal measure is based on the observed outcomes
while the external is the amount of maximisation choices as a proportion of the total number
of choices made. This idea is linked to the original paper (Thaler et al. [1997]) in which
longer temporal arcs in feedback evaluation, from the subject’s perspective, induced a higher
proportion of maximisation choices. This concept was used to explain investors’ choice as
being biased towards short-sightedness (i.e. myopia). As the data analysed was generated
with immediate feedback and had no feedback delays, a proxy for this was identified in a
parameter estimate of the temporal-difference models proposed. The results indicate that
there is no correlation between the degree to which subjects cared about future rewards and
either measure of performance. These results suggest that myopic or far-sighted strategies do
not have an influence on task performance. This could be the case because the time horizon
in this task is too short, in fact the feedback is obtained at each interaction. Even if subjects
considered future rewards within the modelling proposed, these do not play a role important
enough in the experimental design of this specific task. A future investigation could be based
on a task with a structure similar to the one considered in Thaler et al. [1997], with groups of
subjects being exposed to different time-horizons. The present work provides an indication
that for a task in which the outcome of the decisions is immediate, it is not far-sightedness
that allows a decision-maker to achieve better returns.
An interesting extension to the modelling proposed for this task would be to integrate
prospect theory’s probability weighting function (Kahneman and Tversky [1979]; Tversky
and Kahneman [1992]). This function is characterised by overweighting of small probabilities
as well as underweighting larger ones. Combining these ideas with the action-selection policy
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could help improve the descriptiveness of the modelling and more accurately describe the
strategies adopted by the decision-makers.
Recent studies used fMRI neuro-imaging and neurophysiology to study the location of
the signals captured by the quantitative models within the brain and how these interact with
each other (O’Doherty et al. [2007]). Following the same procedures it would be interesting
to pinpoint the differences between the subjects who experience different degrees of payoff
variability and how their brains responds.
5.2 Quasi-field stock trading study results
Modelling stock-market investors as Reinforcement Learning agents
This section of the chapter is focused on the work published as first author and presented at the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Evolving and Adaptive Intelligent Systems
2015 Conference (IEEE-EAIS 2015, Pastore et al. [2015]). One of the key motivations for
this work is to test whether the descriptive modelling, found to be satisfactorily representative
of choice behaviour in a laboratory study, can also capture behaviour in a quasi-field scenario.
The term quasi-field indicates that, even if the subjects interact with an unconstrained scenario,
these interactions are not happening in the real-world, where the outcomes of a subject’s
decisions involve gaining or losing the subject’s personal money. The subjects analysed
in this part of the work engaged in an online game consisting of a stock market trading
simulation. Therefore, many of the constraints of a controlled experiment are not guaranteed
to apply to this scenario. In this sense this task is closer to real-world interactions when
compared to the previous binary decision task. The number of trials the subjects performed
in this scenario is not fixed but depends on the subjects level of engagement. Moreover, the
underlying distribution of decisions outcomes is not controlled by an experiment designer but
derives from the real-world price fluctuations. Another reason to study subjects in this task is
to try to understand people’s attitude towards risk in a real-life decisions from experience
scenario. The scope of this study can be collocated between computational psychology
research and behavioural economics.
The next section presents the online game structure and the motivations for choosing it
as a dataset. Subsequently, the hypotheses to be tested will be provided together with the
methodology adopted for the tests. The models developed to test the assumptions in this
work will be presented in the modelling section. The results of this part of the work will be
presented in the next chapter, together with the results of the previous dataset analysis.
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5.2.1 Transactions data
The dataset used for this analysis is composed of 46 players who produced a total of 1420
transactions. The data for these players was collected for the time-range between the 1st of
January 2014 and the 31st of May 2014. Each player had the freedom to perform as many
transactions as they wanted during these months, therefore some subjects have performed
more transactions than others. Fig. 5.11 shows the timeline for players 1, 17, 37 and 41, as
an example of the difference in behaviour and experience across participants. The graphs
are scatterplots of the transactions, with the circles colour-coded according to the outcome
of each transaction, green for gains and red for losses. The graphs can be read from left to
right, on the x-axis are the transactions as they happened over time. The y-axis represents
three discrete levels of risk associated with each transaction, deriving from the risk-based
categorisation of the available stocks.
The choice made in this analysis, of describing players individually with computational
models, follows the same rationale as the similar decision made in the previous chapter. The
best fitting model is identified for each participant independently, with the aim of finding
the most descriptive learning procedure and decision-making behaviour, for that particular
participant. If an aggregate model is developed instead, by for example collating the data
from all players’ transactions, the effects of learning from different experiences and choices
would average out, leading to a loss of individuality in the results. A similar approach is also
proposed in Daw [2009], with the difference that the methodology described in this work
aims at finding population parameters, by first estimating the most likely parameters for each
subject and then considering some distribution (e.g. Gaussian) over these.
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis tests the assumption that Virtual Trader players grouped the 107 FTSE100
stocks, available to trade during the months considered, in discrete classes according to a
measure of risk associated with each stock. To test this hypothesis, a classification based
on a financial modelling measure of risk called beta coefficient βF , or financial elasticity,
was developed and compared to other 500 randomly generated arrangements. The proposed
RL models were fitted to the choice data for each player and for each of these arrangements.
This first investigation is not focused on testing whether RL is a good descriptive account
of the decision-making players exhibited, which will be tested in the following hypotheses.
In this first examination, models with the same complexity (same number of parameters)
are compared against each other, with the intent of finding out whether the proposed risk-
based classification is a good descriptive choice. This hypothesis is tested by comparing
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Fig. 5.11 Transaction timelines for players 1, 17, 37 and 41. From left to right, each circle
represent the outcome of a transaction; the colour of a bubble indicates the outcome (green
for gains and red for losses), the bubble’s size shows the magnitude of the outcome. The
y-axis represents the risk of the stock traded.
the AIC score of the model using the risk-based classification against the AIC score for
each of the 500 randomly generated arrangements. Each of these comparisons results in
158 Results
a binary value, which indicates whether the risk-based arrangement is better than the i-th
scrambled classification. This method yields a binary vector of 500 comparison results, for
each player. The Clopper-Pearson confidence interval method is subsequently applied to
obtain a probability and confidence interval. The results of this test are shown in Fig. 5.12,
where the x-axis presents the players arranged according to their ID; the y-axis displays the
probability, ranging between 0 and 1, with the chance threshold depicted by the red line at
the 0.5 level. The probability and relative 99% confidence interval, for a player to be likely
described by the proposed classification is indicated by the errorbar; if a player’s errorbar
lies entirely above the chance threshold, that player is significantly likely to be adopting the
risk-based classification proposed. This is the case for 31 players out of 46 (67.4%) indicating
that these subjects are likely to use this risk-based classification of available stocks.
Fig. 5.12 Clopper-Pearson binomial confidence intervals for the comparison between risk-
arranged against scrambled stocks in 3 categories, for all players in the dataset. The players
are portrayed on the x-axis, the y-axis shows the probability that the risk-based stock
arrangement is more descriptive than 500 alternatives. The errorbar represents the 99%
confidence interval for each player, if the errorbar lies completely above chance threshold
it can be concluded that the player is likely to perceive the tradable stocks as classified
according to the proposed risk-based categorisation. 31 players out of 46 (67.4%) show
confidence intervals which are significantly above chance.
A Pearson Chi-squared “goodness-of-fit” test provides the answer for this first hypothesis.
The test resulted in χ2(2,N = 46) = 5.565, p = 0.018 < 0.05, shown in Fig. 5.13.
The results of these tests produce enough evidence in favour of the first hypothesis, that
subjects classify the available tradable options according to a financial modelling measure
of risk, which in this case was identified in the beta coefficient βF , from the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM; Sharpe [1964]).
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Fig. 5.13 The comparison of the risk-based stock classification against the randomly gener-
ated arrangements. The left bar represent the number of players whose confidence interval
indicates they are likely to group stocks based on a measure of their risk. The right bar repre-
sents the remaining players, who cannot be assumed to adopt the risk-based classification.
The red line is the expected count for a uniform distribution.
Hypothesis 1: Virtual Trader players use the risk of the stocks, estimated as beta
coefficient to categorise them into discrete classes.
χ2(2,N = 46) = 5.565, p = 0.018 < 0.05 significant: hypothesis confirmed.
Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis of this chapter is concerned with understanding whether the subjects
who played the Virtual Trader online financial trading simulation behaved in a way which
can be described as reinforcement learning. The reason for testing this assumption on this
dataset is that the Virtual Trader online game can be seen as a repeated decision-making task,
with a reward/punishment signal associated with each action taken. During the months when
the data has been collected, the Virtual Trader game awarded a prize to the best achievers,
converting the game objectives and rewards into concrete ones. The winners were established
as the players whose cumulative assets achieved the highest value at the end of each month.
Players were endowed with a virtual lump sum of GBP 100,000 at the moment of subscription
and were free to trade the available FTSE100 stocks. The participants were ranked on their
cumulative assets, the combination of portfolio holdings and cash owned by a player. The
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Fig. 5.14 Immediate rewards RL model versus Random model. Panel a) shows the maximum
likelihood estimate of the myopic model (2 free parameters, learning rate α and soft-max
inverse temperature β ), compared to the random model. The players IDs are reported on
the x-axis, with each bar representing one player; the bars indicate the MLE associated with
each player; the hollow diamonds indicate the random model MLE for the same player.
The y-axis shows the MLE scores. Since players made different numbers of transactions,
the height of the bars varies greatly within the dataset. The asterisks identify those players
who are better fitted by the myopic RL model as opposed to the random model. Panel b)
shows the same comparison, with the difference that the results of the likelihood ratio test are
shown on the y-axis. The horizontal line is the critical value threshold, above which the more
complex model (in this case the myopic RL) is significantly better than the simpler one (in
this comparison the random model). The value of this threshold depends on the degrees of
freedom, which for the comparison portrayed is d.o. f .= 2 and LRT critical value is 5.991.
modelling developed to test this hypothesis, that players in this game behave in a myopic
reinforcement learning way, used the cash component of the game to model the reward
signal and to develop the state-space. More precisely, the monetary outcome of the “sell”
transactions was assumed to be the reward signal for the agents modelled, and the sum of
these signals was assumed to determine the current state of the world the agent is considered
to be in. In order to provide an answer to the hypothesis, a simple RL model targeting
immediate rewards was fit to each player’s transactions set (i.e. a subject’s choice dataset).
A series of gradient descent searches was performed to identify the parameters set with
the highest likelihood. This procedure examines many different combination of values for
the free-parameters, with the objective of minimising the output, the maximum likelihood
estimate. The MLE score of the RL model is compared to the one of the random model with
the likelihood ratio test. The MLE of a random model depends on the number of transactions
made by the player and is calculated analytically as shown in 4.29.
The results of this comparison are presented in figure 5.14. Panel a) shows the players
along the x-axis, and their associated MLE values on the y-axis. The values of MLE are
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Fig. 5.15 The comparison of the immediate reward reinforcement learning against the random
model. The bars depict the frequency of best fitting models for the 46 players; the left bar
represents the frequency of myopic (immediate-rewards) reinforcement learning models, the
right bar indicates the number of players best fitted by the random model. The red line is the
expected count for a uniform distribution.
presented in the form of bars for the RL immediate-reward model and hollow diamonds
for the random model. The height of bars and diamonds represents the goodness-of-fit of a
model, with lower values indicating better fitting models. The asterisks identify the subjects
whose RL model fits significantly better than the random model, according to the Likelihood
ratio χ2 test at the 95% confidence level (p value < 0.05). This is the case for 7 out of 46
players in the dataset, 15% of the total: players 11, 18, 28, 31, 33, 37 and 42. The comparison
between the same two models is shown in panel b), with the y-axis now representing the
likelihood ratio test values. The red horizontal line represents the threshold above which
statistical significance is achieved; this critical value depends on the degrees of freedom. For
this comparison these are d.o. f .= 2, leading to a critical value of 5.991.
The Pearson Chi-squared “goodness-of-fit” χ2 test carried out on the frequencies of best
fitting models is shown in Fig. 5.15 and resulted in χ2(2,N = 46) = 22.261, p = 0.000 <
0.05. These results indicate that the myopic RL model tested for this hypothesis is not a
good descriptive account of behaviour for the Virtual Trader players analysed. The second
hypothesis is therefore rejected.
One possible explanation for this model failing at describing the players is that, even if
Virtual Trader is a simulation game and the players are unskilled investors, it is possible that
some of them took into account information about the companies of the stocks traded before
making decisions. This type of trading is based on “fundamental analysis”, a method for the
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estimation of securities value and price. An investor would read the financial statements of a
company, investigate rumours and news from different sources and study the historical data
before operating a trade. Another potential explanation for these negative results, is that the
model proposed is based on a myopic goal. A more advanced model, which accounts for a
player’s interest for future rewards could better describe the choice data; this possibility is
tested in the third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Virtual Trader players behave following a myopic reinforcement
learning pattern.
χ2(2,N = 46) = 22.261, p = 0.000 < 0.05 significant, against the RL model:
hypothesis rejected.
Hypothesis 3
Literature suggests that unskilled investors’ behave in a naive way, by making decisions
influenced by their previous personal experience (Choi et al. [2009]; Huang [2012]). The
third hypothesis tests whether the Virtual Trader players behaved naively when playing the
game. To test this hypothesis the short-sighted RL model will be compared to a far-sighted
counterpart, temporal difference learning. Moreover, the far-sighted model will also be
compared to the random model, in order to assess whether the eventual improvement on
the myopic version translates to a higher, population-wide descriptiveness. The ability of
the Q-learning model to include future rewards in the learning procedure makes it a good
candidate to capture far-sighted strategies in the Virtual Trader game dataset. As detailed in
section 4.2.8, eq. 4.2.8, the Q-learning model offers a more complex learning rule than the
myopic RL used to test the first and second hypothesis, and could provide a better description
of the Virtual Trader players’ behaviour. The comparisons between Q-learning against
immediate-rewards RL and Q-learning against random model are carried out based on the
likelihood ratio test methodology adopted for the previous hypothesis. The results of these
tests are shown in Fig. 5.16.
Panels a) and c) of the figure show the comparison between the far-sighted model Q-
learning, with the nested, myopic RL model. This first comparison, between far-sighted and
myopic models, provides a statistically significant improvement in the fitting for 6 players
(12, 14, 30, 39, 40 and 44), but this marginal improvement is not reflected in a better overall
fitting performance for the entire players set. As shown in panels b) and d) in fact, the
comparison between far-sighted model and baseline random model provides comparable
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results to the ones obtained in the second hypothesis test. The TD-learning model fits 7
out of 46 players better than the random (11, 14, 18, 28, 31, 39, 42), representing 15% of
the total dataset. These results are obtained with the likelihood ratio χ2 test, at the 95%
confidence level (p value < 0.05). A subset of these players was already captured by the
myopic model (11, 18, 28, 31 and 42), with only 2 players not previously captured (14 and
Fig. 5.16 Temporal-difference model (Q-learning) versus immediate rewards RL model and
versus random model. Panels a) and b) show the comparison between Q-learning model (3
free parameters, capturing learning speed α , action-selection greediness β and far-sightedness
γ) and the nested immediate-rewards RL model (2 free parameters, discount-factor parameter
set to fully myopic γ = 0, nested version of Q-learning). Panel a) portrays players on the
x-axis and MLE scores on the y-axis, each players’ score is represented as a bar for the
Q-learning model and as a filled diamond for the myopic RL model (immediate-rewards).
The asterisks identify those players who are better fitted by a model capturing far-sightedness
as opposed to a myopic model. Panel c) shows the same comparison but with the outcome
of the likelihood ratio test on the y-axis, the LRT threshold for statistical significance is
3.841 (d.o. f .= 1). Panels b) and d) show the comparison of the far-sighted model with the
baseline random model. Panel b) represents the MLE comparison, panel d) shows the LRT
comparison with the threshold for significance being higher than all previous comparison,
critical value 7.815 (d.o. f .= 3). As for the previous figures, the asterisks indicate the players
for which the proposed model is more representative than the random baseline.
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39). At the same time, due to increased complexity and its relative penalisation by the LRT,
the far-sighted model fails to capture the behaviour for players 33 and 37, which were instead
well represented by the immediate-rewards RL model.
According to these results, the third hypothesis is also rejected. The number of players
well represented by a far-sighted model in fact, is not significantly higher than the baseline
random model, or the myopic model. Conclusions on the entire population cannot be drawn,
considering that the number of players fitted by either myopic or far-sighted reinforcement
learning model is too small. Figure 5.17 panel a) shows the results of the three-way Pearson
“goodness-of-fit” χ2 test carried out between far-sighted model, myopic model and random
baseline. The test resulted in χ2(3,N = 46) = 46.7391, p = 0.000 < 0.05. A similar com-
parison, which focused on the subset of players well described by the RL models proposed,
is shown in Fig. 5.17, panel b). The Pearson “goodness-of-fit” χ2 test for this comparison
provides negative results with χ2(2,N = 9) = 2.7778, p= 0.095> 0.05, not significant. This
last result indicates that there is no evidence that players, if behaving in a reinforcement
learning fashion, do so naively.
Only 9 players out of 46 are satisfactorily captured by either of the two RL models,
with the myopic version capturing 7 and the far-sighted model merely capturing 2. Fig.
5.18 shows that for this subset of players, the assumption of risk-based stock classification
is confirmed. This could indicate that the players who have not been captured by the RL
Fig. 5.17 Panel a) shows the comparison between the Q-learning far-sighted model, the
immediate reward reinforcement learning and the random model. The bars depict the
frequency of best fitting models for the 46 players; the bar represents the frequency of players
best fitted by each model and are colour coded accordingly (blue for myopic RL, green
for far-sighted RL and yellow for random model). The red line is the expected count for a
uniform distribution. Panel b) shows the comparison between the two RL models tested, for
the subset of players they captured.
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models proposed could still act according to a reinforcement learning pattern, but that the
action-space devised in this work is inappropriate. On the other hand, this result could also
indicate that these players were fitted satisfactorily only by chance.
The results obtained from the hypotheses tested in this chapter indicate that players in
the Virtual Trader dataset cannot be represented as reinforcement learning, neither as short-
nor far-sighted agents. These results do not exclude that RL can still be a feasible way to
represent these players, only that the particular modelling developed is not suitable for this
task. Taking into account only the sales outcomes as reward signal is a potential explanation
of this limitation. A potential way to increase the descriptiveness of the model developed,
in order to capture Virtual Trader players behaviour, is to extend the definition of reward
signal, for example, by estimating the value of the portfolio at each transaction, including
the purchasing ones. These results also indicate that more research is needed to understand
unskilled investors’ behaviour, even when analysing a task that does not involve real-world
monetary implications to the subjects.
This work aimed at investigating the indications originating from economics literature
(Choi et al. [2009]; Huang [2012]) and from psychology (Erev and Roth [1998]). The results
provided no evidence that the unskilled investors analysed consistently behave in a naive
reinforcement learning way. As previously indicated, this could be due to limitations of
Fig. 5.18 Subset of Clopper-Pearson binomial confidence intervals for the comparison
between risk-arranged against scrambled stocks in 3 categories, for the players best fit by a
RL model (either myopic or far-sighted). All the 9 players for which either the myopic or
the far-sighted RL model outperformed the random model present a statistically significant
probability of using the stock classification into a discrete risk-based action-space.
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the modelling developed or it could derive from the high complexity of the task analysed.
Replicating this type of investigation within a controlled experiment setup might help clarify
whether unskilled stock traders can be described as reinforcement learning agents. Future
developments for this work and other interesting questions regarding reinforcement learning
behaviour, in connection to decision-making in uncertain environments, will be discussed in
the following chapter.
Hypothesis 3: Virtual Trader players behave following a far-sighted
reinforcement learning pattern.
χ2(3,N = 46) = 46.7391, p = 0.000 < 0.05 significant, against both the RL
models proposed: hypothesis rejected.
χ2(2,N = 9) = 2.7778, p= 0.095> 0.05, not significant, no evidence in favour
of either myopic or far-sighted.
5.2.2 Discussion
The second part of the work presented in this thesis focused on a dataset deriving from
a quasi-field task. This dataset comprised transactions and outcomes deriving from the
interactions of a group of an online stock trading game players. The main question was
whether a descriptive modelling approach based on reinforcement learning models, similar
to the one developed in the first part of this chapter, could also be useful in describing a more
complex scenario. The first hypothesis of this investigation tested the assumption that the
players of this online game grouped the available stocks as if belonging to discrete classes of
risk; the result of this test indicate that this could indeed be the case. Although the results for
the remaining hypotheses provide no support for the idea that reinforcement learning, either
myopic or far-sighted, can be used to describe the learning and decision-making strategies
underlying these players, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the model proposed
is based on a reward signal derived from the sell transactions. This partial modelling could
be inadequate because it does not consider the potential reward the players obtain by, for
example, examining their portfolios at the time when purchases are made. In this regard,
future development would be to include this reward signal. In a similar setup the prices of
the stocks in a portfolio would be recorded, not only at the time of a sale, but also at the
time of purchasing transactions. It is reasonable that players check the prices of the stocks
they own at each available time. The results from this investigation do not provide enough
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evidence to confute or support the indication that unskilled investors behave according to a
naive reinforcement learning pattern, as suggested by Choi et al. [2009]. The aim of a future
study would be to extend the models proposed here and simultaneously obtain a dataset
including longer series of interactions, in comparison to the amount of available options.

Chapter 6
Discussion and Future Developments
Human learning and decision-making are extremely interesting and complex areas of re-
search. They represent part of the overlapping interest of multiple research fields. Economics,
psychology and neuroscience would all benefit greatly from an improved understanding of
the processes involved in human decision-making behaviour. In this regard, computational
models represent an interesting arrow to the bow of researchers. All these disciplines have
produced attempts to formalise human behaviour into models. The development of computa-
tional models to characterise learning and decision-making has been of crucial importance.
Neuroscientists, for example, use in-silico1 models as substrates for hypothesis development
and testing, before moving on to in-vitro or in-vivo. Computational models are of crucial
importance for these researchers and have been used to study, for example, neurological
diseases (Tomkins [2015]). Psychology, as well, would benefit from a better understanding
of learning and decision-making, as this could help characterise the differences in healthy
and detrimental behaviour in individuals (Bechara et al. [2000]). Economists have always
tried to encapsulate decision-making into mathematical models, from both a normative and a
descriptive point of view. Policy makers would benefit from the development of computa-
tional models of behaviour. In fact, by characterising human behaviour with mathematical
formulations, researchers could develop complex simulations and computational models
based on these insights (Rutkauskas and Ramanauskas [2009]) and use these as a platform
where policy makers can conduct initial tests, before introducing new regulations. From these
simple examples it is clear that more investigation on human behaviour, specifically on learn-
ing and decision-making, are of crucial importance for researchers from these disciplines.
In this context, the work carried out in this thesis focused on a set of models characterising
learning and decision-making, to better understand human behaviour in either an experi-
1in-silico modelling refers to the use of mathematical and computational models, in-vitro indicates the use
of cell cultures, in-vivo means the study is performed on tissues of a living being
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mental scenario or in a quasi-field study. The models tested, based on the reinforcement
learning framework, previously received praise for their ability to capture human behaviour
and represented a good starting point from where to begin the current investigation.
To collocate this work into the literature it is worth summarising the questions which
prompted this research and the answers provided by the results of the analyses. The first of
the results form the analysis of a two-choice decision-making task indicate that a state-space
with two states based on the full history of previous outcomes accrued by a subject is a
likely descriptive account of the subjects’ perception. This result reinforces the notion of
previous experiences playing a role in decision-making tasks, as indicated by the “house-
money effect” and the “break-even effect”. Such information can be used in designing the
scenarios in which people operate choices. As an example, investors could be provided with
selected information about their investments. This could help improve the final return on
their investments. The second result points against a fully saturating reward transformation
function. The weakness of this finding is in the fact that only a version of prospect theory
value function has been tested, the one parametrised on previous decision from description
tasks Therefore, more research is needed to discover which function could be playing a
role in the internalisation of the rewards values in binary choice decision-making tasks. An
interesting result, that provides evidence against previous work findings (Erev and Barron
[2005]), in the sense that subjects who experienced more variable outcomes tended to learn
faster. More research is needed in order to shed light on this specific dilemma. This finding
is particularly interesting because it challenges the previous notion that more uncertainty
impairs learning. In a real life scenario this might mean that people who are less certain about
the potential outcome of their actions might quickly pick one of the options available and
might eventually end up worse off. The next result, instead, provides additional evidence to
the indication from Erev and Barron [2005], that more variability in observed payoffs leads to
more randomness in choice behaviour. This finding, paired with the previous one, indicates
that payoff variability plays a major role in decision-making tasks. Future experimental
design should take this into account and carefully identify the appropriate level of uncertainty
to avoid potentially confusing the subjects. Moreover, policy makers should take these last
two findings into account in the regulation of financial or insurance advisory, as it is clear
that decision-makers are heavily influenced by noisy past outcomes. The last test for the first
dataset analysed provides no indication on the relationship between myopic behaviour and
task performance. This might be due to the short time horizon of the task. Therefore, a more
articulated controlled experiment is needed to adequately test for this potential relationship.
In the second dataset analysis it emerged that the players of the online stock trading
simulation could have used risk as a measure to categorise the number of available options
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into a more manageable number. This has implications in real life, evidently because it can
be deduced that investors might be coarsely pooling together options with similar risk, by
using only a technical calculation and neglecting a more fundamental hazard, such as the
nature of a stock or the cyclical risk of the sector to which it belongs. The other indications
from this analysis are inconclusive, as the number of subjects best approximated by the
proposed RL models is too low. This provides two indications: the first is that modelling only
one of the two components of the task, in this case the sales a subject makes, is not enough
to fully capture the decision-making behaviour; the second indication is that such complex
task might not be one in which subjects operate using a reinforcement learning approach.
Future work should focus on testing more advanced RL models, including ones that leverage
function approximation for the reward function, including multi-order polynomials (Ylöstalo
[2006]) and Gaussian radial basis functions (Kober et al. [2013]; Park and Sandberg [1991];
Sutton and Barto [2018]), as well as devising a controlled experiment in which to test for
their descriptive power. A stock market trading simulation might be too complex for this
purpose and a binary decision task too trivial, therefore a controlled experiment that keeps
into account the findings of this work could be designed to gain knowledge to help answer
the currently unanswered questions. The suggested directions of future research would help
shed light on choice behaviour, providing indications for policy makers, financial regulators
and governments. The current global situation offers many instances where to apply the
information gained from research in the fields of behavioural economics and neuroscience.
Financial education is expensive and has been found to be ineffective Choi et al. [2002,
2005]; Cole and Shastry [2008]. Therefore, the key for better investor behaviour could be
selecting and reducing the frequency of the information available (Thaler et al. [1997]), and
limiting the reinforcements (Choi et al. [2009]).
People will always choose as they please. Nonetheless, institutional bodies and choice
architects have the power to nudge them towards the right option. They can do so by
harnessing the knowledge deriving from research efforts on decision-making. By doing
so large negative events, such as the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis, could be avoided,
ultimately leading to a more stable and prosperous economy.
Alvin Pastore
London, January 2019
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Appendix A
The following tables present the summaries of models scores, for each subject in the three
conditions of the experiment analysed in chapter 4. The first column, denoted with “Config”,
is composed of three acronyms identifying the combination of state-space, learning rule and
reward function defining a model. The legend for these acronyms is reported in table A.1.
The second column shows the number of parameters for a model. The remaining columns
show measures of model fitness and representativeness. Specifically, column three reports the
log-likelihood score, column four shows the AIC score, column five is the AIC difference of
a model compared to the best model in the set. The last column represents the Akaike weight
for each model, based on its AIC score. Lines in bold font identify the models which have
been selected as representative of the behavioural data for a specific subject, according to the
methodology described in 4, section 4.1.15. At the end of the tables for each condition there
is a graphical depiction of these results in the form of bar charts, with a detailed description
in the caption.
Table A.1 Abbreviations for model components
State space Learning Rule Reward Function
SS: Single state AT: Average Tracking ID: Identity
FH: Full history QL: Q-learning TH: Hyperbolic tangentLO: Latest outcome PT: Prospect theory’s value function
194
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 1.000 0.003 0.000 -123.161 252.321 6.089 0.022
FH QL TH 3 1.000 0.058 0.000 -122.692 251.384 5.152 0.035
SS AT TH 2 1.000 0.038 0.000 -132.259 268.517 22.285 0.000
SS AT ID 2 1.000 0.002 0.000 -132.347 268.694 22.461 0.000
LO AT PT 2 0.056 0.010 0.000 -133.679 271.358 25.125 0.000
LO AT TH 2 1.000 0.019 0.000 -137.078 278.157 31.924 0.000
LO QL PT 3 0.919 0.002 1.000 -126.542 259.085 12.852 0.001
FH QL PT 3 1.000 0.003 1.000 -120.499 246.998 0.766 0.317
LO QL ID 3 0.817 0.002 1.000 -126.766 259.532 13.299 0.001
FH AT PT 2 1.000 0.003 0.000 -121.116 246.233 0.000 0.466
FH AT ID 2 1.000 0.003 0.000 -123.161 250.321 4.088 0.060
FH AT TH 2 1.000 0.058 0.000 -122.692 249.384 3.151 0.096
LO QL TH 3 0.813 0.038 1.000 -126.090 258.179 11.947 0.001
SS AT PT 2 0.062 0.014 0.000 -128.736 261.472 15.239 0.000
LO AT ID 2 1.000 0.001 0.000 -137.044 278.087 31.855 0.000
Table A.2 Models summary: problem 1 - subject 1
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 1.000 0.002 1.000 -119.590 245.180 1.249 0.247
FH QL TH 3 1.000 0.050 1.000 -118.965 243.931 0.000 0.462
SS AT TH 2 0.051 0.023 0.000 -138.543 281.086 37.156 0.000
SS AT ID 2 0.054 0.001 0.000 -138.606 281.212 37.282 0.000
LO AT PT 2 0.001 1.000 0.000 -126.767 257.533 13.603 0.001
LO AT TH 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 37.328 0.000
LO QL PT 3 0.001 0.553 1.000 -126.743 259.487 15.556 0.000
FH QL PT 3 1.000 0.003 1.000 -119.492 244.985 1.054 0.273
LO QL ID 3 0.151 0.006 1.000 -128.015 262.030 18.100 0.000
FH AT PT 2 0.026 0.024 0.000 -125.359 254.717 10.787 0.002
FH AT ID 2 0.052 0.005 0.000 -137.356 278.712 34.782 0.000
FH AT TH 2 0.047 0.133 0.000 -136.879 277.759 33.828 0.000
LO QL TH 3 0.143 0.140 1.000 -127.686 261.371 17.441 0.000
SS AT PT 2 0.024 0.026 0.000 -123.408 250.816 6.886 0.015
LO AT ID 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 37.328 0.000
Table A.3 Models summary: problem 1 - subject 2
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Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.000 0.983 1.000 -112.463 230.927 1.713 0.177
FH QL TH 3 0.011 1.000 1.000 -114.405 234.810 5.597 0.025
SS AT TH 2 0.008 1.000 0.000 -119.799 243.598 14.385 0.000
SS AT ID 2 0.000 1.000 0.000 -112.700 229.401 0.188 0.380
LO AT PT 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 52.046 0.000
LO AT TH 2 0.006 1.000 0.000 -126.115 256.231 27.017 0.000
LO QL PT 3 1.000 0.001 1.000 -137.141 280.282 51.068 0.000
FH QL PT 3 1.000 0.002 1.000 -132.682 271.364 42.151 0.000
LO QL ID 3 0.000 0.799 1.000 -123.288 252.576 23.363 0.000
FH AT PT 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 52.046 0.000
FH AT ID 2 0.000 1.000 0.000 -112.607 229.213 0.000 0.417
FH AT TH 2 0.009 1.000 0.000 -121.019 246.038 16.824 0.000
LO QL TH 3 0.007 1.000 1.000 -125.261 256.522 27.309 0.000
SS AT PT 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 52.046 0.000
LO AT ID 2 0.000 1.000 0.000 -123.317 250.634 21.421 0.000
Table A.4 Models summary: problem 1 - subject 3
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.073 0.023 0.677 -82.772 171.544 8.553 0.005
FH QL TH 3 0.076 0.464 0.672 -82.210 170.420 7.429 0.008
SS AT TH 2 0.047 0.878 0.000 -84.399 172.798 9.807 0.002
SS AT ID 2 0.043 0.044 0.000 -84.966 173.932 10.941 0.001
LO AT PT 2 0.154 0.016 0.000 -81.633 167.266 4.275 0.040
LO AT TH 2 0.049 0.899 0.000 -85.179 174.358 11.367 0.001
LO QL PT 3 0.181 0.012 0.818 -79.961 165.922 2.931 0.078
FH QL PT 3 0.152 0.013 0.829 -78.495 162.991 0.000 0.336
LO QL ID 3 0.105 0.017 0.790 -83.945 173.889 10.898 0.001
FH AT PT 2 0.141 0.016 0.000 -79.850 163.700 0.710 0.236
FH AT ID 2 0.047 0.040 0.000 -83.713 171.426 8.436 0.005
FH AT TH 2 0.050 0.787 0.000 -83.168 170.337 7.346 0.009
LO QL TH 3 0.107 0.351 0.776 -83.329 172.659 9.668 0.003
SS AT PT 2 0.145 0.017 0.000 -79.697 163.394 0.403 0.275
LO AT ID 2 0.045 0.046 0.000 -85.810 175.620 12.629 0.001
Table A.5 Models summary: problem 1 - subject 4
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Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.001 1.000 1.000 -128.453 262.907 54.218 0.000
FH QL TH 3 0.022 1.000 1.000 -121.058 248.117 39.428 0.000
SS AT TH 2 0.873 0.014 0.000 -137.683 279.365 70.676 0.000
SS AT ID 2 1.000 0.000 0.000 -138.103 280.206 71.517 0.000
LO AT PT 2 0.004 0.140 0.000 -109.989 223.979 15.290 0.000
LO AT TH 2 0.003 1.000 0.000 -137.364 278.729 70.040 0.000
LO QL PT 3 0.276 0.007 1.000 -105.719 217.437 8.748 0.007
FH QL PT 3 0.007 0.091 0.000 -102.344 210.689 2.000 0.195
LO QL ID 3 0.315 0.004 1.000 -111.161 228.322 19.633 0.000
FH AT PT 2 0.007 0.091 0.000 -102.344 208.689 0.000 0.529
FH AT ID 2 0.001 1.000 0.000 -131.249 266.497 57.808 0.000
FH AT TH 2 0.004 1.000 0.000 -134.978 273.956 65.267 0.000
LO QL TH 3 0.271 0.108 1.000 -110.226 226.451 17.762 0.000
SS AT PT 2 0.007 0.103 0.000 -103.023 210.046 1.357 0.269
LO AT ID 2 0.000 1.000 0.000 -138.231 280.461 71.772 0.000
Table A.6 Models summary: problem 1 - subject 5
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 1.000 0.001 0.755 -133.763 273.526 1.348 0.092
FH QL TH 3 1.000 0.030 0.758 -133.526 273.052 0.874 0.117
SS AT TH 2 0.864 0.030 0.000 -134.089 272.178 0.000 0.181
SS AT ID 2 0.891 0.001 0.000 -134.217 272.435 0.256 0.159
LO AT PT 2 0.502 0.001 0.000 -137.953 279.907 7.728 0.004
LO AT TH 2 0.003 1.000 0.000 -135.450 274.900 2.722 0.046
LO QL PT 3 1.000 0.001 0.942 -136.532 279.065 6.886 0.006
FH QL PT 3 1.000 0.002 0.803 -134.742 275.485 3.306 0.035
LO QL ID 3 0.000 0.700 0.000 -135.489 276.978 4.800 0.016
FH AT PT 2 1.000 0.001 0.000 -135.836 275.673 3.494 0.032
FH AT ID 2 0.769 0.001 0.000 -134.950 273.899 1.721 0.076
FH AT TH 2 0.892 0.027 0.000 -134.808 273.615 1.437 0.088
LO QL TH 3 1.000 0.019 0.858 -135.019 276.037 3.859 0.026
SS AT PT 2 1.000 0.001 0.000 -134.940 273.880 1.702 0.077
LO AT ID 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -135.489 274.978 2.800 0.045
Table A.7 Models summary: problem 1 - subject 6
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Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.015 0.110 0.071 -86.036 178.073 4.747 0.053
FH QL TH 3 0.035 1.000 0.662 -85.459 176.918 3.592 0.094
SS AT TH 2 0.021 1.000 0.000 -97.501 199.001 25.675 0.000
SS AT ID 2 0.011 0.138 0.000 -84.663 173.326 0.000 0.565
LO AT PT 2 0.037 0.037 0.000 -94.714 193.427 20.101 0.000
LO AT TH 2 0.022 1.000 0.000 -101.821 207.642 34.316 0.000
LO QL PT 3 0.138 0.012 0.940 -90.950 187.899 14.573 0.000
FH QL PT 3 0.129 0.015 0.924 -85.249 176.497 3.171 0.116
LO QL ID 3 0.011 0.136 0.000 -90.801 187.602 14.275 0.000
FH AT PT 2 0.066 0.028 0.000 -88.960 181.921 8.594 0.008
FH AT ID 2 0.014 0.117 0.000 -86.037 176.074 2.747 0.143
FH AT TH 2 0.027 1.000 0.000 -93.699 191.398 18.072 0.000
LO QL TH 3 0.032 1.000 0.668 -90.514 187.028 13.702 0.001
SS AT PT 2 0.033 0.041 0.000 -88.064 180.127 6.801 0.019
LO AT ID 2 0.011 0.136 0.000 -90.801 185.602 12.275 0.001
Table A.8 Models summary: problem 1 - subject 7
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 1.000 0.002 1.000 -130.838 267.676 32.803 0.000
FH QL TH 3 1.000 0.036 1.000 -130.077 266.155 31.282 0.000
SS AT TH 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 46.386 0.000
SS AT ID 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 46.386 0.000
LO AT PT 2 0.022 0.062 0.000 -116.894 237.788 2.915 0.152
LO AT TH 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 46.386 0.000
LO QL PT 3 0.083 0.015 1.000 -114.436 234.873 0.000 0.653
FH QL PT 3 0.042 0.026 1.000 -116.623 239.246 4.373 0.073
LO QL ID 3 1.000 0.000 1.000 -134.157 274.315 39.442 0.000
FH AT PT 2 0.009 0.112 0.000 -117.807 239.614 4.741 0.061
FH AT ID 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 46.386 0.000
FH AT TH 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 46.386 0.000
LO QL TH 3 0.219 0.106 1.000 -126.516 259.032 24.159 0.000
SS AT PT 2 0.009 0.112 0.000 -117.807 239.614 4.741 0.061
LO AT ID 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 46.386 0.000
Table A.9 Models summary: problem 1 - subject 8
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Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.005 0.511 0.000 -57.368 120.735 6.575 0.013
FH QL TH 3 0.052 1.000 0.915 -57.398 120.796 6.635 0.013
SS AT TH 2 0.011 1.000 0.000 -109.298 222.596 108.436 0.000
SS AT ID 2 0.005 0.511 0.000 -57.368 118.735 4.575 0.036
LO AT PT 2 0.019 0.221 0.000 -58.044 120.087 5.927 0.018
LO AT TH 2 0.011 1.000 0.000 -111.203 226.406 112.245 0.000
LO QL PT 3 0.306 0.014 0.957 -56.690 119.379 5.219 0.026
FH QL PT 3 0.035 0.115 0.527 -55.054 116.109 1.948 0.133
LO QL ID 3 0.155 0.018 0.950 -58.399 122.797 8.637 0.005
FH AT PT 2 0.018 0.223 0.000 -55.080 114.161 0.000 0.351
FH AT ID 2 0.005 0.511 0.000 -57.368 118.735 4.575 0.036
FH AT TH 2 0.011 1.000 0.000 -109.298 222.596 108.436 0.000
LO QL TH 3 0.162 0.371 0.941 -57.094 120.187 6.027 0.017
SS AT PT 2 0.018 0.223 0.000 -55.080 114.161 0.000 0.351
LO AT ID 2 0.005 0.532 0.000 -60.325 124.649 10.489 0.002
Table A.10 Models summary: problem 1 - subject 9
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.000 1.000 0.000 -128.227 262.454 9.963 0.003
FH QL TH 3 0.002 1.000 1.000 -128.381 262.762 10.271 0.003
SS AT TH 2 0.002 1.000 0.000 -128.371 260.742 8.252 0.008
SS AT ID 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -128.172 260.344 7.854 0.010
LO AT PT 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 28.769 0.000
LO AT TH 2 0.017 0.309 0.000 -129.781 263.562 11.072 0.002
LO QL PT 3 1.000 0.001 1.000 -132.700 271.401 18.910 0.000
FH QL PT 3 0.000 0.000 0.719 -138.629 283.259 30.769 0.000
LO QL ID 3 0.144 0.004 1.000 -123.245 252.490 0.000 0.509
FH AT PT 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 28.769 0.000
FH AT ID 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -128.229 260.458 7.967 0.009
FH AT TH 2 0.002 1.000 0.000 -128.425 260.850 8.359 0.008
LO QL TH 3 0.145 0.081 1.000 -123.381 252.762 0.272 0.445
SS AT PT 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -138.629 281.259 28.769 0.000
LO AT ID 2 0.018 0.013 0.000 -129.909 263.818 11.328 0.002
Table A.11 Models summary: problem 1 - subject 10
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Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.650 0.018 0.628 -15.789 37.577 2.131 0.065
FH QL TH 3 0.654 0.381 0.618 -15.725 37.450 2.004 0.070
SS AT TH 2 0.508 0.521 0.000 -15.723 35.447 0.000 0.190
SS AT ID 2 0.503 0.025 0.000 -15.802 35.603 0.157 0.175
LO AT PT 2 0.517 0.023 0.000 -18.486 40.972 5.525 0.012
LO AT TH 2 0.531 0.509 0.000 -17.327 38.653 3.206 0.038
LO QL PT 3 0.712 0.015 0.835 -17.147 40.293 4.847 0.017
FH QL PT 3 0.630 0.017 0.737 -16.582 39.163 3.717 0.030
LO QL ID 3 0.714 0.016 0.730 -16.294 38.587 3.141 0.039
FH AT PT 2 0.494 0.024 0.000 -17.417 38.834 3.387 0.035
FH AT ID 2 0.502 0.025 0.000 -16.490 36.980 1.534 0.088
FH AT TH 2 0.507 0.522 0.000 -16.412 36.824 1.377 0.095
LO QL TH 3 0.717 0.338 0.718 -16.225 38.449 3.003 0.042
SS AT PT 2 0.494 0.024 0.000 -16.729 37.458 2.011 0.069
LO AT ID 2 0.526 0.025 0.000 -17.420 38.839 3.393 0.035
Table A.12 Models summary: problem 1 - subject 11
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.136 0.012 1.000 -122.596 251.191 56.106 0.000
FH QL TH 3 0.126 0.265 1.000 -119.979 245.959 50.873 0.000
SS AT TH 2 1.000 0.003 0.000 -138.593 281.187 86.101 0.000
SS AT ID 2 1.000 0.000 0.000 -138.627 281.255 86.169 0.000
LO AT PT 2 0.007 0.189 0.000 -99.014 202.029 6.943 0.013
LO AT TH 2 1.000 0.003 0.000 -138.590 281.179 86.094 0.000
LO QL PT 3 0.064 0.022 1.000 -97.949 201.897 6.812 0.014
FH QL PT 3 0.004 0.261 0.000 -95.543 197.086 2.001 0.151
LO QL ID 3 0.182 0.008 1.000 -108.076 222.151 27.066 0.000
FH AT PT 2 0.003 0.276 0.000 -95.543 195.085 0.000 0.411
FH AT ID 2 1.000 0.000 0.000 -138.627 281.255 86.169 0.000
FH AT TH 2 1.000 0.003 0.000 -138.593 281.187 86.101 0.000
LO QL TH 3 0.169 0.182 1.000 -106.727 219.454 24.368 0.000
SS AT PT 2 0.003 0.276 0.000 -95.543 195.085 0.000 0.411
LO AT ID 2 1.000 0.000 0.000 -138.627 281.254 86.169 0.000
Table A.13 Models summary: problem 1 - subject 12
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Fig. A.1 Comparison of AIC scores of the 15 models fitted to the subjects in condition 1.
Each bar represents a model and its height represents the associated AIC score. The color of
the bar indicates the type of model according to the combination of state-space and learning
rule adopted. Yellow bars represent the single-state model. Light and dark green represent
latest-outcome models combined with Q-learning or average-tracking respectively. Light
and dark blue represent full-history models combined with Q-learning or average-tracking
respectively. The red bars represent the discarded models.
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Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 1.000 0.004 0.000 -113.394 232.789 2.000 0.071
FH QL TH 3 1.000 0.153 0.000 -123.560 253.121 22.332 0.000
SS AT TH 2 1.000 0.153 0.000 -123.560 251.121 20.332 0.000
SS AT ID 2 1.000 0.004 0.000 -113.394 230.789 0.000 0.192
LO AT PT 2 1.000 0.010 0.000 -114.329 232.658 1.870 0.075
LO AT TH 2 1.000 0.153 0.000 -123.560 251.121 20.332 0.000
LO QL PT 3 1.000 0.010 0.000 -114.329 234.659 3.870 0.028
FH QL PT 3 1.000 0.010 0.000 -114.329 234.659 3.870 0.028
LO QL ID 3 1.000 0.004 0.000 -113.394 232.789 2.000 0.071
FH AT PT 2 1.000 0.010 0.000 -114.329 232.658 1.870 0.075
FH AT ID 2 1.000 0.004 0.000 -113.394 230.789 0.000 0.192
FH AT TH 2 1.000 0.153 0.000 -123.560 251.121 20.332 0.000
LO QL TH 3 1.000 0.153 0.000 -123.560 253.121 22.332 0.000
SS AT PT 2 1.000 0.010 0.000 -114.329 232.658 1.870 0.075
LO AT ID 2 1.000 0.004 0.000 -113.394 230.789 0.000 0.192
Table A.14 Models summary: problem 2 - subject 1
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.175 0.000 1.000 -132.732 271.463 0.124 0.159
FH QL TH 3 0.191 0.011 1.000 -132.669 271.339 0.000 0.169
SS AT TH 2 0.044 0.057 0.000 -138.090 280.180 8.841 0.002
SS AT ID 2 0.033 0.002 0.000 -137.812 279.624 8.285 0.003
LO AT PT 2 0.035 0.005 0.000 -137.826 279.652 8.314 0.003
LO AT TH 2 0.044 0.057 0.000 -138.090 280.180 8.841 0.002
LO QL PT 3 0.174 0.001 1.000 -132.712 271.425 0.086 0.162
FH QL PT 3 0.174 0.001 1.000 -132.712 271.425 0.086 0.162
LO QL ID 3 0.175 0.000 1.000 -132.732 271.463 0.124 0.159
FH AT PT 2 0.035 0.005 0.000 -137.826 279.652 8.314 0.003
FH AT ID 2 0.033 0.002 0.000 -137.812 279.624 8.285 0.003
FH AT TH 2 0.044 0.057 0.000 -138.090 280.180 8.841 0.002
LO QL TH 3 0.191 0.011 1.000 -132.669 271.339 0.000 0.169
SS AT PT 2 0.035 0.005 0.000 -137.826 279.652 8.314 0.003
LO AT ID 2 0.033 0.002 0.000 -137.812 279.624 8.285 0.003
Table A.15 Models summary: problem 2 - subject 2
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Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 1.000 0.003 0.483 -104.249 214.498 0.000 0.297
FH QL TH 3 0.693 0.006 1.000 -112.449 230.898 16.400 0.000
SS AT TH 2 1.000 0.100 0.000 -116.176 236.353 21.855 0.000
SS AT ID 2 0.551 0.004 0.000 -106.896 217.792 3.294 0.057
LO AT PT 2 0.581 0.011 0.000 -108.105 220.209 5.712 0.017
LO AT TH 2 1.000 0.100 0.000 -116.176 236.353 21.855 0.000
LO QL PT 3 1.000 0.008 0.468 -105.428 216.855 2.358 0.091
FH QL PT 3 1.000 0.008 0.468 -105.428 216.855 2.358 0.091
LO QL ID 3 1.000 0.003 0.483 -104.249 214.498 0.000 0.297
FH AT PT 2 0.581 0.011 0.000 -108.105 220.209 5.712 0.017
FH AT ID 2 0.551 0.004 0.000 -106.896 217.792 3.294 0.057
FH AT TH 2 1.000 0.100 0.000 -116.176 236.353 21.855 0.000
LO QL TH 3 0.693 0.006 1.000 -112.449 230.898 16.400 0.000
SS AT PT 2 0.581 0.011 0.000 -108.105 220.209 5.712 0.017
LO AT ID 2 0.551 0.004 0.000 -106.896 217.792 3.294 0.057
Table A.16 Models summary: problem 2 - subject 3
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 1.000 0.002 0.000 -125.669 257.337 2.000 0.048
FH QL TH 3 1.000 0.114 0.000 -127.480 260.960 5.623 0.008
SS AT TH 2 1.000 0.114 0.000 -127.480 258.959 3.623 0.022
SS AT ID 2 1.000 0.002 0.000 -125.668 255.337 0.000 0.132
LO AT PT 2 1.000 0.006 0.000 -125.808 255.616 0.279 0.115
LO AT TH 2 1.000 0.114 0.000 -127.480 258.959 3.623 0.022
LO QL PT 3 1.000 0.006 0.000 -125.808 257.616 2.279 0.042
FH QL PT 3 1.000 0.006 0.000 -125.808 257.616 2.279 0.042
LO QL ID 3 1.000 0.002 0.000 -125.669 257.337 2.000 0.048
FH AT PT 2 1.000 0.006 0.000 -125.808 255.616 0.279 0.115
FH AT ID 2 1.000 0.002 0.000 -125.668 255.337 0.000 0.132
FH AT TH 2 1.000 0.114 0.000 -127.480 258.959 3.623 0.022
LO QL TH 3 1.000 0.114 0.000 -127.480 260.960 5.623 0.008
SS AT PT 2 1.000 0.006 0.000 -125.808 255.616 0.279 0.115
LO AT ID 2 1.000 0.002 0.000 -125.668 255.337 0.000 0.132
Table A.17 Models summary: problem 2 - subject 4
203
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 1.000 0.002 0.284 -131.246 268.491 1.485 0.069
FH QL TH 3 0.205 0.014 0.976 -132.640 271.280 4.274 0.017
SS AT TH 2 1.000 0.048 0.000 -135.432 274.864 7.858 0.003
SS AT ID 2 1.000 0.002 0.000 -131.503 267.006 0.000 0.146
LO AT PT 2 1.000 0.004 0.000 -131.891 267.783 0.777 0.099
LO AT TH 2 1.000 0.048 0.000 -135.432 274.864 7.858 0.003
LO QL PT 3 1.000 0.004 0.216 -131.752 269.503 2.498 0.042
FH QL PT 3 1.000 0.004 0.216 -131.752 269.503 2.498 0.042
LO QL ID 3 1.000 0.002 0.284 -131.246 268.491 1.485 0.069
FH AT PT 2 1.000 0.004 0.000 -131.891 267.783 0.777 0.099
FH AT ID 2 1.000 0.002 0.000 -131.503 267.006 0.000 0.146
FH AT TH 2 1.000 0.048 0.000 -135.432 274.864 7.858 0.003
LO QL TH 3 0.205 0.014 0.976 -132.640 271.280 4.274 0.017
SS AT PT 2 1.000 0.004 0.000 -131.891 267.783 0.777 0.099
LO AT ID 2 1.000 0.002 0.000 -131.503 267.006 0.000 0.146
Table A.18 Models summary: problem 2 - subject 5
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.004 0.007 0.700 -79.628 165.257 12.027 0.001
FH QL TH 3 0.406 0.010 0.988 -73.895 153.790 0.560 0.212
SS AT TH 2 0.001 0.700 0.000 -80.008 164.015 10.786 0.001
SS AT ID 2 0.000 0.100 0.000 -79.640 163.281 10.051 0.002
LO AT PT 2 0.001 0.100 0.000 -79.700 163.400 10.171 0.002
LO AT TH 2 0.001 0.700 0.000 -80.008 164.015 10.786 0.001
LO QL PT 3 0.371 0.001 0.986 -73.615 153.230 0.000 0.280
FH QL PT 3 0.371 0.001 0.986 -73.615 153.230 0.000 0.280
LO QL ID 3 0.004 0.007 0.700 -79.628 165.257 12.027 0.001
FH AT PT 2 0.001 0.100 0.000 -79.700 163.400 10.171 0.002
FH AT ID 2 0.000 0.100 0.000 -79.640 163.281 10.051 0.002
FH AT TH 2 0.001 0.700 0.000 -80.008 164.015 10.786 0.001
LO QL TH 3 0.406 0.010 0.988 -73.895 153.790 0.560 0.212
SS AT PT 2 0.001 0.100 0.000 -79.700 163.400 10.171 0.002
LO AT ID 2 0.000 0.100 0.000 -79.640 163.281 10.051 0.002
Table A.19 Models summary: problem 2 - subject 6
204
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.448 0.001 0.962 -110.715 227.430 59.470 0.000
FH QL TH 3 1.000 0.005 1.000 -81.051 168.103 0.143 0.241
SS AT TH 2 0.001 1.000 0.000 -113.413 230.826 62.867 0.000
SS AT ID 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -113.454 230.907 62.948 0.000
LO AT PT 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -113.390 230.779 62.820 0.000
LO AT TH 2 0.001 1.000 0.000 -113.413 230.826 62.867 0.000
LO QL PT 3 1.000 0.000 1.000 -80.980 167.959 0.000 0.259
FH QL PT 3 1.000 0.000 1.000 -80.980 167.959 0.000 0.259
LO QL ID 3 0.448 0.001 0.962 -110.715 227.430 59.470 0.000
FH AT PT 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -113.390 230.779 62.820 0.000
FH AT ID 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -113.454 230.907 62.948 0.000
FH AT TH 2 0.001 1.000 0.000 -113.413 230.826 62.867 0.000
LO QL TH 3 1.000 0.005 1.000 -81.051 168.103 0.143 0.241
SS AT PT 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -113.390 230.779 62.820 0.000
LO AT ID 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -113.454 230.907 62.948 0.000
Table A.20 Models summary: problem 2 - subject 7
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.018 0.003 0.000 -123.097 252.195 2.678 0.028
FH QL TH 3 0.021 0.087 0.000 -122.758 251.517 2.000 0.040
SS AT TH 2 0.021 0.087 0.000 -122.758 249.517 0.000 0.108
SS AT ID 2 0.018 0.003 0.000 -123.097 250.195 0.678 0.077
LO AT PT 2 0.019 0.008 0.000 -123.038 250.076 0.559 0.082
LO AT TH 2 0.021 0.087 0.000 -122.758 249.517 0.000 0.108
LO QL PT 3 0.019 0.008 0.000 -123.038 252.076 2.559 0.030
FH QL PT 3 0.019 0.008 0.000 -123.038 252.076 2.559 0.030
LO QL ID 3 0.018 0.003 0.000 -123.097 252.195 2.678 0.028
FH AT PT 2 0.019 0.008 0.000 -123.038 250.076 0.559 0.082
FH AT ID 2 0.018 0.003 0.000 -123.097 250.195 0.678 0.077
FH AT TH 2 0.021 0.087 0.000 -122.758 249.517 0.000 0.108
LO QL TH 3 0.021 0.087 0.000 -122.758 251.517 2.000 0.040
SS AT PT 2 0.019 0.008 0.000 -123.038 250.076 0.559 0.082
LO AT ID 2 0.018 0.003 0.000 -123.097 250.195 0.678 0.077
Table A.21 Models summary: problem 2 - subject 8
205
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.033 0.010 0.000 -5.557 17.115 2.000 0.033
FH QL TH 3 0.032 0.295 0.000 -5.575 17.149 2.034 0.033
SS AT TH 2 0.032 0.295 0.000 -5.575 15.149 0.034 0.088
SS AT ID 2 0.033 0.010 0.000 -5.557 15.115 0.000 0.090
LO AT PT 2 0.033 0.023 0.000 -5.563 15.126 0.011 0.089
LO AT TH 2 0.032 0.295 0.000 -5.575 15.149 0.034 0.088
LO QL PT 3 0.033 0.023 0.000 -5.563 17.126 2.011 0.033
FH QL PT 3 0.033 0.023 0.000 -5.563 17.126 2.011 0.033
LO QL ID 3 0.033 0.010 0.000 -5.557 17.115 2.000 0.033
FH AT PT 2 0.033 0.023 0.000 -5.563 15.126 0.011 0.089
FH AT ID 2 0.033 0.010 0.000 -5.557 15.115 0.000 0.090
FH AT TH 2 0.032 0.295 0.000 -5.575 15.149 0.034 0.088
LO QL TH 3 0.032 0.295 0.000 -5.575 17.149 2.034 0.033
SS AT PT 2 0.033 0.023 0.000 -5.563 15.126 0.011 0.089
LO AT ID 2 0.033 0.010 0.000 -5.557 15.115 0.000 0.090
Table A.22 Models summary: problem 2 - subject 9
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 1.000 0.002 0.000 -125.498 256.997 2.000 0.060
FH QL TH 3 1.000 0.104 0.000 -130.575 267.151 12.154 0.000
SS AT TH 2 1.000 0.104 0.000 -130.575 265.150 10.154 0.001
SS AT ID 2 1.000 0.002 0.000 -125.498 254.997 0.000 0.164
LO AT PT 2 1.000 0.006 0.000 -125.962 255.924 0.928 0.103
LO AT TH 2 1.000 0.104 0.000 -130.575 265.150 10.154 0.001
LO QL PT 3 1.000 0.006 0.000 -125.962 257.924 2.928 0.038
FH QL PT 3 1.000 0.006 0.000 -125.962 257.924 2.928 0.038
LO QL ID 3 1.000 0.002 0.000 -125.498 256.997 2.000 0.060
FH AT PT 2 1.000 0.006 0.000 -125.962 255.924 0.928 0.103
FH AT ID 2 1.000 0.002 0.000 -125.498 254.997 0.000 0.164
FH AT TH 2 1.000 0.104 0.000 -130.575 265.150 10.154 0.001
LO QL TH 3 1.000 0.104 0.000 -130.575 267.151 12.154 0.000
SS AT PT 2 1.000 0.006 0.000 -125.962 255.924 0.928 0.103
LO AT ID 2 1.000 0.002 0.000 -125.498 254.997 0.000 0.164
Table A.23 Models summary: problem 2 - subject 10
206
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 1.000 0.000 0.995 -60.749 127.498 0.000 0.177
FH QL TH 3 1.000 0.005 0.994 -60.886 127.771 0.273 0.154
SS AT TH 2 0.064 0.077 0.000 -133.507 271.015 143.517 0.000
SS AT ID 2 0.072 0.006 0.000 -121.284 246.567 119.069 0.000
LO AT PT 2 0.075 0.013 0.000 -123.839 251.678 124.180 0.000
LO AT TH 2 0.064 0.077 0.000 -133.507 271.015 143.517 0.000
LO QL PT 3 1.000 0.000 0.994 -60.790 127.580 0.082 0.169
FH QL PT 3 1.000 0.000 0.994 -60.790 127.580 0.082 0.169
LO QL ID 3 1.000 0.000 0.995 -60.749 127.498 0.000 0.177
FH AT PT 2 0.075 0.013 0.000 -123.839 251.678 124.180 0.000
FH AT ID 2 0.072 0.006 0.000 -121.284 246.567 119.069 0.000
FH AT TH 2 0.064 0.077 0.000 -133.507 271.015 143.517 0.000
LO QL TH 3 1.000 0.005 0.994 -60.886 127.771 0.273 0.154
SS AT PT 2 0.075 0.013 0.000 -123.839 251.678 124.180 0.000
LO AT ID 2 0.072 0.006 0.000 -121.284 246.567 119.069 0.000
Table A.24 Models summary: problem 2 - subject 11
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 1.000 0.002 0.537 -127.270 260.540 26.593 0.000
FH QL TH 3 1.000 0.004 1.000 -114.168 234.335 0.389 0.226
SS AT TH 2 0.935 0.066 0.000 -134.573 273.146 39.199 0.000
SS AT ID 2 0.554 0.002 0.000 -130.269 264.537 30.591 0.000
LO AT PT 2 0.574 0.006 0.000 -130.696 265.391 31.444 0.000
LO AT TH 2 0.935 0.066 0.000 -134.573 273.146 39.199 0.000
LO QL PT 3 1.000 0.000 0.999 -113.973 233.947 0.000 0.274
FH QL PT 3 1.000 0.000 0.999 -113.973 233.947 0.000 0.274
LO QL ID 3 1.000 0.002 0.537 -127.270 260.540 26.593 0.000
FH AT PT 2 0.574 0.006 0.000 -130.696 265.391 31.444 0.000
FH AT ID 2 0.554 0.002 0.000 -130.269 264.537 30.591 0.000
FH AT TH 2 0.935 0.066 0.000 -134.573 273.146 39.199 0.000
LO QL TH 3 1.000 0.004 1.000 -114.168 234.335 0.389 0.226
SS AT PT 2 0.574 0.006 0.000 -130.696 265.391 31.444 0.000
LO AT ID 2 0.554 0.002 0.000 -130.269 264.537 30.591 0.000
Table A.25 Models summary: problem 2 - subject 12
207
Fig. A.2 Comparison of AIC scores of the 15 models fitted to the subjects in condition 2.
Charts and legend as in Fig. A.1.
208
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.022 0.004 0.000 -80.679 167.358 2.000 0.035
FH QL TH 3 0.022 0.125 0.000 -80.874 167.748 2.389 0.029
SS AT TH 2 0.022 0.125 0.000 -80.874 165.748 0.389 0.079
SS AT ID 2 0.022 0.004 0.000 -80.679 165.358 0.000 0.096
LO AT PT 2 0.022 0.010 0.000 -80.716 165.432 0.074 0.093
LO AT TH 2 0.022 0.125 0.000 -80.874 165.748 0.389 0.079
LO QL PT 3 0.022 0.010 0.000 -80.716 167.432 2.074 0.034
FH QL PT 3 0.022 0.010 0.000 -80.716 167.432 2.074 0.034
LO QL ID 3 0.022 0.004 0.000 -80.679 167.358 2.000 0.035
FH AT PT 2 0.022 0.010 0.000 -80.716 165.432 0.074 0.093
FH AT ID 2 0.022 0.004 0.000 -80.679 165.358 0.000 0.096
FH AT TH 2 0.022 0.125 0.000 -80.874 165.748 0.389 0.079
LO QL TH 3 0.022 0.125 0.000 -80.874 167.748 2.389 0.029
SS AT PT 2 0.022 0.010 0.000 -80.716 165.432 0.074 0.093
LO AT ID 2 0.022 0.004 0.000 -80.679 165.358 0.000 0.096
Table A.26 Models summary: problem 3 - subject 1
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.275 0.000 0.980 -79.116 164.233 0.000 0.185
FH QL TH 3 0.276 0.011 0.982 -79.418 164.837 0.604 0.137
SS AT TH 2 0.004 0.264 0.000 -98.975 201.949 37.717 0.000
SS AT ID 2 0.981 0.020 0.000 -84.201 172.401 8.168 0.003
LO AT PT 2 0.989 0.049 0.000 -87.473 178.946 14.713 0.000
LO AT TH 2 0.004 0.264 0.000 -98.975 201.949 37.717 0.000
LO QL PT 3 0.275 0.001 0.980 -79.177 164.354 0.121 0.174
FH QL PT 3 0.275 0.001 0.980 -79.177 164.354 0.121 0.174
LO QL ID 3 0.275 0.000 0.980 -79.116 164.233 0.000 0.185
FH AT PT 2 0.989 0.049 0.000 -87.473 178.946 14.713 0.000
FH AT ID 2 0.981 0.020 0.000 -84.201 172.401 8.168 0.003
FH AT TH 2 0.004 0.264 0.000 -98.975 201.949 37.717 0.000
LO QL TH 3 0.276 0.011 0.982 -79.418 164.837 0.604 0.137
SS AT PT 2 0.989 0.049 0.000 -87.473 178.946 14.713 0.000
LO AT ID 2 0.981 0.020 0.000 -84.201 172.401 8.168 0.003
Table A.27 Models summary: problem 3 - subject 2
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Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.131 0.001 0.788 -87.289 180.579 13.561 0.001
FH QL TH 3 0.631 0.005 1.000 -80.509 167.018 0.000 0.499
SS AT TH 2 0.029 0.122 0.000 -93.694 191.387 24.369 0.000
SS AT ID 2 0.033 0.004 0.000 -92.111 188.223 21.205 0.000
LO AT PT 2 0.032 0.010 0.000 -92.436 188.872 21.854 0.000
LO AT TH 2 0.029 0.122 0.000 -93.694 191.387 24.369 0.000
LO QL PT 3 0.130 0.003 0.795 -87.460 180.919 13.901 0.000
FH QL PT 3 0.130 0.003 0.795 -87.460 180.919 13.901 0.000
LO QL ID 3 0.131 0.001 0.788 -87.289 180.579 13.561 0.001
FH AT PT 2 0.032 0.010 0.000 -92.436 188.872 21.854 0.000
FH AT ID 2 0.033 0.004 0.000 -92.111 188.223 21.205 0.000
FH AT TH 2 0.029 0.122 0.000 -93.694 191.387 24.369 0.000
LO QL TH 3 0.631 0.005 1.000 -80.509 167.018 0.000 0.499
SS AT PT 2 0.032 0.010 0.000 -92.436 188.872 21.854 0.000
LO AT ID 2 0.033 0.004 0.000 -92.111 188.223 21.205 0.000
Table A.28 Models summary: problem 3 - subject 3
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.730 0.000 1.000 -92.384 190.769 0.000 0.174
FH QL TH 3 0.737 0.006 1.000 -92.489 190.978 0.209 0.156
SS AT TH 2 0.001 1.000 0.000 -114.626 233.252 42.484 0.000
SS AT ID 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -111.480 226.960 36.191 0.000
LO AT PT 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -112.002 228.004 37.235 0.000
LO AT TH 2 0.001 1.000 0.000 -114.626 233.252 42.484 0.000
LO QL PT 3 0.731 0.000 1.000 -92.405 190.810 0.041 0.170
FH QL PT 3 0.731 0.000 1.000 -92.405 190.810 0.041 0.170
LO QL ID 3 0.730 0.000 1.000 -92.384 190.769 0.000 0.174
FH AT PT 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -112.002 228.004 37.235 0.000
FH AT ID 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -111.480 226.960 36.191 0.000
FH AT TH 2 0.001 1.000 0.000 -114.626 233.252 42.484 0.000
LO QL TH 3 0.737 0.006 1.000 -92.489 190.978 0.209 0.156
SS AT PT 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -112.002 228.004 37.235 0.000
LO AT ID 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -111.480 226.960 36.191 0.000
Table A.29 Models summary: problem 3 - subject 4
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Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.102 0.003 0.462 -21.770 49.541 1.890 0.037
FH QL TH 3 0.127 0.072 0.584 -21.913 49.827 2.176 0.032
SS AT TH 2 0.055 0.163 0.000 -22.005 48.010 0.359 0.079
SS AT ID 2 0.056 0.005 0.000 -21.825 47.651 0.000 0.094
LO AT PT 2 0.056 0.013 0.000 -21.861 47.721 0.071 0.091
LO AT TH 2 0.055 0.163 0.000 -22.005 48.010 0.359 0.079
LO QL PT 3 0.114 0.006 0.522 -21.797 49.594 1.944 0.036
FH QL PT 3 0.114 0.006 0.522 -21.797 49.594 1.944 0.036
LO QL ID 3 0.102 0.003 0.462 -21.770 49.541 1.890 0.037
FH AT PT 2 0.056 0.013 0.000 -21.861 47.721 0.071 0.091
FH AT ID 2 0.056 0.005 0.000 -21.825 47.651 0.000 0.094
FH AT TH 2 0.055 0.163 0.000 -22.005 48.010 0.359 0.079
LO QL TH 3 0.127 0.072 0.584 -21.913 49.827 2.176 0.032
SS AT PT 2 0.056 0.013 0.000 -21.861 47.721 0.071 0.091
LO AT ID 2 0.056 0.005 0.000 -21.825 47.651 0.000 0.094
Table A.30 Models summary: problem 3 - subject 5
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.376 0.000 1.000 -46.050 98.099 0.000 0.130
FH QL TH 3 0.404 0.013 1.000 -46.131 98.262 0.162 0.120
SS AT TH 2 0.004 1.000 0.000 -49.277 102.554 4.454 0.014
SS AT ID 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -48.336 100.672 2.573 0.036
LO AT PT 2 0.000 1.000 0.000 -48.440 100.880 2.780 0.032
LO AT TH 2 0.004 1.000 0.000 -49.277 102.554 4.454 0.014
LO QL PT 3 0.376 0.001 1.000 -46.067 98.134 0.035 0.127
FH QL PT 3 0.376 0.001 1.000 -46.067 98.134 0.035 0.127
LO QL ID 3 0.376 0.000 1.000 -46.050 98.099 0.000 0.130
FH AT PT 2 0.000 1.000 0.000 -48.440 100.880 2.780 0.032
FH AT ID 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -48.336 100.672 2.573 0.036
FH AT TH 2 0.004 1.000 0.000 -49.277 102.554 4.454 0.014
LO QL TH 3 0.404 0.013 1.000 -46.131 98.262 0.162 0.120
SS AT PT 2 0.000 1.000 0.000 -48.440 100.880 2.780 0.032
LO AT ID 2 0.000 0.700 0.000 -48.336 100.672 2.573 0.036
Table A.31 Models summary: problem 3 - subject 6
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Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.020 0.004 0.000 -82.101 170.203 2.000 0.034
FH QL TH 3 0.020 0.112 0.000 -82.230 170.460 2.257 0.030
SS AT TH 2 0.020 0.112 0.000 -82.230 168.460 0.257 0.082
SS AT ID 2 0.020 0.004 0.000 -82.101 168.203 0.000 0.094
LO AT PT 2 0.020 0.009 0.000 -82.126 168.253 0.050 0.091
LO AT TH 2 0.020 0.112 0.000 -82.230 168.460 0.257 0.082
LO QL PT 3 0.020 0.009 0.000 -82.126 170.253 2.050 0.034
FH QL PT 3 0.020 0.009 0.000 -82.126 170.253 2.050 0.034
LO QL ID 3 0.020 0.004 0.000 -82.101 170.203 2.000 0.034
FH AT PT 2 0.020 0.009 0.000 -82.126 168.253 0.050 0.091
FH AT ID 2 0.020 0.004 0.000 -82.101 168.203 0.000 0.094
FH AT TH 2 0.020 0.112 0.000 -82.230 168.460 0.257 0.082
LO QL TH 3 0.020 0.112 0.000 -82.230 170.460 2.257 0.030
SS AT PT 2 0.020 0.009 0.000 -82.126 168.253 0.050 0.091
LO AT ID 2 0.020 0.004 0.000 -82.101 168.203 0.000 0.094
Table A.32 Models summary: problem 3 - subject 7
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.032 0.004 0.000 -36.863 79.726 2.000 0.033
FH QL TH 3 0.032 0.123 0.000 -36.902 79.803 2.078 0.032
SS AT TH 2 0.032 0.123 0.000 -36.902 77.803 0.078 0.087
SS AT ID 2 0.032 0.004 0.000 -36.863 77.726 0.000 0.091
LO AT PT 2 0.032 0.010 0.000 -36.871 77.741 0.015 0.090
LO AT TH 2 0.032 0.123 0.000 -36.902 77.803 0.078 0.087
LO QL PT 3 0.032 0.010 0.000 -36.871 79.741 2.015 0.033
FH QL PT 3 0.032 0.010 0.000 -36.871 79.741 2.015 0.033
LO QL ID 3 0.032 0.004 0.000 -36.863 79.726 2.000 0.033
FH AT PT 2 0.032 0.010 0.000 -36.871 77.741 0.015 0.090
FH AT ID 2 0.032 0.004 0.000 -36.863 77.726 0.000 0.091
FH AT TH 2 0.032 0.123 0.000 -36.902 77.803 0.078 0.087
LO QL TH 3 0.032 0.123 0.000 -36.902 79.803 2.078 0.032
SS AT PT 2 0.032 0.010 0.000 -36.871 77.741 0.015 0.090
LO AT ID 2 0.032 0.004 0.000 -36.863 77.726 0.000 0.091
Table A.33 Models summary: problem 3 - subject 8
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Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.018 0.006 0.000 -39.635 85.269 2.000 0.034
FH QL TH 3 0.019 0.176 0.000 -39.688 85.376 2.107 0.032
SS AT TH 2 0.019 0.176 0.000 -39.688 83.376 0.107 0.086
SS AT ID 2 0.018 0.006 0.000 -39.635 83.269 0.000 0.091
LO AT PT 2 0.018 0.014 0.000 -39.645 83.290 0.021 0.090
LO AT TH 2 0.019 0.176 0.000 -39.688 83.376 0.107 0.086
LO QL PT 3 0.018 0.014 0.000 -39.645 85.290 2.021 0.033
FH QL PT 3 0.018 0.014 0.000 -39.645 85.290 2.021 0.033
LO QL ID 3 0.018 0.006 0.000 -39.635 85.269 2.000 0.034
FH AT PT 2 0.018 0.014 0.000 -39.645 83.290 0.021 0.090
FH AT ID 2 0.018 0.006 0.000 -39.635 83.269 0.000 0.091
FH AT TH 2 0.019 0.176 0.000 -39.688 83.376 0.107 0.086
LO QL TH 3 0.019 0.176 0.000 -39.688 85.376 2.107 0.032
SS AT PT 2 0.018 0.014 0.000 -39.645 83.290 0.021 0.090
LO AT ID 2 0.018 0.006 0.000 -39.635 83.269 0.000 0.091
Table A.34 Models summary: problem 3 - subject 9
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.030 0.004 0.000 -88.942 183.884 2.000 0.036
FH QL TH 3 0.029 0.133 0.000 -89.217 184.434 2.550 0.028
SS AT TH 2 0.029 0.133 0.000 -89.217 182.434 0.550 0.075
SS AT ID 2 0.030 0.004 0.000 -88.942 181.884 0.000 0.099
LO AT PT 2 0.030 0.010 0.000 -88.993 181.986 0.101 0.094
LO AT TH 2 0.029 0.133 0.000 -89.217 182.434 0.550 0.075
LO QL PT 3 0.030 0.010 0.000 -88.993 183.986 2.101 0.035
FH QL PT 3 0.030 0.010 0.000 -88.993 183.986 2.101 0.035
LO QL ID 3 0.030 0.004 0.000 -88.942 183.884 2.000 0.036
FH AT PT 2 0.030 0.010 0.000 -88.993 181.986 0.101 0.094
FH AT ID 2 0.030 0.004 0.000 -88.942 181.884 0.000 0.099
FH AT TH 2 0.029 0.133 0.000 -89.217 182.434 0.550 0.075
LO QL TH 3 0.029 0.133 0.000 -89.217 184.434 2.550 0.028
SS AT PT 2 0.030 0.010 0.000 -88.993 181.986 0.101 0.094
LO AT ID 2 0.030 0.004 0.000 -88.942 181.884 0.000 0.099
Table A.35 Models summary: problem 3 - subject 10
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Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.061 0.003 0.522 -59.640 125.279 1.688 0.045
FH QL TH 3 0.075 0.075 0.627 -60.049 126.098 2.507 0.030
SS AT TH 2 0.029 0.178 0.000 -60.397 124.794 1.203 0.057
SS AT ID 2 0.030 0.006 0.000 -59.795 123.591 0.000 0.105
LO AT PT 2 0.030 0.014 0.000 -59.908 123.817 0.226 0.094
LO AT TH 2 0.029 0.178 0.000 -60.397 124.794 1.203 0.057
LO QL PT 3 0.064 0.007 0.550 -59.720 125.441 1.850 0.042
FH QL PT 3 0.064 0.007 0.550 -59.720 125.441 1.850 0.042
LO QL ID 3 0.061 0.003 0.522 -59.640 125.279 1.688 0.045
FH AT PT 2 0.030 0.014 0.000 -59.908 123.817 0.226 0.094
FH AT ID 2 0.030 0.006 0.000 -59.795 123.591 0.000 0.105
FH AT TH 2 0.029 0.178 0.000 -60.397 124.794 1.203 0.057
LO QL TH 3 0.075 0.075 0.627 -60.049 126.098 2.507 0.030
SS AT PT 2 0.030 0.014 0.000 -59.908 123.817 0.226 0.094
LO AT ID 2 0.030 0.006 0.000 -59.795 123.591 0.000 0.105
Table A.36 Models summary: problem 3 - subject 11
Config d.o.f.i αi βi γi log(Li) AICi ∆i(AIC) wi(AIC)
FH QL ID 3 0.047 0.003 0.000 -63.226 132.452 2.000 0.036
FH QL TH 3 0.045 0.106 0.000 -63.469 132.938 2.486 0.028
SS AT TH 2 0.045 0.106 0.000 -63.469 130.938 0.486 0.077
SS AT ID 2 0.047 0.003 0.000 -63.226 130.452 0.000 0.098
LO AT PT 2 0.047 0.008 0.000 -63.274 130.549 0.096 0.093
LO AT TH 2 0.045 0.106 0.000 -63.469 130.938 0.486 0.077
LO QL PT 3 0.047 0.008 0.000 -63.274 132.549 2.096 0.034
FH QL PT 3 0.047 0.008 0.000 -63.274 132.549 2.096 0.034
LO QL ID 3 0.047 0.003 0.000 -63.226 132.452 2.000 0.036
FH AT PT 2 0.047 0.008 0.000 -63.274 130.549 0.096 0.093
FH AT ID 2 0.047 0.003 0.000 -63.226 130.452 0.000 0.098
FH AT TH 2 0.045 0.106 0.000 -63.469 130.938 0.486 0.077
LO QL TH 3 0.045 0.106 0.000 -63.469 132.938 2.486 0.028
SS AT PT 2 0.047 0.008 0.000 -63.274 130.549 0.096 0.093
LO AT ID 2 0.047 0.003 0.000 -63.226 130.452 0.000 0.098
Table A.37 Models summary: problem 3 - subject 12
214
Fig. A.3 Comparison of AIC scores of the 15 models fitted to the subjects in condition 3.
Charts and legend as in Fig. A.1.
